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"I know in tin* of peace that Foblie delations in
the concept of the leaders of the £avy occupies a very
subordinate piace. That's vary unfortunate because they
have to change their thinking entirely when they ?et into




Shortly after graduating from the U.S. Kaval
Officer Candidate School in 1954, X became acquainted with
the rollicking and satirical honor of William Stinkley's
neffr/ft r^ ftoar frft^ ***** (titv York, 1956) , a best-selling
novel about Havy public relations activities in the Pacific
toward the close of World Mar XX.
Brinkley served as a young Bevy public relations
officer on Guam in 194$. His hilarious descriptions of
"paper-clip-throwing" and "boose~drinking * navy officers
assignee to coticle correspondents and manicure the navy's
image at war's end are not particularly flattering. Yet*
aa one reads his work, the clear impression comes across
that by the tine the battleship Mleeaari sailed into Tokyo
Say, the wavy had a rather sophisticated and dynamic public
relations program in action.
This was not the case at the beginning of the war,
as indicated in the following passage from the bookt
Before Pearl Harbor, reporters seldom came around
the navy, and those who did were treated aa identified
enemy agents dedicated to filching its innermost
secrets, fiven for s considerable time after Pearl
Harbor mn admiral might «o along for months having to
do nothing but fi^ht the war and never encounter a
reporter. But by the beginning of 1945 the *avy*s





abruptly falling in love with the power of the press,
had opened the floodgates ana reporter* vera descending
lika schools of happy barnacles on the Pacific
flirt, (». 44)
As an aspiring young public information officar
myself (the duty title was chamg&d in June 1945) , I was
moat curious in 1954 as to what caused the almost 180-dearee
turn the Kavy public relations ship took during world
War XX. Who gave the orders to the helmsman? What kind of
fuel in the form of techniques and methods was used? Sow
far and where did it go eft* it completing the turnabout?
As a full-fledged Kavy public affairs officer
(another title change in 1964) pursuing graduate study at
the University of Wisconsin in I960* X had the opportunity
to satisfy my curiosity* Encouraged by Profeasor Scott M.
Cutlip, a foremost authority on public relations history,
and urged on by a Kavy public affairs col league,
Lieutenant Commander ton Scoval, who broke sail before me
with a study of Kavy public relations prior to World War XX,
X ventured forth into the shoal waters of what seemed to be
myriad boxes of files stuck away in musty corners of
federal repositories in the Washington, D.C., area. The
task was formidable; for many of these dusty boxes had
never been opened before, and meaningful indexing was
almost nonexistent. At times, X had apprehensions over the
efficacy of attempting a study of such wide scope in a
Master's thesis. Hut the archivists were so helpful and
*t&S tt*«
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the topic so interestiny that I plowed forward with only
passing trepidation. The experiaace has been personally
vary rewarding.
without the aid of certain archivists* librarians
and racord~fteepers* the research phsse of the thasis would
hava been untenable. I particularly wish to thank the
following individuals for thair invaluable assistance in
identifying and locating pertinent Mavy records
t
Dr. Dean C. Allard* head of the Operational Archives
Branch, naval History Division of the Office of the Chief
of ftaval Operations* and his able staff—Mr. Barnard
Cavalcante* UTS. Mildred Mayaux* Mrs. Mae Beaton and Mrs.
Barbara Gilmore* Mr. P. $. Meigs and Mr. W. B. Greenwood of
the Mavy Department Library j Mr. Clayton Janes* Chief of
Section One of the Reference Service Branch* Washington
National Records Center* Suitland* Md.? Mr* Marry Schwartz,
staff member of the national Archives; and Mrs. Milmar Day*
rile Supervisor for the Mavy Department Office of Informer'
tion. A special vote of thanks ia due Mrs. Mildred saruch.
Chief of the Records and Reference Unit* Office of the
Secretary of the Mavy* for her help in gaining permission
for one to screen the restricted set of personal papers of
James Forraatal on deposit at the national Archives.
To Rear Admiral £. m. Slier* UStfZ (Retired)* former
director of the Office of Vaval History* and his information




expresa say appreciation tor initial advice and counsel on
the direction the study »houl<S take. In this regard also.
Dr. Harold Stolson of the University of Wisconsin rendered
valuable aid* especially in tha areaa of proper emphasis
and possible limitations In scope,
I am deeply grateful to many participanta in the
World war XX Navy public relatione atory Who shared their
experiencea with tm in personal and telephone interviews*
X owe a particular debt of gratitude to n**s Admiral
Harold B* (Win) Miller, public relations officer for
Admiral Cheater w* tfimits and navy Director of Information
at the close of the war* Admiral Miller not only gave
freely of his time in several interviews* hut also gener-
ously made available certain personal files which added a
unique and vital perepeetive to the thesis* Others who
provided firsthand information were Miss Helena Phi liberty
Mr. Daniel ». Kimball, Mrs* H. R« Thurber, Lieutenant
Commander Gilbert Shaw. 3006, and the following retired
Bevy offreera i Vice Admiral W. a. Beeeher, Jr., ftear Admiral
Robert W. Berry, Captain* Jay B* Smith and Harold B« Say,
^wesms ^e^(PMS»o^SMe4^ia^B7 s> ars^Hb jjfcw" s^ameiieaieem^awp'sa)
My aineereat appreciation ia extended to Captain
Kenneth ** Wade, US* (Retired), and Commander J. W. Stier-
mam, Jr., USB, for their understanding and encouragement
during a very critical stage of the effort*
To Professor Cut lip, who as »y thesis advisor

ateered and guided am throughout with patience and wisdom*
and to the other members of at? thesis committee* Professor*
Douglas Jones and William alanfeenbur^. I am especially
indebted for advice, counsel and assistance.
A special salute is given to interim typists &haren
Falmer, Suaan ffhumway, and Evelyn and Katby Groenke, and to
Mrs* Lloyd Renneberg for her capable preparation of the
final manuscript*
% lasting gratitude is ejtpreaaed to the V*8. navy
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When asked early in World War XX to state a public
relations policy for the Kavy. Admiral Ernest %T. King
succinctly replied s *Pon*t tell them anything. When it*s
over, tell the® who won.**
Xt was a "tongue-in-cheek" resark by the Havy'a
crusty military chief* yet not as facetious as it sounded.
Xt was indicative of Ernie King's true feelings on how the
war should be fought—and won. in a climate of strictest
security*
The »avy took a fearful beating at Pearl Harbor.
Yet. the fleet remained the nation's first line of defense
in the immediate months following the attack, desperately
waging delaying actions in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
Xt was not surprising that security became such a trenchant
watchword for Admiral King. He was opposed to the publica-
tion of any data which teight tip off the ene»y as to the
strength and disposition of his thin line of sea forces.
The admiral's reaction was not due entirely to the
contingency situation* however. Xn many respects, it was a
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ain navy thinking, which had its roots in the tactical
necessity for secrecy en the high seas. Probably to a
greater decree than in any other form of military activity*
success in naval warfare depends on the element of
surprise. £n the vastness of the oceans* where a 7Q~ahip
task force can operate in an ^xmm the sise of a pinpoint on
a global map, stealth in maneuvering is a vital ingredient
for winning battles. Years of indoctrination in this
intrinsically valuable operational tactic have contributed
to a tendency on the part of many naval officers to make
security the primary consideration in other areas of
activity as well* such as the release of information.
Historically* wars always have been troublesome for
the nation's information policy-makers. The age-old
conflict between the people's right to know and the neces-
sity for military security inevitably complicates any plan
for an orderly and free flow of wartisne information. Yet*
paradoxically, the vital imed to K®#$> the public informed
in war has been responsible for an increased sophistication
in government information programs.
Such was the case in the U.S. *iavy during World
War XI. Adsairal Kind's initial security-oriented approach
to the release of information eventually gave way to an
elaborate public relations aechaaiaaa which actively and
aggressively publicised the navy's war role, particularly








3What were the forces behind this evolutionary
process? First and foremost* it would seem that a funda-
mental change in attitude in the sea service toward the
public relatione function was essential*
Traditionally * the Havy has been known as the
2
"silent service* Its ships and men ply the seven mmmm
thousands of miles from shore* in splendid isolation from
the prying eyes of civilisation* In such an environment*
mm remote as the nether world of tteptuns* the qualities of
strong dedication to duty* independence of thought and
fierce pride in one's accomplishments naturally evolve* To
brag about his deeds* however* is somehow beneath the
dignity and decorum of the true navy man* The record
should "speak for itself 1* without the benefit of promotion*
The silent service tradition also is anchored in
the old days of sail, when lack of communications caused
lengthy delays in the transmission of news from abroad and
at sea*
Even when speedier communications emerged at the
turn of the century* the custom of silence continued for
another reason— fear of reprisal from higher authority*
*f«w naval officera had any desire to stick their foot in
their mouth* Quotations which reached the press often
resulted in demands for explanations* A head stuck above
.r*\i.
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water was a target for a ready oar."
As late as 192S. Hear Admiral William A. woffett,
chief spokesman for the newly emerging naval air force* waa
criticised severely by the Navy Department for trying to
counteract in the press the onslaught against naval avia-
tion by General silly Mitchell* "As you know* to the
4
average naval officer the word 'publicity* ia anathema*
"
Moffett wrote concerning the censure. "X waa brought up to
hate it myself* and atill hate it. N
the silent service label is somewhat overdrawn*
though* So government agency* and especially no military
service* can operate in a vacuum. It is dependent upon the
support of the public and it a elected leaders for its
sustenance. The Navy has acquiesced to this political
reality since its inception and at times has proven itself
quite adept at bringing to the attention of the public and
Congress the necessity for seapower and the consequent need
for ships and men to project it. It has* however* shunned
such politicking except when it considered it to be
5
absolutely essential. Zn the same spirit* it has avoided
formal public relations endeavors as being somehow a
psychological violation of the ailent service tradition.
Wavy ?ubUc, RfilfttionAJ^xi^r^ to World War XI
There have been notable exceptions in Havy history







5many of these have occurred in tinea of war.
Daring the Civil war. Secretary of the bevy Gideon
Well**, a former newspaper editor, distributed communiques
to reporters in Washington! sad Admiral Parragut embarked
a correspondent in his flagship to report eyewitness
accounts of the capture of Hew Orleans.
In the *panieh~American war, correspondents freely
embarked in Kavy ships off Cuba, mad a fleet of press
dispatch boats darted back and forth from Key West to file
stories. In Manila Bay, there were reporters on hand with
Admiral Dewey to record his famous order to the captain of
the Olympiat "You may fire when ready, Grid ley:"
Admiral Mahan's books and articles on seapower at
the turn of the century, although not written for public
relatione purposes in the strict amnmm of the term, did
much to enlighten the American people on naval policy and
its international implications.
In the early 1900s, spurred on by President
Theodore Roosevelt's shipbuilding program, the Navy insti-
tuted a publicity campaign to aid recruiting. It also
supported the formation of the Kavy League, a civilian
organisation dedicated to educating the public on the tm*^
for a strong eea service. During this period, too,
President Roosevelt utilised Savy ships for international
port visits and naval reviews. This policy of "showing the





aflag 1* culminated in the 'round the world cruise of the
Great White Fleet in 1908. 6
Still* before World War X, the Navy had very little
in the way of an organized public relation* function. In
1912, an officer of its General Board suggested that a
apecial office he set up in the Havy Department for public
infonsation. He was given a polite reply, but no action
was taken on his proposal.
With the outbreak of war in Europe and the
resultant submarine menace in the Atlantic, public interest
In naval affairs suddenly increased. Secretary of the Ravy
Josaphus Daniels, a newspaper publisher, started holding!
daily press conferences in his office. Soon after the
United States declared war on Germany, Daniels established
a navy 23ewa Bureau and staffed it with civilian experts who
reported directly to him. The bureau's main duties were to
service the Washington press and cooperate with the
Committee on Public Information, earlier appointed by
President Wilson and headed by journalist George Creel.
Following World War X, the Mavy relapsed somewhat,
but not completely, into its silent service tradition, the
Mews Bureau continued to function on a much reduced scale
until it was replaced in 1922 by an information section in
the Office of naval Intelligence (QUI) . This small office







civilian assistant. The Information Section continued
with the sane meager staff and very limited funds until
shortly before World war II. In 1939. it was renamed the
Public Relations Branch of ONI. At tn«* same time, subsidi-
ary offices to handle public relations were activated in
all naval districts. This action indicated a growing
awareness by the «avy that an expended information function
was necessary in light of the increasing international
tensions.
M« and Scops of Study
The Kavy was not alone among the military services
in being slow to recognise the importance of public
relations. Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Canter contend
that while "today's top military men provide a leadership
responsive to public opinion ... this trend represents a
sharp break from the insulation which largely prevailed
until World War XI. wS
It waa almost a foregone conclusion that the public
relations function in the nation's armed forces would be
upgraded during the war. There were drastic changes in
practically all aspects of the military system. Rapid
weapons modernisation, the emergence of air power as a
decisive military strategy, and monumental logistics prob-
lems involving global aupply lines were just a few of the








8concepts* including those of public relations.
The greet influx of reservists end other civilians
to active; duty had a momentous impact on the process. The
magnitude of the influence of these "uniformed civilians"
can be imagined when one considers that the Bevy alone grew
from an average personnel strength before the war of
203*000 officers and men to a peak of 3*408*000 during the
a
war. This tremendous manpower increase created a host of
recruit inc problems with attendant public relations
implications. Additionally* more than in any past war* an
outlet had to be provided for the human desire to seek
recognition for battle exploits*
There also was a massive personal involvement in
the conflict by the American people who remained on the
home front* resulting in heightened demands for war news by
the press and the public. This appetite for information
had to be satisfied* since the armed forces were absolutely
dependent on industrial and other domestic support.
The effects of public opinion* the needs and views
of the nsws media* and related pressures from higher levels
of government all were instrumental in helping to shape the
nation's wartime information policies. Major technological
advances in communications since the last war, giving the
news media expanded opportunities and techniques for
reporting, compounded the process. In addition, political
and social changes between thn two wars made World War II a
.M
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Such forces* necessitating as they did a restruc-
turing of public relations practices and procedures* ware
bound to have an effect on military attitudes toward the
function as well. 1*w© central questions may be posed*
hmmvmSt concerning any such attitudinal change in the Navy.
Was there truly an altering of opinion toward public
relations in the Navy's professional officer corps? And*
if so* was it genuine and abiding* or aaerely a temporary
accc»s»odation with th* dynamics of war?
A full invest itjation of these questions was beyond
the scope of this study* ainca it would involve research
into postwar navy attitudes* However* there is sons
evidence from the wartime experience to indicate that the
Savy's military leadership "went along with the World
fear 21 public relations tide*" so to speak* only because
of compelling circumstances which left it with little other
choice. Vincent £avis states that while many changes did
occur in the flavy during the war* "a number of the basic
attitudes and perspectives that were formed within the
Kavy*s officer corps during the half century before the
attack on #aarl Harbor weru only partially modified by the
waxtiioe experience.
*
The pri*aary objective of this thesis haa been to












relation* policies and practice* during world Wmc XX? and,
in so doing* to investigate any causal relationships
between these changes and basic Navy attitudes toward the
public relations function*
Xt is hoped that this study also nay provide sons
insight into the proper role of public affairs in the Ravy
and the other U.S. military services today. While such an
evaluation has not been attempted here* it is suggested that
any account of one service's experience with the necessity
and desirability of a viable program to inform and influ-
ence the public in an all-out war might serve as a useful
laboratory setting for future analyses of government
information programs* Such examinations are especially
pertinent today in the wake of widespread criticism of
U.S. Government* and particularly U.S. military* handling
of public affairs in connection with the war in Southeast
Asia. 12
Xn concentrating on the evolutionary aspects of
Havy public relations in world war XX* the following
hypothesis was explored t Although the Msvy„ began the wax
with tha organisation and directive, .to conduct , an adaquatfl
information program,* ita efforta .wars mainly .ruaponaivfi
ratbag
, .than crttfttive .until glxcanatancaa dictated a mora
enlightened public, relations stance in tha 1 attar atagna of
the confXict
»
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the Savy initially eaaphasised the infoxmaUQn aspects of
its program over the broader range of public relations
activities designed to mold favorable public opinion* Kot
until it conceived that its very existence was threatens*
by plans to merge the armod forces after the war did the
sea service engage in specific "linage"building* techniques.
The roles played by certain individuals in the
World War XI Bavy public relations story were extremely
important. In particular, the personal information
philosophies of Admiral King and the two wartime Navy
secretaries* Frank Knox and James Forrestal* had a major
impact on the direction and scope of the Mavy's information
efforts* To a lesser degree* the personalities and skills
of those performing the function, especially the civilians
recruited frees the mass media and associated fields* also
had a definite bearing on the operation.
In this regard* a secondary objective* but one
integrally related to the primary goal* has been to trace
the development of the central, field •r^ fleet organisa-
tions established to implement the Mavy's wartime public
relations policies* Special attention has been given the
Navy'* Office of Public Relations in Washington* 1>.C.
,
since this centralised unit figured prominently in formu-
lating many information policies as well as setting up
procedures for their application.
Several questions arose during the examination of
•JC | | fl - i
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these organisations* What isethods and techniques did they
employ? Which media of communications war® used? What waa
the nature of their relationships with representatives of
the news media and various public organisations? Bow
important were their interfaces with other government
information agencies, such as the Office of Censorship *n&
the Office of war information? To what extent did they
coordinate their activities with the public relations
offices of the other military services?
This last inquiry broached the subject ot inter*
service rivalry and its impression on the information func-
tion in ail the anaed forces during the war* Conflicting
ideas among the services on how the war should be waged
naturally had significant public relations overtones* This
is an area deserving more extensive observation. It has
been dealt with here only to the extant in which certain
incidents reflecting inters® rv ice rivalry induced specific
Kavy public relations responses* ©ver-all, ^mpizm
occasional disagreements between the Army and Savy in such
matters ma accreditation of correspondents, the services
cooperated with each oth#r quite well in the public rela-
tions arena*
In the final analysis, events in any war have the
greatest iaapact cm policies and actions. During World
War II, there were definite cause and effect connectiona
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directives and procedures, particularly with regard to the
release of information. Therefore, it has been both
advantageous and necessary to treat the entire subject
within the context of the operational history of the
conflict*
Any evolutionary theme implies progress. Sue to
the infsasibility of conducting surveys, content analyses
or other scientific Measurements within the framework of an
already expanded study, no attempt has h^ttn made to
quantify results of the 8avy*s wartime information program
in terras of media exposure or public impact. The variety
and types of efforts to publicise the navy have been
emphasized over the amount of publicity uained or its
effectiveness. However, certain indicators of effectiveness
—such as media comment* public opinion polls arid internal
evaluations—have been included, permitting a limited gauge
to be made of the success of the navy's efforts.
* key definition in the thesis is that of "public
relations function. Cutlip and Center define the term as
"the planned effort to influence public opinion through
socially acceptable performance based upon two-way eoomuni-
13
cation. " With some qualifications, this is the basic
concept of the function used here. As already stated, the
major thrust of the Kavy*s program early in the war was
directed at informing the public rather than influencing
opinion. Also, there was not as much emphasis at that time
'.ro.c-r.Ko
14
on "two-way'* ooa&Eunication, although the need to a»aaur«
the public pulse was recognised at high levels in the Savy,
and a pr&ss and public opinion analysis section did exist
in the Office of Public relatione. The criterion of
"acceptable per formanee * was considered by those directing
the navy's prograa as being essential to an effective
effort. However* during World War II this criterion was
sos&etixaes taken for granted because public support of
military performance was usually enthusiastic* despite
press and other criticism of specific strategies and
tactics. There were instances, however, when performance
became a aatter of concern for public relations personnel.
The term "public relations * is used by the author
because chat was the title §iv*& to the function in the
Navy immediately prior to and throughout xaost of the war.
The naa» was officially changed to "public information " in
June 1945, and the function is currently referred to in the
navy as "public affairs. Although the distinction between
"public relations* as describing the over-all function and
"public information" as applying to the provision of data
to the news media and the public was apparent during the
war, the two terias often were used interchangeably*
The methodology employed in this study consisted
mainly of historical analysis of primary source docusne nts
relating to the subject. This original material was supple-
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individuals who v*ir* either directly associated with the
Navy's wartiiae information program or had ,uaowiu<Z^o of its
operation. Other than newspaper mxl aagasine articlas* a
few unpublished manuscripts and brief references in several
books, there is a dearth of secondary literature pertaining
to the topic. A more detailed discussion of reference
material is contained in the "Bote on Sources'* at the end
of the thesis.
A chronological narrative mode of presentation was
chosen for its sequential value in developing the evolution-*
ary theme. The period covered is from July 1940 to
September 1943 with some overlapping at both ends.
In the next chapter* we shall take a look at the
mobilization of the Kavy'e public relations program on a
wartime oasis. Chapter Three deals with the handicaps of
censorship and security under which the program operated
during the first year of the war and the subsequent criti-
cism leveled at the navy for withholding and managing the
news. The middle years of the war are covered in Chapter
four, with the emphasis on expansion and reorganisation of
the Havy*s information effort and the gradual improvement
in the war's outlook for the Allies. Chapter Five brings
our story to its successful conclusion* chronicling the
tremendous revitalisation of $avy public relations under








It Is tin* now to give the signal* "All engines
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Navy public relation* functioned in an austere
climate during the two decades following World War I.
Pacifism* isolation!ski and public apathy toward the military
were the prevailing moods of a nation preoccupied with
internal affairs*
Added to this restraint were severe economic
pressures. There simply was not enough money to operate
more than a token information program* "It was easier to
get the Chief of Naval Operations to talk to the px^ma than
it was to get requisite supplies with which to make copies
of his statements," claimed Miss Helens Philibert, a
civilian public relations assistant for the Navy from 1917
to 1947.
In 1937* a survey of information activities in
forty-three federal government offices revealed that the
Navy and War departments were among eighteen agencies
scoring below average in four measured categories of public
2
relations practice* In the Navy, emphasis was placed upon
response rather than creativity* The director of the










(OKI) wrote to a University of Wisconsin professor in 193&*
"This department conducts no publicity campaigns* being
concerned specifically with the dissemination of factual
information.
Actually* the navy did appreciably more than just
dispense information between the two world wars. The
flight of the 8C~4 in 1919 and other efforts in the 1920s
to promote naval aviation in the contest with Silly Mitchell
ware special projects initiated to cultivate public
support. Also* correspondents were ersfoarksd in fleet
exercises and on flying reviews; cooperation was extended
to feature motion picture and nuwarcel producers; and a
task force of setae thirty ships was sent to Mew York in
1939 for the World's Fair. Fox the moat part* however.
"propagandising" was left to the civilian arm of the Kavy,
4the Jtavy i& &$*£•




The austerity for the &avy's public relations
program ran parallel to hard times for the fciavy itself.
Some of the most valuable units of the fleet had been
scrapped following the Washington isaval Limitations Confer-
ence in 1922. Subsequently* the* sise of the Bavy was
reduced even below treaty strength.
In 1933, however* a gradual upswing in naval
fortunes began. President Franklin D. Roosevelt* 9n old
friend of the sea service* allotted $238 million of the
itttft* * oj fl^in UNO)
(•• «•• of* 1© 5n»jti1
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funds appropriated in the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933 for ship construction. In 1934. Congress author-
ised building the navy back up to treaty strength; and whan
Japan withdrew from the naval limitations agreements in
1936* all legal barriers to naval construction were
removed. In January 1938* the President proposed a $l
billion naval appropriations bill to Congress* The bombing
by the Japanese of the American gunboat £ejLi£ in December
1937 helped to ease the way for its passage.
However, the spirit of isolationism and public
apathy toward the military was still strong throughout the
country* even as late as September 1939 when war broke out
in Europe. It was not until the fall of France in June
1940 that the mood of the nation changed from complacency
to alarm. The President then initiated a positive program
to convince the public that continued isolation from the
rest of the world was a dangerous policy for the United
States.
On July 19, 1940* Congress enacted into law the
Two-Ocean Navy Act* authorising a 70 per cent increase Ln
ships and naval aircraft that would enable the fleet to
carry on simultaneous campaigns in the Atlantic and
Pacific. Zt was the largest naval building program ever
undertaken by any nation.
The parsimonious existence which the navy had led




austere climate in which iiavy public relations had bean
operating was tiue for a concomitant change.
IflriUlfc „ JfiftQX ,X9&iR& XkhUL HBmIB
FJ^jht days prior to the passage of the Two-Oeaan
iiavy Act* newspaper publisher frank Knox succeeded Charles
Edison as Secretary of the Havy. Mr. Knox was a prominent
Republican who toad been his party's vice-presidential
candidate in 1936. His appointment, and the concurrent
naming of fellow Republican Henry L. Stlirson as Secretary
of War, were political rooves on the part of FDR, who wanted
two members of the opposition party in his cabinet prior to
the forthcoming Presidential election.
Mr. Roosevelt had additional taotives for nominating
Knox. He saw in the forxner Rough Rider sad ardent admirer
of Theodore Roosevelt a potential secretary who would
support enthusiastically his non-isolationist foreign
policy. The President also respected Knox's public
speaking and public relations ability and planned to assign
his new cabinet assiber to sound out public opinion on
proposed Measures with trial-balloon speeches.
Mr. Knox, by virtue of personality mnd background,
was well-suited for dealings with ftftHflllMj the public and
the news ssedia. To a certain extent, this public relations
role turned out to be a primary one for him; since the
President, with his lifelong love of all things naval, had
!: - -
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been in the habit of personally contacting the admirals on
operational matt<&*». Mr. Hoosevelt continued this by
passing of the secretary throughout moat of the war*
dealing directly with Admiral King and Admiral William 0.
Leahy, who was appointee Chief of Staff to the President in
July 1942. 7
Whatever his disappointsrent, if any, over the
direct Presidential exercise of Siavy control, the new
secretary showed no reluctance in assuming the public
relations mandate. Be immediately began holding weekly
press confarencea in his office and, only twenty days after
taxing the helm, he sent a reminder to all bureaus and
offices of the navy Department to furnish pertinent data to
the Public Halations Branch of QM1 for dissemination to the
news media* Three weeks later, he issued a memorandum
allocating duties and responsibilities of the Havy's
civilian executives. "Public Relations*1 was <m» of 9m^n
m
specifically assigned to the secretary himself.
Knox's personal stewardship over Bevy public rela-
tions during his first year in office was enunciated clearly
in an addreas he made in the summer of 1941.
I consider it to be one of the saost important func-
tions X have—to have the Kavy adequately tend accurately
portrayed to the public. This »avy of ours belongs to
the public, and what it is doing for the de&nse of the
public, with a v®ry few reservations, should be made







The secretary took ft positive step toward ensuring
that the Navy's story would be made known to the public
shortly after he assumed office by directing a mobilisation
of the public relations organisation for contingency
operations. Before describing this aiobilization, it is
worthwhile zo note that on August 22, 1940, James Forreatal,
a highly successful investment banker and also a newspaper
-
man early in his career. became the first under Secretary
of the aavy, a new post created as part of the emergency
planning.
ttavy ftublic aalationa logins tQ HnfrUim
For several months, news media and public interest
in the &avy had been increasing as a result of the mounting
international tensions and consequent concern over
national defanse. As early as 1939, an annual report of
the Public Relations Branch stated that the number of press
inquiries had expanded considerably in the past year and
that 9Q0 news releases were made compared to 550 the year
before. The number of releases increased to 1,216 during
fiscal Year 1940, and in May of that year a request was
made for a "statistical research unit** to be added to the
Public Relations Branch to handle the ever-increasir
volume of press queries. A month earlier, another internal
memorandum cited the growing demand for wavy photographs as
the reason for needing additional photographers throughout
-.,-7
mi
M -. , , • .. M| ft| MMHpC" ;•'• MV H^NH '«*» ; vu • ^* t; -
25
the fleet.
The Office of Naval Intelligence gradually H«d been
expand inc; its small public relations staff in recognition
of the increased demande being placed upon it. The four
personnel Who had manned QUI* a Information Section since
1922 multiplied fern eiyht in the middle of 1939* and in July
121940 the number had risen to thirteen." More increases in
personnel were on the way.
The summer of 1940, in tact* covUu be termed the
"turning point"1 when Havy public relations changed direc-
tions from a peacetiRm to a wartime footing. The financial
blight that had plagued the function for so t&any years had
been eased by the passage of the First Supplemental appro-
priations ^ct on June 2d. On July la* Commander Baity K.
Thurber relieved Commander Laland k. Lovette as officer- in-
charge of the Public Relations Branch* with instructions to
"build the office up for an emergency. **
War plans for military public relations had been
drafted as far back aa 1924. These early plans* with
certain revisions, ware approved by the Army-Kavy Joint
Board in 1939 and signed for the navy by Secretary Edison.
They languished in the Executive Branch and were never
approved by the President, but portions ware utilised by
the Mavy. 14
The plans called for the establianaent of a ftavy




with a deputy director and five operating sections. Naval
reserve officers with experience in public relations or
allied fields were to be recalled to active duty to head
th*> various sections of the vartinc office.
Uniforantf Civilian* rrotosaiflnaliae,, fcha function
Commander Thurber began screening the records of
reservists r and* although there was no legal requirement
for them to do so at that time, certain individuals were
asked to return to active service to augment the Public
Relatione Branch. The first to accept was a retired
Regular &avy officer* Lieutenant (junior grade) Victor r.
Blafcaslae* who reported in August 1*40 to head the newly
created Scripts Section. A naval reservist* Lieutenant
Cosaaander William M. Qalvin* former aecretary of the navy
league* cams in September as chief of the Analysis Section*
and Lieutenant Commander K. John Long* a reservist who had
been on the executive staff of ftatignflU wftflgrft^hift, took
control of the Pictorial Section in December.
In February 1941* Lieutenant Coraraander Jamas G.
Stahlman* u$m, editor and publiaher of the Nashville
(Tenn.) Bjaoaer. «nd former president of the newspaper
Publishers Association* volunteered to return to active
duty as director of the Naval Districts Section. At the
same time* Lieutenant Commander Morvelle W. Sharpe* a
reservist who had been an independent radio consultant*
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another reservist* Lieutenant Cossnander Wallace S. Wharton.
* member of the (Portland) QSfegttfl JOiirnag editorial staff*
IS
•gain donned hia uniform to aerve in the Press Saction*
In early April* Frank Knox wrote to hia managing
editor at the Chicago lastly q««ra . Harold €>• Flaherty* that a
direct cosamiesion aa lieutenant commander awaited hia
arrival into the public relatione fold* and that he would
be on active duty no longer than elx aonths* Mr.
0*Flaherty accepted the coraraission and began acting aa a
special assistant to the director of Public Relations a few
weeks later* Another friend of Mr. Knox* Frank £• Mason.
former president of International Hews Service and at that
tine vice"president of the National Broadcasting Company*
waa asked by the secretary to serve part*ti»e as his
special assistant for public relations in a civilian
capacity. Mr* Mason performed this function as a dollar-a-
year &an throughout Knox's tenure* dividing his tliaa
between Washington and his SBC office in Slew York, lie also
assisted the Office of Public Relations (QW&.) in a*ny
endeavors* particularly in the radio field. 3,
Also in 10*41 1341* in anticipation that there
would be an influx of correspondents* broadcasters and
photographers into the fleets in the event of war* initial
steps were taken to place experienced personnel with the
forces afloat. Accordingly* arrangementa were made to









Los Angeles TJLoaia. staffer, and Stuyvesant B. Wright* of
Paramount Hews, to serve as public relations officers for
the Pacific and Atlantic fleets respectively. 8 Crake
reported to Honolulu in August 1941, and Wright to Norfolk,
Va. a short tie* later after first spending several months
in OPft as head of a motion picture sub-section.
Fleet photographic needs had been considered at the
beginning of the mobilisation in August 1940, when at
Commander Thurber'e urging the Chief of staval Operations
sent a letter authorising the recruiting of photographic
personnel from the motion picture industry for the naval
reserve. There had been a long-standing offer from the
national Geographic Society and March of Time, Inc., to
train such personnel for the Navy*
The recruiting effort in Bollywood was quite
successful, and a sizable number of highly-skilied
photographers were formed into special photography units on
s ttttnSby status. The first three of these units were
scheduled to report to the fleets in the spring of 1941,
but instead were diverted to the Office of the Coordinator
of Information by John Ford, the Bollywood director and a
naval reserve lieutenant commander. Xt was not until late
fall of 1941, when the well-known photographer, Carlton
Mitchell, Jr., accepted a lieutenant's commission in the
naval reserve and took charge of the navy's eombat photog-






appeared in the fleets.
The official mission of Navy public relation*
basically had remained the same &»r a number of years—to
provide the public through the ue* of the mass media all
information about the navy compatible with aecurity. In
July 1940* the Public Relatione Branch adopted as ita
isottot "Service Consistent With Security* * At the same
time* it was decided that in view of th» international
situation and the nation's response to it* "attempts to
•sell the Navy* to the country were irrelevant and should
20be firmly mid scrupulously avoided. "
Behind this decision evidently lay the realisation
that it was no longer necessary to promote the navy in the
eyes of Congress and the public in order to get »«ore
ships* planes and nan. It also reflected* perhaps* an
awareness that in a wartime setting the public would brook
no "press~&gentry gimmicks" in military information
programs.
The added personnel and expanded functions of the
Public delations Branch necessitated a larger physical
plant as well. Accordingly* in August 1940* the office was
moved fro® the three cramped rooms it had occupied in a
remote second- floor corner of the Mavy IJepartment Building
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first floor of the building attar the wain entrance. The




Secretary Knox had begun the organisation of a very
liberal public information program, but security was soon
to prove a powerful restraining force. Reacting to the
deteriorating world situation* the tfavy already had
initiated a series of security measures in early 1933 that
broke with long-standing policy. Cameras were forbidden
aboard ships and shore stations without specific author-
isation; the cloak of secrecy was thrown over many facets
of new ship construction; and* in an unprecedented peace-
time move, correspondents were barred free* fleet
maneuvers.
In the spring of 1939. the number of ships
scheduled to visit Mew York for the World's Pair was
suddenly reduced from 119 to 30 due to diversion of a large
portion of the fleet to Pacific waters. In September of
that year, all general visiting to units of the Bavy's
shore establishment was discontinued. In September 1940*
further prohibitions were placed on release of information
about new constructions only the names and general class!-
23fication of new ships were allowed to be published. * On





Harold ft* Stark, sent a letter to thai naval service voicing
concern over "the increasing amount of classified informa-
tion which is being reported in the press* over the radio*
M
and in news photographs*
"
As a result of the rising concern throughout the
Navy over security violations ana* upon the reeaMas&tfations
of Commander Thurber and the Director of fiJaval Intelligence,
secretary Knox initiated a program of "voluntary censorship*
for members of the news media* On December 31, 1940, he
sent a confidential letter to over 3,200 media agencies
throughout the country, asking their cooperation in the
"avoidance of publicity " after January IS, 1941, on the
following subjects—unless announced or authorised by the
fiavy Departments
(1) Actual or intended movements of vessels or aircraft
of the U.S. navy, of units of naval enlisted
personnel ox divisions of mobilized reserves, or
troop movements of the U.8* Marine Corps?
(2) (Mention of) "Secret" technical U.S. naval weapons
or development thereof!
(3) Mew U.S. navy ships or aircraft;
25
(4) U.S. navy construction projects ashore*
Reaction to this unique letter was either favorable
or unfavorable, according to whose point of view is
considered* Commander Thurber claimed that replies were
almost 100 per cent favorable* The primary questions that
arose, according to him, addressed the possibility of plans
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whether there would be a central Jiavy clearance office for
items of questionable security, and What changes, if any,
would be asade in the Havy list in the future.
George •« McMillan, on the other hand, asserted
that the letter was "widely criticised, especially on the
grounds that the bans were too general, and could not be
aaisj
followed* * lie ehmmzved that Knox was compelled to
respond to the criticism and quotes from a statement issued
by the secretary on February 9, 1941s
Prom a few sources has com an unfounded charge
that the tfavy Department was making an effort at peace-
time censorship. Slothing is further from my own mind
or from the purposes of the Havy Department. But those
of us charged with the proper conduct of the wavy, who
are fully cognisant of the gravity of the current
emergency and ita potentialities, cannot but be greatly
concur ned about the making public of certain vital
information • • • of value to (potential enemies) and
definitely damaging to the progress and maintenance of
our national defense.
To further explain the new policy. Secretary Knox
and Commander Thurber embarked on speaking campaigns.
Also, the Washington National Press Club scheduled an -of f-
the-record" forum on the problems of press censorship.
The War Department quickly jumped on the Savy*s
"voluntary censorship'' bandwagon; and in early May,
Editor ft frUhUfthax quoted both branches of the service as
reporting "an almost universal practice of submitting
questionable news for clearance before publication. * ma
article went on to say that while reporters did not enjoy
as free access in both the Navy and War Departments aa they
-m
.
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had a few months before, the news product was greater with
nose news releases issued and stress conferences held.
At least one journalist* however , nay have been
subtly •tweaking the navy's nose*1 on voluntary censorship
when he wrote in the wanner of a Marc Anthony speaking at
Julius Caesar's funeral i
They (the navy) have a pleasantly courteous public
relations section staffed with gentleisen and ladies who
are your idea of what a Savy officer ought to be. They
are always ready to giv« you what they think is good
for you to have. ... Censorship? There is no such
thing, if you must call it anything, call it
sympathetic and graceful direction. 30
After Pearl Harbor, &Jtt&x£&$-I&Mnlm Pfttt* credited
Mr. Knox's system of "voluntary cooperation* with helping
to "train the American newspaper m^itoz to police himself
... to recognise the difference between news that would
give *aid and comfort to the sneny* and news that
wouldn't."31
JPuhl ifi&ty, nin on British fihipa aja nnaxifcan Porta
Upon passage of the Lend-Lease Sill in March 1941.
nention of the presence or novenents of British warships
and nerchant ships in U.S. waters was added to the Navy's
"avoidance list."
Tan baa on publicity about the British nen-of-war,
wnich were undergoing war-danage repairs in American naval
shipyards* was destined to plague the voluntary censorship






aggressively interested in the firsthand battle stories the
British had to tell, claimed that the presence of the
vessels was oomaon knowledge in the ports of arrival.
When the badly damaged English battleship JftUftXA
steaaed into Mew York harbor in broad daylight* and her
sailors were subsequently seen in the bars of Manhattan*
the Mew York Seliy Kaw printed a photograph of the ship
and carried a story on her arrival* A few other newspapers
followed suit, but the majority refrained from publishing
the information. Secretary Knox rebuked the papers that
used the story. and there was "no recurrence of this kind
32
of violation of the i.avy's voluntary system.*
numerous protests were filed with the Navy Depart*
sent over the continuing ban, however* especially from
stadia in itew 0M . . : Torfol.;. San Francisco and Seattle, the
primary port cities involved. In Seattle, a newspaper even
contended that a boat carrying newsmen was shot at by a
»avy guard when it encroached in restricted waters where a
33
British ship lay at anchor.""'
The secretary* after considerable consultation with
British naval authorities* succumbed to the pressures frcei
the press and aodified the policy in late September 1941.
8s promptly announced the names and location of a dosen of
the British warships and added that "access by the press to
British vessels ... will be granted on the Initiative of








he modified the policy further by et ftting the Ksvy would
issue news releases on the presence of individual British
I .
ships seven days after they arrived in port.
Additions! Rttst.rictiQfifi-*irt laaft goaltivt Stcaa
On June 4* 1941* one week after President Roosevelt
declared an unlimited national emergency* the fcavy took
still another action toward restricting publicity.
Secretary Knox announced that press releases concerning
contracts between the Wavy Department and individual con-
tractors would be discontinued* Since October of the
previous year* it had been a normal procedure for joint
Army-fciavy releases to be wade on any national defense
contract amounting to $1 million or more. Also in June
1941, monthly summaries to the press of vessels under
construction and merchant ships delivered for use as
auxiliaries were dropped for security reasons.
While the emphasis had been on the curtailment of
information in the first few months of 1941, the naval
leadership was making certain positive public relations
moves. On March 17* the Chief of aaval operations sent a
letter to the naval service stressing that public relations
was a function of command and cautioning against s too
rigid interpretation of the phrase, wcompatible with
military security." Two days later. Admiral Stark again
addressed the subject, this time in a letter to naval
.
Si
district commandants. Be enjoined the rational coflsaand«rs
to upgrade their information program* by considering the
placement of public relations officers in each state , large
publishing center , or gone Where there was an important
naval activity, A 29~pa<|« %uide to iiavy Public delations*
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was enclosed as a tool*
flif.ttVtl lahaanf. of ,thft Qfflcs of Public Relations
On May 1, 1941* Secretary Knox transferred the Navy
Department's public relations function from the Office of
Haval Intelligence to the Office of the Secretary, where it
would be under his direct control. In so doing, he
followed the footsteps of the Her Department in setting up
am independent and centralised Office of Public
IB
Relations.
Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, former Commander in
Chief of the U.S. Pleet as a four-star admiral and more
recently Commandant of the Twelfth tfaval District at San
Francisco, was appointed -Director of Public Relations,* in
effect relieving Commander Thurber. The admiral reported
for duty in Washington in the middle of May and promptly
issued a statement saying, "We shall be as liberal with
information for the press and public as the law and
situation allow.*
Although he had no formal experience in public











Kavy*s information chief. As the senior officer on the
Savy list, he was widely respected by hia fallow admirals,
an important prerequisite for the job. As float cosswander
in 1936, ha had initiator a broader and mora liberal press
40
policy*
The organisation of OFR initially corresponded
closely to that of the Public Relations Branch in QUI.
There were seven sections in the new offices press, radio,
pictorial, analysis, scripts, adsainistrative and naval
districts* However, there was now a staff of fifty-five
compared to tfre thirteen in July 1940 when mobilisation of
th*s function began, Another thirty-eight were on the
way. 4*
Admiral Bepburn had three executive assistants:
Hal O'Flahertyt frank Mason; and ULeutanant H. w. Gordon,
Jr., a Regular navy officer who served as the admiral's
aide and also headed the Administrative Section. In addi-
tion to conducting the business management of OFR. Gordon
handled accreditation to the fleets of news media
representatives and worked with the Marine Corpa in formu-
lating plans for its combat correspondents.
Lieutenant Coassander Robert *r. Berry, «s», who had
been in charge of the Frees Section in the Public Relations
Branch since May 1940, continued in that capacity in the
new office. Hie staff had grown frost three officers and
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two civilians in May 1941* Sevan weeks later, there were
thirteen officers, seven civilians and six enlisted men in
the section. Many of these were former active newspapermen.
The Frees Section prepared, cleared and distributed
news releases* answered press queries* and arranged press
conferences. It was divided into three componentst
a "city-roots* staff of officer-reporters who covered the
various naval offices and bureaus in Washington on a
regular "beat-system* basis; a watch section of officers
who manned telephones around-the-clock to answer inquiries;
and a reference division which had been set up in February
1941 under Miss Helens Phillbert to compile background
data.
The 24-hour watch section was activated on Nay 8*
1941. It had been a 16-hour watch since November of the
previous year. One of its functions was to prepare a
nightly news summary from the United Preas wire in the
office for transmission to all Bavy ships and outlying
stations.
The Radio Section* still headed by Horvelle Sharpe*
arranged for Kavy participation in network programs* wrote
scripts for radio addresses by naval personnel and for
radio recruiting material, answered broadcast queries* and
conducted liaison with commercial broadcasters. One of the
four assistants to Lieutenant Commander Sharpe was a




The Pictorial Section had been operating since
December 194Q under John Long. It distributed still photo-
graphs* motion pictures and display posters* mn& cooperated
with newsreel companies and motion picture producers* By
May 1941* Lieutenant Commander Long nad a staff of five.
Also in May, an art progress, the foundations of which were
laid earlier in the year by Command*r Thurher, was initiated
in the section* An eminent etcher and water-color artist*
Vernon Howe Bailey* was given a contract to paint activities
of the navy's shore establishment* By June* other civilian
artists were added} wsiA in September 1941* artist Griffith
Baily Coals* president of the National Society of Mural
Painters* accepted a reserve commission as a lieutenant
.m^w*^w^B^^*wes^*»^m"^* ^?^w ^•^^^^*j^bp^*> ^* ^w» *y <» ^jyiiww ^^'^fc w»^w~^pr ^e^^*w^B**^wT^Bi w^k •^•^m^f iipfw ^••*
recording fleet activities on canvas*
As the demand for Mavy photographs and motion
pictures mounted in the spring of 1941* the photographic
facilities available to OPR proved to be inadequate*
Secretary Knox subsequently convened a special board to
study the navy's photographic needs*
Bill Calvin continued as chief of the Analysis
Section* which he started in September 1940* He now had
four officer assistants* The section compiled a dally
summary of what appeared in the news media and elsewhere
i * JWJ,\
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about the Navy and on other pertinent topics. It alao
produced special * feedback " raports on specific eubjecte.
auch aa "Typical Reactions to Huaao-G&naan Wax* and
"Editorial factions to Landing in lea1and. " The first
issues of the daily analytical summaries ware called "navy
Hawa Bulletin*.- On May 27, 1942* the name was changed to
"Daily Difeet."
The digsat was provided to senior Navy officials and
to ail Wavy public relations officers. Everything that wae
considered indicative of public opinion—even Secretary
Knox* a fan mail—waa read* analysed and reported. In
Lieutenant Commander Calvin's words* "Our job is to follow
public opinion trends aa they have reference to the navy's
policies* programa* expaneion. Me try to keep our finger
42
on the public pulse."
A 1943 report on the Analysis Section stated that
ita staff regularly screened thirty-one newapapera and
43twenty magaxinee in preparing the Daily Digest. When the
Office of War Information waa established in June 1942.
editorials clipped from about 400 newapapera by that agency
became an additional source of information. The War
fieparteaenfa Bureau of Public Relatione monitored radio
programa and newareels for both the Army and Bavy. Public
opinion polls also were screened.
0PR*s Scripta Section wrote speeches tor «avy




AM* •"aarfaildfeq IMMI a ierf .7 m*" >ilU
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prepared special pamphlets. It also served as the clearing
house for all written material other than press releases.
Victor Blateealee remained in charge of this section,
assisted in May 1941 by three reserve officers and one
civilian.
The Maval Districts Section had been organised in
late February by Jimmy Stahlman to coordinate the public
relations efforta of the fifteen naval districts in the
continental United States* Puerto Kico, Canal iSone and
Hawaii. It also acted as the liaison branch between the
Washington office and the fleet public relations officers,
and cooperated with welfare, patriotic, civic, fraternal,
educational, entertainment »nd other civic organisations.
Wherever possible, however, these civic liaison contacts
were decentralised to the districts*
The district public relations offices were, in
total, functioning below peacetime operating levels when
Lieutenant Commander Stahlntan was dispatched on a fact-
finding tour in early 1941. As a result of his trip,
several tma^xve officers in the field were ordered to
active duty in the districts, and a gradual buildup of the
id
regional offices was be«jun.
On Hay 9, 1941, shortly after the function of
public relations was removed from the Office of Kaval
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Intelligence, the Chief of Kaval Operations directed the
district commandants to transfer their public relations
offices also from intelligence to a separate status
directly under the commandants themselves. * By this
action and the establishment of public relations offices in
the fleets a few weeks later * the framework for the war tin**
Havy public relations organisation was virtually complete.
But the districts were slow to Implement their
public relations responsibilities. Consequently, on June 7,
Secretary Knox sent a message to the commandants to "please
proceed Immediately to complete plans for staffing of
district public relations offices with necessary officer
personnel and clerical help." On August 22. he forwarded
to the field and fleet commands an organisation plan for
setting up public relations offices afloat and ashore* a




Basically, each district and fleet office was
organised into three sections
—
press, radio and photography.
In naval districts where more than one large metropolitan
area had to be served, establishment of field offices was
encouraged. Already, on June 30, the Third naval District
in Hew york had drawn up plans for subsidiary public
relations sections in Albany, Buffalo, Mew tondon. and
Kewark. It was envisioned that forty officers, mven
&ofe
Kf •'.






enlisted nan and eleven civilians would be needed to nan
tlMi Hew York and sore officee. The Eleventh Sfaval
District in San Diego also was quick to sat tip regional
office* in the &oe Cigalas and fhoenix areas.
*y *epte«&er X, If41* aost of tha naval districts
had fully staffad public relations offioas functioning vary
much as they would throughout the war. for the most part*
personnel xaaning the district offleas vara carefully
selected. Tha third Seval District public relations offi-
cer, for instance* wrote to Hal 0*riahertyt "I Havs
personally hand -picked avary officer on sty staff and X haws
endeavored to secure only the most intelligent nan that X
could lay ivy hands on, as wall as man of savers! years
experience in thai? respective professions.**^ The
burgeoning staff of 09ft in trashington also was hand-pickad
as much as possible* in keeping with the desire of Secretary
Knox to place the stoat talented and experienced people
as
available in public relations.
Xn late July 1941* a conference of district public
s* aF iB>^pea*>^aj^F«sss: •#*«» ^**a*a^ ^P eewees 't^<* a"** ^*s>s t» ^ssvas^ssMS^pa'SfMf "'•^*" at-esr^Sr
Secretary of the Savy, Admiral Hepburn* top- flight execu-
tives fro» the news media, public relations representatives
e**a,' ^>^*a* *» m^^u * **^m^kw ^waewe ^j^^ear ese^^w ^*^aa^s>Vvf ^^*e**» ^w^*f^w • ^e*afc ^a •^'"J^aa • ^e*ap*k^waanp
T *ssfltislt*irfr *f n Amiift4ij i%f^%mi> i" #1 awtif t~ai sisis%iT f*x,'xa* HsifsiiwHrt^l i^isn *" .sVfrik^otm wvm*"a>wp *w#**>%#"aswp ^e wieewr^^ sp s* ^^at*ww^<a*^H**^^si^^p^^ %ts^^s ^ears'^'e^vs4Poa*s>***^'a^'4v o ™™a*
the mating* it was estitaated that the wire services were
carrying about 40 pair cant of the news releases and other
..."
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press »«t®rial issued by QFft. The naval districts worm
^p s^arVPesmk ^e^s^p^is »#ne» WA9^Mw*ar'N**«w vt^ a»^p«*s^mie»e»«^#s^^ w^^ ^p^Fa> ^#^*a»%> %*a^
newspapers and radio stations la their areae. 51
On aevarai occasions sinca the and of world war I.
the navy had faced what it considered to bs a raa.-jor throat
to its role in national 6<ttena&—th* reoojasendation* for
craatlon of a separata air fore* out of the Array •»* Navy
air arms* In tha spring of 1941, th* issue again was vary
much alive in the form of savoral Mils pending before
various congressional committers*
Bavy a fforts to counteract the pressures for an
independent air carvisa inescapably involved public reia*
tiona and turned out to ba one of the first major tasks
assigned to Admiral Hep&orn* On June 6, Secretary xnost
wrote to waitst Lippsasan and otttsr journalists, personally
inviting them to a Juno 12 luncheon in Hew York at Which
tha admiral would discuss ths "arguments for and against
a uaifiad Mr Service** On July ?, tha Analysis Section of
OfR iaauad a special tfavy Haws Bullatin ant itlad *A Croaa-
Soction of Public Fraction to the xmification of Army Air
forces. " And in August* Hepburn sent to the district
©ommandants two »avy position papers, "Tha Wavy and the
Separata Air force" and "Ths Came Against tha United Air
force*" In his accompanying letter* ha stated that tha
-
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material stay he used "in eny manner which you deera best
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... in connection with public relation* activities.**
The Eighth ftavaX District at Kew Orleans toofc the
admiral literally and offered one of the papers to Southern
editors with the suggestion that it would nake good
editorial i&aterial. One of the editors* affronted by the
suggestion, declared i NX am aaasec that a thing so
resesbling the handout editorials of the German press
53dictators should coxae from an American institution.
"
Hepburn, embarrassed by the incident* siraply offered the
opinion that the Mew Orleans press officer had used "bad
judgement. M
Nevertheless* the public relations effort to sub-
merge the separate air force idea continued. In October
•
Admiral Hepburn wrote to the Coeamandant of the Third ftaval
District!
• . . both Life and XjLsm. are helping us with favorable
publicity on the question of unified air service. Xiim.
has been given extraordinary opportunities for
gathering data on this subject in the Pacific and sons*
thing is in hand with *-if* along the sans line. The
frftturflttV Evelina ffQsjfc also has corw into the fold and a
writer for that zaag&zine is now afloat on an aircraft
carrier where he will have exceptional opportunity to
gather material not available to others. a*
^ngflBCJihftli <sf Qttfrqqliw CffffMtni/Ta.tlonw.
For soma time the Army and Navy jointly had been
planning their censorship responsibilities in the event of
55








responsible for cable and radio communicstions censorship*
while the ftrmy would take charge of censoring the nails.
In order to prepare for its role* the navy had
secretly initiated training for a select group of Hew York
newspapermen who were to be commissioned aa naval censors
when the time cause. All queries concerning the "hush-hush*
school, conducted at Third naval district Headquarters,
were left unanswered* The Chicago *r**""»» quoted the
district public relations officer, Lieutenant Commander
John T. Tuthill, Jr., USMR, who owned a string of small
weekly newspapers on ijong Island, as saying t "I don't know
there ia such a school. " The Tpifomp concluded by
editorialising, This disinclination for publicity ...
Blight be based on the navy* a fear of being accused of
jumping the ^un on a censorship appropriations request
pending before Congress.
"
The leaks in the press and from congressional
sources about the Navy* a plana for censorship of overseas
communications pressured Secretary Knox to issue a special
statement. In it, he emphasised that no censorship of
domestic news waa involved, other than the voluntary form
currently in effect. Ms once again thanked the news media
for their cooperation in the voluntary censorship program
concluded with an "interesting" bit of rationale
t
(X believe) • • . that the pz&m» and other news services
will welcome a strict censorship of outgoing communica-
tions, not only in the realisation that such censorship
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is in the best interests of national security but in
the knowledge that with the leakage of vital informa-
tion effectively bottled up within the United States* a
greater freedom for the dissemination of legitimate
sews will result* »'
Two more subjects were added to the voluntary
avoidance list by 0*?a in October and Wovemher—the number
of planes in the Havy and Marine Corps and information
i
concerning the arming of merchant ships*
On August 23* 1941. it was announced that Admiral
Hepburn would be placed on the retired list on l»ovemb«r 1
but would continue on active duty as director of Public
Relations. In November* he waa joined in the office by
another retired rear admiral on active duty* Deary A.
Wiley* who headed a new Industrial Morale Section. Admiral
Wiley was assisted by four reserve officers.
The new section was an outgrowth of recommendations
made in the apriny of 3941 by Lieutenant Commander &*siie *•
Jacobs, an officer in the Analysis Section* that addresses
be made by notable Havy personnel at private industrial
planta holding Savy contracts and that efficiency awards
for excellence of production be presented by the Wavy. The
first awards extended under this new program ware the fore-
runners of the World War XI Army~»avy *E* Awards. In
October* Secretary Knox asaigned to the Director of Public
Relations the responsibility for coordinating the &£avy*s
activities in building industrial morale by serving as a




clearing agent and advisor for the speaking en^ecjertienta and
various competitive awards. He also directed Admiral
Hepburn to act as liaison officer between the navy Depart-
ment and other 90vernmant agencies en civilian morale
matters*
By November there was a staff of ninety-one
employed by th» Office of Fublic Helatlonet five Regular
navy officers i thirty-six reserve officers? and fifty
civilians* mostly in clerical positions. The office now
occupied eleven rooms in the Umvf Department building.
The press officer* Bob Berry* moved up to the
position of Assistant Director of OFR in October when he
^™ "*^» w #r e#%*^e^^p^w^e avmp ^^v^^^wi^w^^*OB^Be^^» e* ^ ^••^w^ v-s^m^S e^»mm^^ w*"*m' efc ^j^w>m^ ^w^^»^^p ^wrw*.
over by Wallace Wharton. A separate Motion Picture Section
was crested on August 2* removing this responsibility from
the Pictorial Section* The head of this new section was
Ensign Alan Brown, USSR. Hal Q* Flaherty was released to
inactive duty to return to the Chicago Pally ***** on
October 22* as he had Hmmn promised by his old boss* Frank
as
Xnoau
Also in October* Lieutenant Conmander Robert K«
Vining* USSR* who had been the Fifth Maval district public
relations officer in Norfolk since late April* transferred
to London as the first information officer for the
Commander* a. ft. Saval Forces* Europe, tie waa replaced in
60
Borfolk by Lieutenant Commander Wilson Starbuck* Uam.
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Sluapsipt on tftm,JtMs.. af faarv Harbor
As Pearl iiarbor Day approached, the $avy*a
mobilisation for public relation* had been completed. In
terma of experienced paraonnel. It was a forioidably or^an-
iaation. Thar* were almost 100 persons in the kaahington
office, 127 officer* alona in the fifteen naval district
offices and their various branchae, and 5 public relations
officera attached to the floats. 61 Perhaps the proportion*
ally small nonsber of personnel with the operating forces,
a^w^^^^S' ™ mw • m ""•• ^m e^me ^m^tt^m m» *^ w ^c ^^ *» %*sww ^*^* as «d<«» *m^» ^^ernees^ ^^••'ft^aa w#w*v *r^^wat^p^a
the function on the eve of Pearl Harbors What information
"compatible with security" could be released in wartime?
K firm believer in public relatione. Secretary Knox
indeed had set up an organisation calculated to fully
chronicle the navy* a story in combat. Yet, Mr. Knox also
was torn on the horns of the security dilemma. At the
conference of public relations officers in the sussaer of
1941, he had gone out of his way to stress that he would
use the full measure of his influence as secretary to
change the attitudes of soma Mavy officers who believed
they would stay out of trouble if they refused to talk to
I I
the news teedia. Vet, he religiously pursued his policy
of voluntary censorship of information he considered needed
to be kept secret*
The inconsistency in Mr, Knox's philosophy was
perhaps more apparent than real, tievertheleaa, there was





no evidence cm the ev© of Pearl Harbor that his enthusias-
tic promotion of the value of public relations had
penetrated the "security syndrome" of the admirals in
charges of the fleets that would soon be making the news.
Zt would mm«m reasonable to assume that the secretary's
ambivalence over security versus information at least
partially influenced the attitude of the admirals.
Whatever the reason* the secretary's liberal public
relations program did not have the support of many of the
Havy's high-ranking officers as the nation prepared for
war. In their minds * the increasing threat of U.S.
involvement in the European war during the past year
required that ths navy adopt intensive security measures*
And as our relations with Japan rapidly reached the breaking
point, secrecy enshrouded the operations of the fleet in
the Pacific. After Pearl Harbor* this secrecy intensified
throughout the fleets, resulting in extensive criticism of
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CafciTE& XX2
?m vtmt mm or hostilities
On £«KKudtioc 7* 1£41, 3$0 Japanese carrier-based
aircraft, operating fro>a a naval striking force at sea,
heavily attached ships of tha U.S. Pacific Fleet and
military installations at Pearl Harbor and other locations
en Qahu# Territory of Hawaii, four battleships, one seine-
layer ami one target ship war© sunk; four battleships,
three cruisers, three destroyers, on« seaplane tender ami
one rvpair ship were dajr*a$ed. The Havy Jfard and tiaval Base
at fearl Harbor i ttaval Mr Station* ford Island; Maval
Patrol Plana Station, Kaneohe; Marine Corps Airfield, Ewa*
mn& Army airfields at Hickem. Wheeler and Bellows ail wars
damaged. Ona hundred eighty-©i$ht naval and Army aircraft
IMPS destroyed* Killed or missing were 2*004 Havy seen, 222
Aray personnel and 108 Marines. The Japanese lost five
aidget submarine a # twenty-®ifhfc aircraft and fewer than 100
sen*
This is what happened at Pmmel Harbor, bet the
Asftsriean people were not given the complete story





Within hours after the attack* the Wavy** plan for
ceneorahip of all outgoing cable and radio communications
waa placed in effect* Mao* whan queried by reporters.
Army and tfavy public relatione officers simply replied that
they had no information and had been instructed "net to
2
talk on any subject* * The Mavy further refused to allow
the press to reprint a broadcast by Waahington commentator
Fulton £**wis* Jr«* in which he had given considerable
i
detaila of the attack obtained from congressional sources*
Finally* on December lb, the Savy did announce that
three destroyers* a tain© layer and a target ship were sunk*
one battleship had capaised and other vessels had been
damaged* In the interim* however* eyewitnesses brought
back firsthand accounts of much greater damage* and
American radio atations and newspapers freely reported the
exaggerated claims of the eneay picked up on Japanese radio
broadcasts* The disparity between the official announce'
ments and the unofficial accounts led to wild rumors that
persisted for many months. Xt also contributed materially
to the diasatiafaction with war news policies by both the
press end public that marked the first year of the
4
conflict.
Fublic disapproval was slow in developing* however*
Anger* fear and patriotic fervor were manifest in the
hearts and minds of most Americans immediately following
<v«A
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Pearl Harbor. In a pell conducted by the Office of Facts
and Figures in early January 1942, 53 per cent of the
public agreed that withholding details of our loeaes and
damage at rearl Harbor was justifiable in order to avoid
helping the **namy. Twenty-nine per cent even went so far
as to state that the people had no right at all to expect
the story on losses any sooner than they got it. Only ?
per cent felt that there was no excuse whatsoever for
delaying the initial news for a whole week* while 6 per
cent said they could understand why the government wanted
to hold it back but thought it did more harm than good.
A related question about future handling of news
concerning Military losses was quite revealing of the
public's ajsbivalent attitude over the news versus security
issue. Almost 74 pmr cent of those polled believed that
military loases should be announced as soon aa confirmed
,
ajutotig as the, caws Ama&XuK&mlte, Mia .ths, mmm*
Interestingly enough, 13 per cent felt that bad news of
this nature should be withheld until some good news could
be released with it, while a sizable 10 per cent considered
the best policy would be not to announce news of our losses
at all.
"Aid, and Cnrcfnrt to tha %imm m
The early public acceptance of the necessity to
maintain security waa due in aoaa measure to President
-.-.-/.
ii
Roosevelt* a iyn8h the day after Atari Harbor in which ha
outlined initial rules for news about the war. First* the
accounts must toe true* he said* and secondly* they must not
give "aid and comfort to the enemy.* Significantly* when
asked who was to determine what information would fall in
th© latter category* the President replied that it would be
a
up to the higher officers of the Army and Navy. Thus, at
the very outset* the decision whether or not to release war
news was left to military sources.
The first area of secrecy* however* resulted from a
direct order issued by the President himself, no casualty
lists were to be published. It was reasoned, with
considerable justification* that the enemy might induce
from a complete list of names th$ ships and stations to
which the dead and wounded were attached* Only the death
of Hear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd was announced immediately*
The first official casualty lists were not released until
7
three months later*
Many Army and Hsvy officers were convinced that the
Japaneae could have occupied Pearl Harbor if they had
followed up their air attack with an invasion. The reason
the enemy didn't* according to these officers, was that he
did not know the full extent of the damages he had
e
inflicted* despite his propaganda claime. This aaaumption
on the part of the American military waa responsible in the
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early stages of the war for a very atrlct interpretation of
what information would give aid and comfort to the enemy.
»«vy Hcurity foMugaa
The »avy especially clasped down the lid of secrecy,
particularly in the fleets and at advance 'bases where naval
censors cotwaandeered every outlet of communications. In
Washington, Secretary Knox rescinded his September relaxa-
tion of the ban on publicity for British and Allied warships
in U.S. waters* asking once again that there toe no sention
of the presence or movements of these vessels. Later in
December* he requested the news media to refrain from
publishing reports and rusers of U.S. forces sinking enemy
submarines, unless they could be attributed directly to an
9
official goverrwsent spokesmen.
The secretary also took steps to ensure internal
security. On December 17, he directed the district
commandants to acquaint all naval and civilian personnel
under their commands with their individual responsibility
10for observing naval and national security. In the
directive, ha modified two of the voluntary censorship
categories he had asked the press to guard against a year
earlier. The publicity restriction on "new U.S. wavy ships
or aircraft" was extended to "strength of military
disposition, and the restraint on 'U.S. wavy construction
projects ashore" was changed to "productive capacity for
•
Si
certain items used by the Eevy. Still caught on the horns
of the diieirma. however, Knox closed his institutions by
cautioning the commandants not to iet their security
indoctrination procedure* interfere with the dissemination
of unclassified news by the district public relations
offices. "The navy Bust at all times keep the public
informed on all matters not involving actual ttaval or
national security." he admonished*
The navy's main cifficuities with the press at this
time centered arouna the censorship of cable* wireless and
telephone messages leaving the Worth American continent.
Foreign correspondents in particular complained bitterly
about the delays in clearing aessages* failure to notify
writers of deletions in their material and the alaws
t
insurmountable difficulties encountered with foreign
language dispatches. A uroup of British journalists
sppealeu directly to Secretary Knox to alleviate the situa-
tion, and representatives of the Foreign frees Association
conferred with other Kavy officials.
Meanwhile, the Array took the initiative in
attempting to establish better press relations during this
critical period. On December 19* officials of the War
Bepartment invited editors and publishers of all daily
newspapers to discuss the status of war correspondents and
"other things touching upon relations between the Army and

rs.
12 the arssy also freeiy answereG reporters'
M
inquiries in Chicago shortly after *earl Harbor, while aavy
public relations representatives there said *no news will
be releasee- until the situation is clarified is
,13
* Id
it the *resi<ieat sstablisnec; the Office of Censorship
Byron Price, Executive Haws Editor of tha
foiicy Board, whose »»a&*rship iaclutleo' the two
secretaries, and a Censorship Operating Hoard t<
of representatives of each goveramat agency involved in
censorship. 14
The Office of Censorship soon was to take
the navy the troublesons* task of controlling outgoing eao*
cable and radio cosusuaication*. As for dosassstie
». Mr* Price* a firm advocate o£ freedom of the
sat from FreaiUent aoosevelt
by the news saedia themselves, thus* on the hoa» front
#
p^mm censorship continued to follow the ^voluntary
tion* progrss» instituted by secretary Knox a year earlier
with the newspaper editors having the benefit of twelve
«




Mr. Price* however, did not rely on the newsmen'
a
eaperienee or Knox* a guideline a liter voluntary censorship.
In January 1942* after consultation with the Army and navy
and other government agencies aa well aa prominent editors
and broadcasters* he issued a flqtte...ft* flltrf itt Practical to
yrfiai and ftftBJO* The code epelled out certain classes of
intonation which the newa media were requested not to
divulge unless made available to thesa by appropriate
authority. Of special pertinence to the Mavy were the
following restricted categories*
(1) The movements* identities and cargoes of naval and
merchant ships, including those of our allies and
enemies; and the sinking or destaging of these ships
from war causes.
(2) Detaila of new snipe under construction* including
advance information about launchinge and commission*
ings? and the physical setup or technical detaila
of shipyards. I®
It should be emphasised that the censorship code
applied to the preas and not the Bevy, if under the coda
the press waa asked not to publish certain information*
that earns information could be released by the Navy if it
ao deaired« By the name token* a atory cleared by the Havy
could be publiahed even if it contained information which
i?
waa restricted by the code*
Mr* Price attached a proviso to hie code in which
he promised that newa on all of the prohibited subjects
would ultimately be released by the government. "But in
war* 4* he aaid. "timelineaa ia an important factor* and the

M
Government unquestionably is in the best position to decide
when disclosure is tisaaly.
*
The Sevy'a decisions on the
timing of its releases* as we shall see* usee to draw much
criticism during the first year of ths war.
The office of Censorship Had no responsibility for
issuing information* This was a departure fro® the proce-
dure followed in world n*x X, whan the functions of censor*
ship and information were combined under the Creel Committea
on Public Information. The separation of the functions in
norId war IX reaulted from President %oosevalt*s acceptance
of the censorship plan drawn up by the Joint Army-I*avy Board
in 1937 and presented early in 1941.W
There ware a number of naval officers directly
attached to the Office of Censorship throughout the war for
the purpose of security review. Relatione between the
navy* a Office of Public Relatione and the "censorship
people " were very good, according to Captain Harold B. Say.
usual (Retired). The news media for the most part dealt
directly with the tfavy if they had any questions about the
security statue of wavy topics. At other times, newsiasn
would first contact the Office of Censorship, and that
office would then call the navy to check out the item, for
these caile. Captain Say claimed, hie office had an informal
code worked out with "censorship* to circumvent the reluc-
tance of savy operational officers to release staterial.
'
*7
If Q&& wanted the subject in question released* Say would:
sissply ask the censorship call&r, "ttM you asking a» or
tilling an?* ance the Office of Censorship clearec" «n
item* tho »avy would say nothing about it.
When the United State» entered the war, there wer*
six civilian agencies of the federal gevernaent involve in
propaganda and information activities. The taoet recent of
awpi^WflP^F %p^p .e»^w ei^p*'^s*Wifp^s mF"^a^p atnr aa^jfc-Sii'wiss^P' sirSt as^»^»*^>^p ^ntea^s ^p •»* *^a>n» <sv^^
(OFF)* established in October 1941 under poet Archibald
Maciaiaa to coordinate the work of tha other information
21
organisations. *
Tha policymaking body for Off was ita Consaittee on
War Information, composed of representatives from various
govem&ent agencies t including the Array and »*vy. Tha wavy
representative, appointed by Secretary Knox* waa *dlei
Stevenson* who later mmxv^ as Governor of Illinois end waa
twice a Presidential candidate.
ie* ^tr ™e^e e*aa^p» e^ v>#!W* ^^s^RSf*e^w*iif ^r ^**< a> w •»-^wn jl s*naesr ei^^RR^^ ewes^*e a*asey
resulting cloak of aacracy surrounding naval operations.
Mr. Stavanaon pxo&&w®& a '"project in public education* to
restore tha public's confidence in tha Wavy. The thrust
of this propaganda a ftort waa to fee directed at the Hevy'a
many functions, reepoasibilitiaa and limitations in a
global war. aaaisting #tr. Stevenson on tha project was
•,..'.;-.a >•- i.»«c»X ,5?
Christian Barter* Orr'e liaison officer in the Wavy Depart-
Mint end later Secretary of State under President
Eisenhower.
The firat atap in the effort was to be a campaign
to eapaaaise the "colossal character of war operations in
the Pacific* ay stressing the aagnitude of geography* tiae
differentials and other considerations concerning the world's
largest oeean. The taek waa labs led "Project Proposal
So. 2* of OFF* and Adairal Hepburn assignee wallac* 8*
Wharton* the head of his press section, to act as G9x*a
liaison officer for the project*
Evidently this rather intriguing atteapt at domestic
propaganda never saw fruition* for the author waa unable to
find additional references to it beyond the two aeaoranda
cited. It did serve as an eataaple* however* of the type
of liaison conducted between the Office of Public Relations
and the other goveranent information agencies in the early
atagea of the war.
Lieutenant Commander Wharton also was assigned to
represent Adairal Hepburn at daily neetinga held after
Pearl Harbor at the headquarters of Colonel Wiiliaa Donovan*
the President's Coordinator of Information (COX) . Xn late
January 1942* Bill Salvia* the Analysis Section chief*
replaced Wharton sm liaison officer with Donovan** group.
Since the COX had been assigned the task of handling






contact officer was to provide Havy news and information
for dissemination abroad by short-wave radio.
Similar to the Office of Censorship* the COX also
had a number of Mavy officers attached directly to his
staff. One of these, as we have already seen* was
Lieutenant Coamander John lord, the Hollywood motion picture
director, who headed the Visual Presentation Section and
had sixteen naval reserve officers under his direction in
that COX unit. Colonel Donovan* a principal assistant also
24
was a naval reserve officer.
Shortly after the attacK on fsarl Harbor. Secretary
Knox flew to Hawaii for a firsthand assessment of the
situation. Us returned convinced that secrecy on fleet
operations in the Pacific would be paramount for sons tins
to coos and that it would be necessary to withhold other
forms of information about the navy's war effort as well.
At the same time, he was determined to provide as much news
for the public as possible within these security
parameters.
One of the first actions he took was to bring
Dempster HacMurphy. business manager of the Chicago fiftilg
Jftttfft* to Washington to survey Mavy public relations needs,
assets and liabilities. JtacKurphy did not remain lony; he
quickly ran into opposition from many of the Secular flawy
-i*
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officers in the bureaus and offices and never really got
25his study off the ground.
The basic format for the release of Kavy war new*.
the communique, took shape within a few weeks after Pearl
Harbor * however. A Communique Officer* Lieutenant Cora-
mander R. i>. Bill, Jr., USSR (Retired)* was assigned to the
Frees Section of OPR to prepare at least one official
communique daily, for this purpose* ha was provided with
battle information and combat narratives by the Publicity
Security Officer on the ataff of the Co—tender in Chief*
0.S . Pleat (COKXHCH) * and alao received daily summaries
from the Office of Naval Intelligence. After drafting the
communique* Bill sent copies to the Office of Censorship
and the COX prior to its release by the wavy press relations
officer. 27
The key man in the naval communique system was the
COJU&CH Publicity Security Officer* Xt was his responsi-
bility* subject to higher authority on the fleet commander's
staff and to appeals from the director of Public Halations*
to decide the content and timing of the communiquea. Ha
also represented the security policies and views of CQHXHCM
in dealings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff* the Coordinator
of Inter-American Affairs* and later the Office of War
Information* In addition* ha prepared a weakly summary of
navy activitiea for use by the Secretary of the Navy at hia





ft -a Mil ' '-
,«»fti95*^? miasq
71
officers during **» ***** Captain Theodore T. Patterson*
t»K. of the COWIHCH Piano Pivisior*, who hod newspaper
experience before entering the naval /taadt'my—from
Zteoember 1941 to June 1343; Captain John &. FhiUipe* 06»,
who became the firat official Publicity Security Officer in
the newly created Combat Intelligence Diviaion of the float
staff in June 1943; and Captain J. F. Walsh, USB* from
ia
March 1945 to the end of the war.
To supervise the issuance of cosacauniques and other
Havy war news releases by the Office of Public Relations*
Secretary Knox enticed Lieutenant Commander Paul C. Smith*
V$)m, editor and general manager of the San francisco
cftrpnig i^ . to return to active duty aa head of the Pxmmm
Section. He arrived ten days after Pearl Harbor to relieve
Lieutenant Commander Wharton* who had already begun
functioning as liaison officer with OFT and the GOI. In a
memorandum to the chiefs of fcavy bureaus and offices* the
secretary announced the arrival of Smith in glowing terms
t
(fie) "is one of the most widely known and greatly respected
editors of the country and he ham coma to »9rv9 at a very
great personal sacrifice. "*
In the same memorandum* Knox asifced each bureau and
office chief to set down the security rules he wished to be
observed for news coming out of his department. He added
With these precautionary meaaurea taken, X want
each Bureau Chief to arrange so that the Public
Relatione Department will be provided freely with all
I.I.V-
?2
information available that has mews value* Bern much of
this information im to bs released win be passed upon
by Admiral Hepburn. . • , In this way I think we can
sat up a news handling system which will fauction
smoothly and will achieve the purpose X have in raind.
That purpose is to give to that newspapers and other
sctivitias that can km made public with dee regard for
navy Security *m tha protection of assantially secret
matter.
the raeponse to this memorandum was in most respects
negative. Tha restrictions proposed by tha naval military
leaders, if institute*** would hava bsen sufficient to
render tha entire jsavy public ralstions program ineffective.
for axag$>l*« the Chief of naval Operations, admiral Harold
ft. Stark* submitted a list of thirty-eight subjects about
which ha believed no information whatsoever should bs
furnished to tha press. According to Admiral Hepburn, this
list covered *tha antire field of news which is pertinent
for inclusion in official communiques if tha public is to
I
a
bs kept reasonably informed upon tha ptogx*mm of the war."
Admiral Hepburn want on to say that tha Bavy's
early war communiques had been criticised for "meagerness,
woodenness and evasiveness, * and that steps would have to
be taken to improve tha system for receiving information.
Ha recommended that there be given to an officer-messenger
of Q»R currant information from all bureaus and offices on
the status of the war* Tha very same day, Secretary Knox
forwarded the admiral*a letter to all bureaus sad offices





let Refer*nee (*) are approved. Chiefs of Bureaus and
Offices will take steps to ineure effective cooperation
with the Office of Public ftelations. * 31
Frank Knox's frustration with the "security
syndroms* of the military leadership seeioed to reach Its
seaith in the early stages of the war, and he included the
Army in his bitterness. In February 1942* he wrote to a
friandt
With respect to the public relations policy, my
difficulty as a life-long newspaper reporter is to oat
the aea of the two armed services to recognise that
this is not a private war to he carried out surrepti-
tiously* but that, after all, the country belongs to
the public antS the public is entitled to know all that
we can tail them without giving away secrets to the
enemy. Hut in simple tense, the task is to sell the
idea that the people are to he told all that can he
tolrfi thai* * « « instead of as little as possible—the
less the better.
The latter, unfortunately* is the peacetime
attitude of the Army and Siavy. In a system where
promotion is dependent upon records, the instinct of
the *r*sy or Ssvy Officer when confronted with a
reporter and a request for news is that if he says
nothing he can't be hurt, but if he saya something, it
may be used to his disadvantage, therefore, they have
puraued a policy of alienee consistently. 3*
The secretary himself, however, was at the center
of a controversy that developed in aaam&ey and February
1§42 over the time of release of naval communiques* Since
the war began, the Washington correspondents for morning
mewspapera had accused the navy of timing its releases to
benefit the evening papers, one of which was Knox's Chicago
tMlilV ttftWi
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rumors spread that the navy planned to release at noon the
next day information about the Gilbert and Marshall Island
raids on January 31. A group of morning newspaperman* lad
by l*rod Fasley, acting chief of the mm York Baily m*%«
trashington bureau, organised a telethons haraaement casapaiun
in an attempt to get tha Jfsvy to hold up the release until
the following evening so that the morning papers eould
print it first. Pasley had additional word that the only
two eyewitness correspondents embarked on the raids were
reporters from the Chicago na^iy ¥*»" and the Chicago Tfl—-
fie caustically told the Bevy Freaa Section t "It's not going
to look well if the release is so timed that an exclusive
eyewitness account by a Knox man appears in a Xnox paper
33
and in papers served by a Xnox syndicate."
The persistence of the morning newspapers**n paid
off. Zt was decided to issue the initial communique about
the raids on the evening of Pabruary 12* giving bare
details for morning papers, and to follow up with a more
complete release at 9*30 tha next morning for the afternoon
journals. A memorandum for tha press the next day struck
bach at the battling journalists by saying. "The navy
Department considered this manner of release « fair distri-
bution of the news to all concerned. Obviously, not
everyone can be pleased in such a manner. Consequently.
34there's the explanation, and that's that.
*




week, *arli*r. On February 5, he wrote to Admiral Hepburn*
Although X am certain that this precautionary
suggestion is not necessary aa far aa either you or
your aanior officera are concerned, nevertheless X wish
you would take the necessary steps in the Office of
Public Relatione so that under no circumstances will
the representatives of the Chicago asliy s*w» receive
any siore favorable treatment fr©» Public Relations
officers of the Mavy Department than is receive** by the
correspondents or writers of any similar newspaper
under slmi lar conditions*^
The secretary exhibited a personal concern for many
facets of public reletions during the early part of 1942.
8e sent a letter to all ships and stations encouraging
commanding officers to toe on the alert for publicity
photography opportunities , citing several occasions on
which there were no photographers on hand to record news-
worthy events, as also was extremely interested in a fund-
raising ^xiv* for the savy Jtelief society. The campaign
was chaired nationally by Clarence Dillon of Dillon* Read *
Company, New fork* but involved considerable liaison work
by the naval district public relations officers* Walter
winchaXl, an inactive-duty naval reserve lieutenant com-
mander, was Mew Yorfc chairman.
Another program which required public relations
cooperation by the Havy during 1942 was the effort on behalf
of War Savings Bonds. Admiral Hepburn assigned one of his
officers. Lieutenant Commander Eugene Saehman, USlet, to
conduct public relatione activities for the Coordinator fax





Khen the war started * applications for commissions
mm public relation* officers literally swamped both
Waahington and the naval districts, ftt the same tints* the
number of public relations officers was frosen* as were
other specialties in the Navy. But within a faw weafcs*
many of the younger officers serving is public relations
anslunmsnts wars detached for sea duty and other combat
jobs. The rapid turnover in personnel* especially in the
district offices* was complicated by the Increased informa-
tion workload brought on by the war. ?o compensate for
these conditions* Secretary Knox initiated a policy of
accepting for duty in public relations those officer candi-
dates who had minor physical defects sufficient to dis-
qualify them for sea duty.
The over-all quality of navy public relations
personnel thus began to decline somewhat from what it had
bean before the war* when officers were hand-picked for
their special talents and capabilities. Evidence of the
change was apparent in a memorandum written by Frank Mason
In the fall of 1942 in which he aired a Slew York Tim*
complaint about *youn$* inexperienced and irresponsible*
naval reserve public relations officers. The basis for
the newspaper "a criticism waa the fact that one of its
stories had been reviewed by a former XiamA office boy who








¥he complaints over immature public relations
offleers, coupled with the difficulty in keeping certain of
tte young son is shore billets, caused the Office of Public
Relation* to consider limiting future assignments in the
function to officers over th» age of forty, fortunately.
thin plan was nipped in the feud, partially by Foul Smith
who wrote directly to Secretary Knox outlining strenuous
M
objections to the policy.
Bapsrlease was an instrumental factor in the deci-
sion early in 1942 to bring Imland ?• Uwette, now a
captain, hack into OPft to relieve Commander Boh Berry as
the Assistant Director. &erry remained as an executive
assistant to Admiral Hepburn. A former head of the Public
Relations Branch in OKI who had the respect and confidence
of the tfashington Press Corps* Captain Lovette—as a
destroyer squadron co»msn«?er—had two of his ships sunk in
the attack on Pearl Harbor. According to £&&£&£-*>
£mhliahft£* ae brought back with him "that spirit of out-
raged indignation that animated anyone who witnessed the
treacherous attack ... and he infused this feeling in the
fcS
entire public relations staff. 1*
Lovette found the public and the news media "in s
high state of doldrums as a result of ftaarl Harbor, and
demanding details of all encounters* m4° Bs immediately
promised that he would ensure the factual accuracy of
future eemmuaigues and news releases* so that they would
**m etftfu
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"atend up in the light of hiatory.
"
Other personnel changes in OPR early in 1942 saw
ttx. J. Harrison Hartley take over the Radio Section from
Lieutenant Coanandar Sorvelle Sharp© and Lieutenant Coar
maader William K, Bernrieder* URKk, reliev* Lieutenant
Ceassander Jamas Stahlman aa head of the fcaval districts
Section* Stahlaan reported to Saw Orleans aa Eighth Saval
District public relations officer*
Meanwhile* the increase*' demands of the news madia
following the outbreak of war dictated certain changes in
the functions ant! activitiee of soma of the sections in
OtR* Hartley estimated that demands for eervicss by the
radio industry alone trebled after Pearl Harbor. 41
Since the four eaajor radio networks* all located in
Hew York City* wars devoting more and more broadcast tie**
to the war effort* Including naval activitiee* it became
apparent that a branch office in Hew York to concentrate on
the problems peculiar to network radio would have coneider-
able value* The Amy had already sat ^ap such a branch
directly under its Bureau of Public Relatione. The navy
followed suit on May 25* 1942, establishing in Kew York the
Branch Radio section* Office of Public Relations* The new
office waa under the direction of Lieutenant Morgan 6. A.
Reichner* USSR* former scmdio officer for the Third Naval
Diatrict public relations office who had his own advertising
firm in Kew York City before returning to active duty
'I .1 1 1 |
7*
in 1941.
In the spring of 1942* the savy had three regular
half-hour programs par week on network radio. "The Pirat
Line* waa featured by CBS, while the Blue network carried
"Meet Your i*avy w ami Mutual aired "Anchora Aweigh."
Bartlay wisely reco»asended to Captain Lovette that addi-
tional programs not ha added "for t&mt of our material
Uhaoo«in9 too spread out.*
The broadcasting industry, in addition to airing
regular service~oriente6 programs, provided invaluable
eeaietance to the military in recruiting and other caaqpaigns.
Early in tha war. for instance* there waa a shortage of
binoculara in tha rapidly eapa&din? fleeta. Tha Mavy
decided to ask tha public for their binoculara on a loan
basis for tha duration and turned to radio to snake tha
appeal. The broadcasts r* responded with such effectiveness
that "within a month a steady supply of binoculara was
43
reaching tha aaval Q&servatory.
-
Requests for aeeistaace from magazine publishers
also multiplied rapidly during this period. In Harch 1942,
a new Mmjasine Section was formed in tha Washington office*
replacing tha old Scripts Section. Victor Slakeslee, the
1009-time head of Scripta and now a lieutenant commander,
waa placed in charge of the new section. And as was done
with radio* a Branch Ma^asine faction was set up in Sew
I
York, with Lieutenant Jamee van Alan* USSR, mi director.
?he upgrading of eervice to aagasinea was particu-
larly timely at thia etag* becauoa naval personnel vara
be^innin^ to return £r©» convbat aonaa with action atoriaa
of ^raat intercet to mogaitna editors* Within aix taonths
of ita esteblishaent* tha Mftoasinc taction of ©PR waa
handling 250 manuscripts par aonth* tooth for magaainaa ana
books. Ito bigyeat atory of the year was an interview with
Lieutenant Cotaaender John ©. Bulkley* tJSM« the IT-Boet
efcippsr who directed the evacuation of General itaoArthur
from the Philippines, Arraitgesonts ware mac* for Bulklay*
daring a viait to Washington* to work with a writer from
the eection in developing the atory. ftasrifira BUamt
printed it in full? and later tha hook *ftE»y w»r» a»p>n<isHiA
waa published about tha adventurea of Bulkley and other
fT-Boat personnel.
In another organisational change* a eub-eection of
the Pictorial Section waa located in the Lars Anderson
Mansion on Haaaaehuaetta Avenue to supervise tha Navy*
a
cosebat art progra** war poatera* and apeclai diaplaye and
exhibita* Lieutenant (junior grade) Bofcert L. Parsons*
mm, waa designated of£icer~in-charge of thia activity*
Tha new sub-section steamed frost a recommendation on
December 29* 1941* by the Committee on War Information that
the Office of Facts and Figures coordinate the preparation
and distribution of all goveriment war poatera*
If
The coabat art program, meanwhile, waa now in full
•winy after its initiation in the fall of 1941* Lieutenant
Coamander Griffith nailey Coale already had painted scenes
depicting a convoy snroute to Iceland and the Japan©ae
attack on Pearl Harbor. Four young artists. Lieutenant
a
(junior grade) fcwight C. ghepler and williesa 7* draper of
Boston and Albert K. Hurray of Maw York, and Kneiga
Mitchell Jamieeon of Washington ware coamiaaionad early in
1942 and aant to aea to record dramatic incidents in cosfeat
Mm*. It is interesting to note that theae artiste were
wall received in the fleets partially because they could
salt confidential details in a painting that a photograph
stlght reveal. Another prominent artist. John Taylor Arsis*
known for his etchings of architectural subjects, was
engaged under wavy contract to etch various types of eoabat
vessels, both under construction and in a completed state*
An additional function undertaken by navy public
relations abortly after our entry into the war waa the
providing of publicity for special recruiting drives. Leas
than a week after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Hepburn wrote the
diatrict cosnaadante that their immtiimt* publicity eapha-
sls should be on the »avy*a tmmd for sasn. Zn April 1942,
ha dispatched two letters etreeeing the requirement for
publicity on the Clean V~l and Class v~$ recruiting
programs for non-aviation and aviation officers respectively.
By April 1942, there ware fifty-seven officers, ten
. s
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enlisted wen and sevsnty-threc civilian* in the Office of
Public delations—exclusive of the branch personnel in Maw
York—for a grand total of 140. an increaae of forty-nine
since Pearl Harbor* Of the fifty-seven officers* only nine
were Regular Kavy* showing the reliance by the ttavy on
45
uniformed civilians performing public relation* duties.
MKtVr.ftl fitogj flftirairialiila Hhatiiftlft
In each war* certain sen emerge a* strong and
natural leaders of a particular aspect of their nation's
war effort* In naval operational matters in norId War 11*
euch a men was Admiral Ernest J* King*
King was personally selected by President Roosevelt
to relieve Admiral Husband Kimmel as Coeaaender in Chief of
as
the y.S. Fleet following the disaster at Pearl Harbor*
and furthermore was macs directly responsible to the
President himself* Three months later—on March 12* 1942—
he also waa designated to replace Admiral Stark as Chief of
Havel Operations* This unprecedented move of combining in
mam the Havy*s two top military commands gave King a
greater concentration of power than had ever been vented in
47
any previoua American naval officer* ft also had signif-
icant implications for the navy's wartime public relations
program* since all policies for the release of information
had to have at least King's tacit approval if sot his








approval was vary difficult to come by*
The natural aversion to publicity shared by seafar-
ing man seemed to be personified in Admiral King* Mood to
this was his absolute preoccupation with security following
Pearl Harbor* Ha especially wanted to avoid the appearance
of any information which night reveal to the Japanese that
their codes had been broken or let the Germane know about
our anti~substarine techniques* Hr waa most aincoro in
hie conviction that lives could be saved and battles won by
withholding or delaying the release of many detaila about
our wartime* operation*, "If I can save one life by
restricting public relatione* X will* * he remarked at one
point early in the war* It waa a sentiaemt not easily
argued against* and one shared by nasty othera*
Inevitably* Kin? 'a negative approach to public
relations was deetined to clash with Frsnfc Knox's snore
liberal views on the subject* It was one of the few
instances of basic disagreement between the two men during
the war* The secretary had concurred with the President
in the choice of Xing so the top naval military leader and
had great respect for the admiral's unusual abilitiea and
long experience* despite the fact that ha waa often by-
passed by him on operational and many administrative
mattsre*
Xing and Knox never really reconciled their differ-




Of course* the Secretary of the 8avy had final say on what
waa to ba released and what withheld* In actual practice*
however* icin^'a viawa uaually prevailed* particularly
during the first two year* of the wax* For instance*
through 1943 he waa able to Maintain a policy of paremitting
virtually no atoriaa of an operational nature to be cleared
in tha thaatara of combat* £aeh one had to ba referral
back to Washington* where hia deputies censored them in
conjunction with tha Office of Public Relatione. More
often than not during this period, tha admiral* a deputise
voted on tha aide of caution and rafuaad material that tha
aacretary'a repreeentativee and later they themesIvee would
have passed*
Rear Admiral Juliue A. Furer* U8H (Retired),
recorder of tha Ifavy** wartime admlniatrative history,
definitely atatea that Admiral King*a desires on tha release
of information ware accommodated in tha long run. furer
citea aa evidence for hia concluaion tha fact that tha
director of Public Aalationa ultimately waa ordered to
report both to the Secretary of tha Kavy Mai the Chief of
naval Operations, At least one parochial vote for Secretary
Knox aa the winner in the dispute* however* waa registered
in a postwar letter to Mrs* Knox diecuaaing the public
relations disagreemente between the two men* "King was
always severe* to publicity* He was built that way, Frank*









views which* of course* prevailed."
An exaaqple of King's distrust of Knox a* a news-
paper pu&lisher occurred at a top level and top secret
briefing on Guadalcanal early in the war. The secretary
missed a point and asked the admiral to go into raor© detail.
Xing looked at hi» and eaid. "Of course* you realise thia
la completely off-the•record* Mr* Secretary:" ^
t arly in 1942* Admiral Hepburn had a meeting with
Xing at which the fleet commander agreed that it would be
all right to "loosen up a little*1 on releasing policy. *
few daye later* the Chicago ^l^n* took a regular naval
communique about defenses on Midway and added to it some
information obtained from secret massages seen months
earlier by an employee who waa a former naval officer, the
resulting atory should have been submitted for clearance by
the newspaper* but instead was passed by an assistant news
editor who thought it was si&ply a rewrite of the official
communique. Upon reading the article* Admiral King
immediately called Admiral aepburn and roared* "I didn't
I
wean to loosen up that much: *
Iran* Knox also took exception to what he considered
carelessness on the part of the Trrfrfrnwr *n publishing
secret information. In late 1942* he wrote to will Kays
complaining thstt
Bertie Mccormick's praise of the navy falls on
rather deaf ears. On two separate occasions* he has
not let any concern for the Havy and security of the
-
men who man ©or ship* prevent him from publishing
information of the highest value to the enemy. 5*
When the carrier renftngfrffy was sunk in the tattle
of the Coral Sea on May 8* 1942. maws of bar loas was with-
held for thirty-five days* oven ten days after her
survivors and thousands of others who saw her go down
arrived in San Diego on June 2. The rationale for this
delay was tossed on the top secret fact that a powerful
Japanese fleet was prowling the mid-Pacific evidently bound
for a staler strike against Midway. Since the y^yjnytMie had
been sunk by one of our own destroyers after sustaining
criticsl damage, Admiral King assumed that the enemy did
not know of her loss* At least* he wanted the Japanese to
think that the carrier would he available to defend the
0.3. outpost. Whether or not the enemy fell for the trick*
it is true that they turned tail and ran in the ensuing
Settle of Midway, icing was convinced that their ignorance
of the loas of the Lexington led then to overestimate the
aise of the American force, and thus he felt justified in
keeping quiet about the earlier sinking. Severthe leas, the
lateness in the announcement caused a tremendous furor to
be raiaed by the press and many Congressmen. 57
Also in the spring of 194a* King was urgently con-
cerned about the attack on Allied merchant ahipping mounted
by German submarinea near our Atlantic Coast. As a result*
he issued a stringent directive prohibiting all publicity
4 MNHOTB*
.:..
m•bout our own submarine operations, tfcia directive vm so
literally interpreted that the security review officer in
0#K could not ev»n get fif**low stories about submarine
.to.**!. 5*
within the limite of hia security policies* how*
aver, the admiral triad to be helpful to the news media*
according to hia biographer* Ifaltar whitehiil. Although ha
did not hold any formal press conference* during the war*
ha frequently not on an informal basis during 1942*1944
with a group of weanington correspondents at a friend*
a
houee in Alexandria. Vs.* giving then background briefings
on current naval operation*. This relationship resulted in
tha following "citation* being presented by these
correspondents to "Fleet Admiral Ernest a. King" after tha
for conspicuous bravery and intrepidity above sad
beyond the call of duty in performance of which he
daringly ignored his own natural instincts* and alone
and aingi&handedly* at a moment when adverse winds of
publicity ware threatening to sink the whole fleet*
exposed himself to a frontal assault by the $i&}m&
shock; troops of the journalistic enemy led by some of
the most reprohsnaible and blood-thirsty Washington
correspondents* and from that moment on* never retiring
to cover from their incessant salvoes of crossfire*
storms d the enemy in its own defenses and in the
decieive and little-known Battle of Virginia conquered
and captivated them completely* ^*
One of the earlieet and probably largest headaches
for tha navy's Office of Public Relatione and the U.s*







over procedures far releasing information about merchant
•hip sinkings by Oermam submarines off our Atlantic Coast-
On January IS. 194a* the prngmm of newspapers were
filled with reports about the close-in German submarine
activity, with the less story being the sinking of the
cnimk^rm east Qf {*&*» York* The &*&**, it would seem* was
not violating the censorship code* issued only a few days
earlier* because that code permitted publication of news
announced toy "appropriate authority* * The problem was that
Byron Price had failed to identify in his code just who
would he considered pgqp*x authority* tthea the merchant
ships began going down and survivors drifting hash ashore*
^m wwSapvJ os*^^^m*n>,'a» **^(^w»# h^^y^» ^^*y^* ^> *a*m^RP At ^^si^^ee y^p^ww^im we^^^^sm** ^mse^wafc^s
lieutenant along the coast suddenly became "appropriate
authorities'* for the release of such news* which in turn
was verified by the district public relations office in Mew
York without prior check with Washington*
The Office of tfaval Intelligence immediately fired
off a "broadside* at Admiral Hepburn* demanding that
"proper steps be taken to withhold from publication news of
sj
enemy operations in United States coastal areas* * * In
response* the Director of Public Relations sent a dispatch
on January 16 to the commandants of coastal naval districts*
establishing the policy that all announcements concerning
m^^^frep ^ess^m^Bm*e ^w*»«^esf* ernes'•s^m^assS'im^^* ^^Bo^mm i«'«m"mr ^WTSm(m^^^^*nf ^mae»» ^ej^^**-^** w*eww*^w ^m*v.
their waters would henceforth be made first by the tlavy

62
Bepartment in Washington* Hasty consultation with the
Office of Censorship had secured a tentative agreeisent that
ail such releases would be channeled through the Fress
section of 0**» with the Itavy now designated as the sola
"appropriate authority 4* for news of this nature. 0§H
quickly followed up its message to the coastal commandants
with detailed instructions on how to handle such delicate
matters as survivor interviews and eyewitness accounts (sea
note 17).
On January 17* the Office of Public Relatione
apologised to the press for the Misunderstanding surrounding
the f*ft**fm incident, in the form of a "not for publication'*
**^aj^jt^*es^sisbis<pe» w ffSs^nsasA ^aaaaa ^acet «wss> \^^Feit mWT w'^meeJa- npiKs^m* »eaw * earn* sswp^p sa^P^sns
of the Press Section, while stating that the Kevy depart-
ment in Washington was without authentic information about
the sinking, nevertheless did not excuse the Navy's
responsibility for the resulting confusion—in which soma
newspapers carried the story while others Hilled it in the
absence of official confirmation* Lieutenant Commander
Smith's tactful approach to the situation enabled him to
solicit press cooperation i^ withholding such stories in
the future until they could be cleared by his office* "even
though the incident may be within the view of shore
observers, and even if the information has been given by
local officials* Uaval or otherwise.*63





Price*, who in a statement to managing editors admitted that
"the confusion recently over submarine activities has been
due to a series of errors on the part of all concerned
,
SjJ
including ths Office of Censorship** Fries assured the
editors that the necessity to clear stories with Washington
applied specifically to the subject of enemy action against
Merchant ships and sinkings of enemy submarines. Naval
authorities in outlying possessions could still clear anil
^m^m^m *»-w ^smmt *m e^^e e^w ^^^m ^* ^e ee e^mer^m ^*> m^ ss^Sr^s ^^^npee*s ^w ^a> w*# ^^^^^^ssa»^sw^^Bp %sfSwp ^*m»eem e«M#
naval district public relations officers retained the
authority to release naval information of other types
within their areas*
The security rationale behind the withholding of
news about merchant ship sinkings was valid only if one
agreed with the Bevy's presU.se that the primary enemy «
intelligence reports en the subject case from the skippers
of German submarines who fired the torpedoes, fceports from
these sources <auite naturally were open to question. Even
if the enemy commanding officer was absolutely sure that
the ship he attacked did .indeed go to the bottom, which
could not always be the case* he was reluctant to break
radio silence to inform his superiors because of the peril
in which this would place his own vessel. If he chose to
wait until he returned to port* the information could be
delayed for weeke* In addition* he might not make it back









flaw in tha Wavy'a logic waa that <iuit«
iy
sinking* free their
raiio to gat their tlfiaannHitOHl Tlmx* war* plentiful
witnasa accounts and survivor storiaa floating
vie* circulation fivan to thaa*
it vary difficult lor the prasa to
Oelaya on puteXleity about ehip sinkings. At laaat ana
alitorial writer* in denouncing the policy
«
inaiatad that Hitler knew bow a
bat further claiaad that tha *ss*ie*n public should
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which began to erode the Morale of the entire Merchant
Marine. Thia prompted Admiral Hepburn to write to the
a™* Seem iB^Sk *e#^W '(* w^lWIIIlItW§Wn™»FVW W
It has lately developed that the type of publicity
resulting has created a eerioua aituation with reepect
to the moral* of as&rchant crews. Caaaa have occurred
where aarioua difficulty and delay hava bean experienced
in eecurin* crewe* Tha principal source of trouble ia
the emphasia by toe preaa upon the •horror* aapecta of
caaualtiaa aa gathered from survivors. Conversely*
(there haa been) tha comparative dearth of news items
showing heroic actions or good morale* <&
Tha only eolation open to the admiral on the
survivor interview problem wee to attempt to bring thaaa
interviews under Ifcavy control aa i^uch as possible*
Accordingly, ha issued instructions in hia letter that the
eMetrict public relatione officer* interview tha survivors*
firat and than preside over their initial contacta with tha
preaa*
Admiral Hepburn took a major atop in late March to
neutralise some of tha preaa diaaatiafaction over the now
controversial merchant ship issue* In a memorandum to all
district public relations officers, ha implored them to
aearch for ways to make tha press understand tha reasons
and 'reasonableness* of the currant policy*69 81s plea waa
significant in that it repreaented the firat evidence since
tha war began of a growing realisation that quite possibly
tha press and tha public had not been presented with suffi-




In early June, the releasing procedure for ahip
sinkings. Which at laet had bean operating aaoothly.
received a jolt from an unexpected source—Congress. On
mjml^^ Jw&rx**» ^^ a> ^pspsamp ^w ^*^m^pj»;^»ee*s, ^^s^es a»*^^##^mifc^» a *a%^ej^w3a> * a e^efcae^^p
issued an announcement about a ahip sinking front his office.
Ha felt qualified to do so, because the survivors had
landed in hia hone atate and the Kavy had provided hi& with
information about the incident. Further* the watch officer
in the Office of Censorship passed the story because ha
quite properly judged meufeer* of Congress to be Nsppropri~
ate authorities • * 80 crisis developed over thla loophole
in the policy , hot the Wavy was forced to releaae its own
story on the sinking within a couple of hours after the
70Senator's releaae.
The &avy also received criticise from the press
concerning ita operational meaeurea to cor&at the u~aoat
menace. Over 300 merchant ships and tankers in the Carib-
bean, Gulf of Mexico and along the U.S. Atlantic Coast had
been aunk between aid*January and late June of 1942. In
the wake of these losses, columnists Arthur Krock and
Waiter TJ.p£*aann urged the aea service to cos$ensate for the
ahortacje of destroyers by using small boats to locate and
fight the German submarines. The Kavy countered with the
claim that such small craft ware not seaworthy enough and
did not have the listening devices* speed and armament to
deal with the modern eubmarine. The onslaught of the
'
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columnists continued. however? and on June 27 « the »avy
announced that it was relaxing ita restrictions to allow
1*000 email boata and crave to qualify for anti-suiamarine
patrol* *Xa eo doing** *^»^"«» declared, "it may have been




The merchant ship issue continued to causa certain
problems throughout 1942* Early in May* the taking of
photographs for publicity purposes of damaged ships which
managed to return to port had baan prohibited* This
directive was so literally interpreted that it had to be
canceled in late June because no photographs at all of
WW^W sjHe^ejpS^s ^P^P 4»^p a#^s«es^p *r^P#sP*sSO ** dmjMPsPvF wnHPm WWV jr ipB^P^»^^V PSUwit
^Pm*meP^h^iP^js«e ^SmPSSj^p m^i^Pi ^bSA%»^mdbee^*^p^P mvw^P* s^^p>i»>' mm%#pjpsrsP a ^4PV* ^Pm>%seme» ^e^^p^p ii<vuAr
fied to allow commercial photographera, who ware often the
only ones at the scene* to take picturea
—
provided they
were submitted for clearance* On June 1* the prase waa
raqueated not to identify the ports where survivors landed
except in very general terms such as "an East Coaat port*"
This irritating restriction was finally rescinded in lata
December whan the instaneee of sinkings close to our shores
ware considerably reduced.
The reason for this reduction* however # the
increasing success of our anti-aubmarine warfare meaaurea*
continued to be cloaked in secrecy* On June 3* 1*42* the




stating, "Ho information concerning activities of U.S.
submarines will be released for publication prior to
73initial release by SecKav." Admiral Hepburn attempted to
relax this stringent policy by submitting a detailed plan
to Secretary Knox in July which would have permitted
considerable background information to ba given out on anti-
aubmarino capabilities. What happened to this plan is
not known* It is known* however, that at least as far mm
our own submarine setions are concerned, the "silent
service" label applied early in 1942 remained appropriate
throughout the war.
The savy did make public in late summer the first
casualty list of Merchant Marine personnel killed or
missing as a result of enemy action. And, it is interesting
to note that shortly after the Germans launched their
attach on coastal shipping, the prewar restrictions against
publishing photographs of merchant ships armed or being
75
armed was purposefully lifted.
first Cftsmlty Ust sikS Initial
VoVtffy Ecelarlions
Complete lists of dead and wounded were a trouble-
some security and public relations problem from the very
start of the war* Eight after ffearl Harbor, the Army and
navy had agreed on a procedure for releasing casualty lists
while at the same time protecting security and providing for
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•, cm December 12. President Roosevelt orders that
HO general release of casualties by names be made, merely
total numbers and categorise. In lata January 1942* the
Office of Facta and rigurea asked the war and Havy Depart*
aianta to join with it in staking a recommendation to the
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President to allow publication of eueh lists by names*
M»anwhiie« the Savy had boon holding up announce-
cants of naval losses until lists of survivors could ho
thoroughly cheeked and the next of kin of all casualties
notified* Due to the llavy policy of permitting frequent
shifts of personnel between ships and stations in the
fleets and outlying areas and other factors peculiar to sea
warfare* there were often long delays in obtaining accurate
information on casualties. Thus, in the middle of March
1942* news releases concerning the loss of nine naval
vessels were pending because the next of kin had not yet
boon notified* 77
Admiral Hepburn became concerned over what ho
terraed *mn increasing tendency on the part of the press and
public to suspect that the navy was withholding unfavorable
news regarding ship losses because of the grist picture it
presents." Ha based this concern on an analysis of
editorial coajeant and personal conversations with leading
journalists and radio commentators* &n example of the
editorial comment which disturbed the admiral appeared in
the Sew York TJffiftft on March 12 1 "Unnecessary suspicions*
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unwarranted cfcslay. a«i confusion over what information the
mavy Pepartment actually dams release is not calculated to
stiffen tamrican morale la • long hard war. "7 fas cay
after this editorial appeared. Admiral Bepfeurn
confirmed, provided that a© security consideration* were
Involved Caaa note 77). Every effort would toe made to
Inform the next of kin prior to the public announcement,
ew?aa%» m*asdemw ^wyr^e-ds^ai e#ee sbmPBSTSf^r-ap si^^m ^me* ^PeWm^m^isjiseeiraS maiSj-^mai'MT ^ji ne*ssSm<mtSgi^i? 4S%aw>
e» ii(J^iP e-^^a^m^^ av^r j,aa<a4BfiMF 41
A few days later* the Cosm&ittee on War Information
of 017 issued a press ralaaae stating that the government
pledged to give the American people the bad war news aa
well aa the good* ao long aa it would not give aid and
am
00mfort to the enemy. Xt wee the firat comprehensive
government statement of policy on mar information and
represented the firat official admiaaion that there wee
press and public diaaatia faction with the manner in which
the release included a longraweited decision
regarding the publication of eaaualty liata. Lists of
servicemen killed in action would be made public on the
condition that the news madia would not ieaue nationwide
summaries of caaualtiea* They wave to confine themaelvma
to pabliahing only the mamma from their own areas.
On May 2* the navy re learned ita firat casualty liat
5
of thu war, covering the period from Becember ?, 1941* to
April 15. 1943* Thtt ii»t consisted of the namas of dead,
wounded and missing, a* a result of enemy action, of the*
Kavy. Coast Guard and Marina Corp*. lit consonance with the
earlier decision, it carried with it the stipulations that
newspaper* and local radio stations must use only naaaa
whose next of fcia reside in their respective circulation
and broadcast vicinities, ana that magasines and radio net-
works should restrict themselves to nmm* of national
significance or interest. The promise was made that addi-
tional lists would be compiled as rapidly aa possible qpon
receipt of information and tha notification of naxt of
Kill*
By thia txsm, however, a firm procedure had been
worked out to hold up the lists only thirty-six hours after
telegrama ware sent to the next of kin* The lists ware
compiled by a sub-section in the frees Section of 0*m
headed by a civilian, Mr* ftobert Templeton.
A second raster announcement in the Office of Facts
and Figure a March preee release about war information
policy was that future *joint bulletins, * giving a general
review of the military situation in various theaters of
operation, would be issued from time to time by the Chief
of Staff of the Army and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
The policy declaration also spelled out in detail
for the first time the reasons for withholding certain

types of news* The rational* ?iven for restricting
•pacific naval news showed much evidence that Admiral King*
a
rigid ideas on what should and should not ha released ware
vary much in ascendancy at the beginning of the war. Jfior
inatanc«f any news of tna ainkiny of American eo**bat ships
was ruled out until
,
it waulQ no Ijnftgfiir fas .odE **\y vilmi ,Jaft
fchajsnajsy* Damage auatainad by J.s. Havy ahips would ba
reported whan it occurs in sight of tna enemy, but tna
extent of tna d snags normally would not ba announced until
repair a had bean made.
Thraa raaaona wara advanced for tna policy of with-
holding any nawa of enemy submarines sinkings. The first
two had considerable validity! thee© actions were difficult
to verify; and tna enemy would probably aand another
submarine to replace one that ha knew for aura waa lost*
The third reason waa not ao easy to rationalise. It waa
claimed that withholding nawa of enemy submarine sinkings
would have mn "adverse psychological effect" on the enemy*
•reauaably. it was felt that in the absence of any news*
anxiety would build up in the enemy camp when a subaarina
failed to re-turn to ita horns port as scheduled*
tna pre as ralease underscored one indisputable
factor behind soma of the delays in naval nawa* 80 often $
it was absolutely eesential for a ship or task force to
maintain radio silence in order not to tip off the enemy as







were frequently not filed until • vessel reached port.
The press and public had no quarrel with the basic
philosophy of not giving out information that would aid the
foe* As tie shall see* however, they were shortly to dis-
agree with some of the Navy's judgments as to what informa-
tion fell in that category* But first* let us look at
another atep being taken at this time to further the
information flow* the refining of procedures for handling
war correspondents*
Agggaditatifin of tfnr Corrgj
There had seen a system in effect for soma time in
the Administrative Section of Ot*R for accrediting
correspondents to the fleets and for special embarkations*
In the emergency period prior to the war* many media
obtained Navy accreditation for correspondents on a "wait
and see 9* l>*BiMt* when the war began* these accredited
reporters flocked to Hawaii and other points* eager to
embark with the fleets.
Due to the critical operational situation and the
emphasis on security* there were few embarkations in the
Pacific in the first months following Pearl Harbor* how-
ever* Correspondents were required to fit their material
into the framework of official communiques from the bsttle
areas* mvd often were able to fill in details on those
communiques only days and sometimes even weeks after
t4$
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particular operations took place. By order of the Pacific
always had to precede press copy* which first had to ha sub-
mitted to the fleet public relations officer for cheeking
by the fleet censor* Vsmmm copy of an operational
nature* even after this censorship at the source* had to be
sent back to the Office of tublie delations for clearance.
There was at least one early complaint filed by a
correspondent over the initial procedures for handling
press copy in the Pacific* In late feforuary 1942* Admiral
Kindts referred two articles written by John 'Donne 11 of
the Dew York fraiiy yew, which had been disapproved by the
censor* back to Admiral Hepburn with the remark that the
reporter "proposes to discuss their disposition with the
i
secretary of the Wavy.**
It was obvious to both the Navy and the An*y that
procedures for handling war correspondents needed to be
updated. As a consequence* in April 1942* a common policy
for accreditation and other details connected with these
correspondents was worked out between the two services; and
a Joint Army and Bevy War Correspondents Credentials Board
was established to consider each request for accreditation.
In announcing the policy to naval commands. Secretary Knox
directed maximum cooperation with accredited war
correspondents consistent with security. 8s emphasised
, , Ki .*.t .CU.? t«W*^ ***
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that "this cooperation is to bo interpreted as including
authorisation for embarking these accredited correspondents
on board vessels or other craft of the United States.
£aeh correspondent was required to sign three
waivers prior to receiving his accreditation* He had to
waive all claims against the government for losses, damages
or injuries incurred While attached to a military unit 7 ha
had to subject himself to abide by the provisions of U.S.
liavy Regulations and other pertinent instructions in the
area of his attachment? and he had to agree to submit his
material for censorship.
Censorship rules for war correspondents were agreed
to jointly by the State « war and navy Departments and the
Office of Censorship in May 1942. The basic regulations
required that ail press dispatches filed from outside the
continental United States had to be cleared through the
cognisant U.S. military or naval commander at the point of
filing. If a dispatch was received without evidence of
such clearance, however, it could be passed by the Office
of Censorship in the United States.
In September 1942, the navy further required war
correspondents embarking with the fleets to have a license
signed by the fleet public relations officer or the fleet
censor. This was in addition to regular accreditation
credentials issued by the Army-Navy correspondents board.






















forces afloat had to have the approval of the ©ireetor of
Public Relations. In November, both the Army and #avy
began requiring the submission of governmental Personnel
Security questionnaires from correspondents desiring
accreditation for the purpone of conducting background
investigations on them.
The system for handling war correspondents was
working smoothly by the fall of 1942* and a large number of
press and rsdio reporters operated out of Hawaii under the
control of the Pacific Fleet commander. However, it was
still difficult for correspondents to embark in a liavy ship
under combat conditions, despite Secretary Knox's encourage*
went to commanders to allow them to do so. A reviewer of
the book, Vhrnn Ifff ***** Piefc-'rtap*- lamented in December
One of the minor disappointments of the year has
been the dearth of good stories in the Pacific. Here
in an ocean lapping at the feet of half the people of
the world is being fought the greatest naval war of
history. That war has encompassed for us the disaster
of Pearl Harbor, the hopelessness of Cavite, the
desperate heroism of Macassar Straits and the Java Sea,
the elation of Midway—here were stories that had
everything but reporters. $•
There were complaints from photographers, too, that
mot enough attention was beiny given to the picture
agencies, which pooled their coverage by means of a "Still
Picture Pool." The Associated Press, Acme, International
sows Photos and JAJ&l initiated the pool under rules set













such pool photographers, but as late mm October 1942 only
four ware accredited with the Pacific Fleet*
KajEajalijhiBejat^ of,_t!m Qtfifig, jbJL
S0t long after Pearl Harbor* President Roosevelt
stated that he was opposed to the "establishment of one
large department of information which would issue* as in
as
the last war* all information put out by the government. *
He seemed to prefer that each office and department of the
government speak through its own information service
.
As we have seen* however* the government was often
criticised during the first few months of the conflict for
its handling of war information. In particular* news of
military and naval operations were considered by many to be
"belated* confusing* or inadequate.*^ The charge was
hurled also that the government was "sugar-coating" the
news by withholding or minimising information about our
more serious lossas* including those at Pearl Harbor. The
Committee on War Information of OFF wrestled with the
problem of developing a common information policy* but
press and public dissatisfaction continued to grow.
Finally* on June 13* 1942* the President consol-
idated the information functions of several agencies*
including the Office of Facts and Figures* into one Office
of War Information (owl). 90 The new office* headed by the
well-known broadcaster Elmer Davis* operated directly under
•ih&t 11 m%0u '*adk
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the President as part of the Of fie* of tmergency Manage
-
The Director of War Information was made respon-
sible for coordinating the information activities of all
federal departments and agencies. However, each department
and agency retained control of information programs
relating to its ovn authorised activities* subject to the
policies formulated or approved by owx. Significantly* the
determination as to whether specific military information
would he of aid to the enemy was left in the hands of the
war and Savy Departments* Where it was placed fey the
Preeident ri^ht after Pearl Harbor, There was a stipula-
ha oonaulted by the Army and navy on releasing matters. 91
Shortly after he took office* Elmer £avis proponed
to the two services that he be provided a daily report of
all military operationa* after which it would he determined
by mutual conference What news should be released and what
should not. the services agreed to thia procedure as it
applied to military communiques to be ieeued by their own
information agencies. However* they were extremely reluc-
tant to give 0W2 any information which they did not wish
made public* because they considered Davis to be the
primary official advocate of full disclosure and hence a
"major government security problem."
The meetings of OWt's Committee on War Information
...
. ...
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Policy—set up on the same lines as the old OFF Committee
on War Information—were not productive* according to
Davis* because the Secretaries of State* War and Navy
appointed their respective information chiefs to be their
representatives on the committee* "(These were) gentlemen
who* whatever their competence in operations* had little to
say about the information policies even of their own
93departments* . * * **
Although Elmer Davis* first dispute was with the
Army over the capture and trial of Nasi saboteurs who
ej
landed from a submarine on the East Coast* his major
problems during the remainder of 1942 ware with the Navy*
as we shall see in the next section*
While OWI did not have the authority that Elmer
Davis 6%mit^4 in the matter of press releases* it did
maintain strict control over all government participation
in commercial radio* Every program proposed by any office
or agency had to be channeled in writing through OWI* and
each script had to be reviewed and cleared by its radio
bureau. That bureau also served as the central point of
contact for government relationships with the broadcasting
95industry*
Daily contacts were maintained from the very begin-
ning between the various sections of the Navy Office of
Public Relations and their counterparts in OWI* Bill
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liaison officer with OffI, as ha had done earlier with the
Coordinator of Information ami OFF. Savon officers from
the Office of Jtfaval Intelligence* including one admiral,
96
ware assigned to OWI for security purposes.
As mentioned in the last section, suspicion grew on
the part of the press and public early in the war that the
government was "sugar-coating* the news for morale purposes.
While the full extent of our losses at Pearl Harbor waa not
known, there was a whispered belief that they were much
greater than announced. In the eyes of many, the Japanese
must have known what damage they did at Pearl Barbor?
therefore, it naturally followed that the only reason the
complete story was being withheld was to prevent the public
from Knowing the true seriousness of our military situation*
Whan the Havy made an announcement on April 18, 1942, that
certain of the ships damaged at Pearl Harbor had been
repaired and were back in service. Bob Casey of the Chicago
Tgjfcm^ cynically laid a story on the censor's desk in
Hawaii stating, "The Wavy announced today that asx&n of the
tMSL ships sunk at Pearl Harbor have been put back in
The Wavy, probably inadvertently, contributed
greatly to the "sugar-coating* theory, when it released
early reports that more than sixty Japanese ships had been
*.ts*i«s&w two ^olfe. •-k -'
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sunk toy Allied fleet* in the Battle of Makassar Strait on
January 24* 1942. The true figure was four, but this final
tally was not arrived at until all battle reports were
authenticated. The Incident was a prime example of the
difficulty in substantiating losses at sea, especially in
the Pacific during the early stages of the war, when many
battles were fought at night or at distances in which
contesting ships were out of sight of each other. The
experience also led to wore caution on the part of naval
commanders in the future in reporting enemy losses and
hence to delays in receiving and announcing the losses bach
tame **
In early March* a representative of the Office of
Facts and figures accused the Siavy of giving out all of the
as
good news and little of the bad in its communiques.
Cited in particular was the communique reporting the Battle
of Badeong Strait on February 19, which left the Japanese
fleet withdrawing to the north apparently frustrated in its
attempt to invade the island of Bali. The actual invasion
followed closely* however, without subsequent statements
from the Siavy.
Some of the confusion in reporting results of naval
battles in the Pacific during these first few months was
due to a lack of coordinated releasing policy with our
Allies. At this stage of the campaign* American* British*
Butch and Australian combined fleets (the ABDA forces) were
.pm %&w > pfl
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desperately attempting to harass the Japanese March into
the Motherlands East Indies. After the Battle of Coral sea
in early Hay* news of the engagement was released in both
Washington ami Melbourne, The Australian communique
reported that U.S. Army bombers played a major role in the
victory* a fact unmentloned in the U.S. Navy announcement.
Intelligence reports received later indicated that no Army
100bombs fell on any Japanese ships.
The major navy Information problem developing out
of the Battle of Coral Sea—the sinking of the T^«twg»*Mt
and subsequent withholding of that fact for thirty*five
days—has already been discussed.
The Battle of Midway* June 4-6. 1942* was hailed mm
a major victory for U.S. forces* which it was. Four
Japanese aircraft carriers and one cruiser were sunk* and
Admiral Yamamoto's force retreated westward early in the
battle* abandoning plans to invade Midway. Mewsreels in
lets June and early July glorified the victory with
"excellent aerial shots showing enemy ships maneuvering
frantically to escape American ships and planes* and
finally going up in flames.*101
An important factor in the Japanese defeat at
Midway was the breaking of their naval code by American
cryptologists shortly before the Battle of the Coral Sea*
enabling the U.S. Wavy to obtain advance information on the
102
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Pacific after Midway , a correspondent wrote a detailed
account of the Japanese order of Rattle which was published
in the Chicago Tribuna . Washington Tita«*-M^r*ir3 and Kew
York fraiiy Newff . The information was attributed to
"reliable sources in naval intelligence." The Wavy immedi-
ately reacted toy recommending to the U.S. Attorney General
that an investigation be concocted to determine whether the
Espionage Act of 1917, as amended in 1940* had been
violated. A grand jury* convened in Chicago in August
1942* ruled against any indictment of the Tgifrunp. or any
other newspaper "because of the great public interest
involved concerning the story that the Wavy had advance
knowledge of the strength of the Japanese fleet. '*
The good news of Midway was cheering to the
American people* but it was offset shortly after the battle
by the announcement that the TfmA FWftftn had been sunk
earlier in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Hcwevar* the Havy
was not to reveal until 100 days later~~on September 16—
that still another carrier* the Xofkfrran- had been sank in
the Battle of Midway itself.
The rationale behind the long delay in announcing
the sinking of the Yorktani *** that it had only been
damaged in the actual battle and was not sunk until three
days later when it was torpedoed by a lone Japanese sub-
marine. Again* the Havy** security experts assumed that
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had every reason to believe that thr- submarine* whi
accomplished the sinking was destroyed itself a short tims
later. Further, initial plana were being made at the time
for the first U.S. offensive against the Japanese in the
Solomon Islands. A major part of the strategy, of coarse,
was to deceive the sassy as to our strengths and weaknesses.
If there was any doubt in his mind that the* Vorfttqwn had
been sunk, why resolve that doubt by an official confirma-
tion, the reasoning went.
The above rationale might have been accepted by the
press and the public if the Japanese themselves had not
announced shortly after the Battle of Midway the sinking of
a U.S. aircraft carrier. One newspaper editorial put it
this wayt
(The) announcement that ... the carrier Yorfrtaye,
had hmmn sunk • • • hangs up a new record in delayed
communiques. The official excuse for this tardy
announcement would have us believe that it was not
until this week that the Kevy Department was sure that
the Japs knew the Voiritfcowft had gone down. Yet on
June 3th this newspaper carried a dispatch reporting
that the Japanese radio had definitely announced the
sinking of a large U.S. aircraft carrier the day
before. Just who was the Havy trying to kid—the Japs
or the American people?
... There is the uncomfortable suspicion that the
American people, instead of being told the truth as
soon as the truth can be told, are being fed bits of
good news and bits of bad news according to a scien-
tific dietary program worked out by morale experts who
look upon us as a mixture of boobs and fraidy-eate.104
The opinion that military information was being
tampered with for morale purposes was compounded by the
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about the XpxfcfcflKa's loss. Rear Adairsi W. H. P. Blandy.
Pacific Fleet destroyer commander, held a press conference
in Washington at which he claimed the U.S. fleet in the
Pacific was now superior to that of the Japanese because of
the severe enemy losses* Commenting on the timing of
Blandy's statement, the above editorial asked t "Could he
have been sweetening in advance the sour communique that
was coming?"
Columnist Arthur Krock took the position that the
public would better understand the Navy's security reasons
for withholding news of our losses if they had been given
the true picture of the severity of the disaster at Pearl
105
Harbor. In expressing this view, he struck closely to
the heart of public dissatisfaction with war news
policies. The American people were by this time very
personally and emotionally involved with the war. even if
their individual roles on the home front were in many cases
limited. They collectively seemed to resent any evidence
of a lack of confidence in their ability to "take it" on
the part of the government. In the words of one editor.
"Even when we're losing, we don't see any sense in covering
106
up the scoreboard. *
By no means was all press comment about the
Yarktrwn communique unfavorable, however. In fact.
according to a report of newspaper editorial reaction to
the announcement conducted by the Analysis Section of OPR,
tm
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S8 psr cent of the editorials »cr«*j»d were favorable to
107
the 8avy compared to 42 per cent egsinst. An excellent
example of an opinion in complete agreement with the navy's
position appeared in the Long Beach (Calif.) sapee-
Delayed confirmation of the sinking of the aircraft
carrier Vorfctown * • « provides an excellent illustra-
tion of the importance of censorship and the holding op
of news which would he of value to the enemy. It is
true* the Japanese loudly proclaimed the loss of the
Yorktown immediately following the Midway encounter,
out subsequent events proved that they merely were
guessing. They knew that the carrier was in that
region* and to report its loss not only would provide
something to brag about at horae, tout there was, they
believed* the small likelihood that such an announce-
ment would bring forth an admission or denial from the
United States navy. As the result of wise censorship*
however* the world was kept in Ignorance of the
Yorktown* a fate* and the Japanese in the west Pacific
were kept in a state of suspension. Hot being certain
of the whereabouts of the carrier* they were obliged to
map their strategy on the assumption that it was
available for action. *«®
Although complaints ever the delay in the TmHmaTfl
announcement were quite vocal* the Savy was to receive an
even greater public relations "black eye" over ita handling
of the account of the Battle of Bavo Island on the night of
August B~B* 1942. The Japanese scored a major victory in
this battle whan seven of their cruisers and one destroyer
approached an Allied fleet in the middle of the night
completely undetected. Throe American cruisers**the
mmtarjk** ftuiney and Vtoimnm,ir-**d one Australian cruiser*
the **nlm»TM - were sunk. One other U.S. cruiser and two





The Australian* promptly announced the Iocs of the
it but the day after the battle, Admiral King merely
admitted that one American cruiser had hm^n sunk and two
others damaged along with two destroyers and a transport.
At this point, he was not withholding anything, since this
represented the total extent of the information he had. A
few hours after his initial announcement* however, the
admiral was informed that the two damaged cruisers had gone
down also* tie then made a decision not to release this
fact, because he reasoned the Japanese would have returned
to attack the American transports debarking Marine
reinforcements on Guadalcanal if they had known the two
109
cruisers were not there to protect them* When no further
statement was forthcoming from the Mavy, the public was
left with the impreesion that the battle was actually an
American victory, since King's original announcement stated
that the Japanese force had withdrawn.
This time, according to JtsjfttMftfe* Elmer Davis had a
-showdown- with the ttavy, eventually forcing it to release
on October 12 the news and names of the three cruisers sunk
110
at Savo Island. Be described this confrontation in a
confidential letter to his wife, in which he offered an
interesting insight into the personality of Admiral Kings
... we have a major row on with the navy? X had a
long argument this afternoon with Admiral King which
got very acrimonious yet somehow remained friendly. He


















him* and maybe it was something of a relief to him to
find someone who wasn't. This is a very serious
matter, however* and will have to be resumed next week
and taicen right to the top if they do not coma
around.1^
Twenty* four hours after the announcement on the
Savo laland einkings* the Navy countered with good news in
a communique about the Battle of Cape Eaperance. Davis
claimed that he did not know about the Cape Ksperance
victory when he pressured the earlier release* Keverthe*
less* due to the close proximity of the two announcements*
both OWI and the »avy were charged with delaying bad
releases until they could be offset by more palatable
112
Davis also had been kept in the dark about the
sinking of the carrier gajtp. and the damaging of the battle'
•hip ffgrth, filXwUni on September 15 near Guadalcanal? and
the disabling of the carrier Saratoga in earlier action.
According to the OKI director* he did not hear about these
events "until returning travelers brought back the
«ilX2 «.^
We had always agreed with the Kavy that no detaila
about ships damaged should be given out; but it was
• - * essential that we • • • know what had happened*
so aa to form a judgement on what should be published;
if this concealment had continued CWI would have had
to go under different direction*
Davie again "talked" to the Savy about the situation* after
which information on the losses was updated.
On October 26* 1942* the carrier Hfnrftftt was sunk
\Q **
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after the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. Two daya
later, the wavy announced that aha was only damaged. That
eame night* apaaking in tfew York* Pavis told an audience
that all loaaaa of major wavy vessels reported aa of noon
that day had been released. Ha later explained that at the
time of his statement ho did not know about the sinking,
but inetead had been told that the carrier was in tow and
114
aiight be eeved.
Tha episode occurred only a few days before the
Movea&er 4th congressional elections? and Pavis pressed
Admiral King to release news of tha Hoxtt&'s sinking to
avoid the accueation that the administration was holding it
up for political reasons* When King refused, Pavis went to
sea President Roosevelt personally on the natter. The
President agreed that tha lose of a carrier should be
announced but that the ship's nana should not be released.
The Havy did announce tha sinking on October 31, prompting
Davis to comment that now *OHZ waa over the hump with the
Wavy* so far as major issues were concerned . . . Never
again was news withheld from us, nor was there much dis-
114
agreement about ita release.
*
After the elections in Hovemfoer, Davis discussed
the various delays of news about naval actions in a
national radio broadcast. While he asserted that military
security was the only factor in these delays, he claimed
that news of some of the ship leases waa withheld longer
««^.. iU HZ -^
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than necessary. Significantly, he added that criticism of
tha news policies regsrding tlia naval war in the Pacific
reached a crescendo juet before the congre esional
Hi* assertion was backed up by tha results of
monthly surveys on public aatiafaction with war information
conducted by tha Princeton University Office of Public
Opinion Research. Xn December 1941, 69 par cent of tha
American people thought the government waa supplying auffi*
116
cient information about the war* This approval fioure
declined steadily as the war pr09recced* however, until it
reached a low of 49 p»w cent in October 1942. Following
Bavle* successful fiyht with the yavy over tha BaamJL
anncunoement i*A the publicity given to the north African
landings, the fifurea jumped dramatically to 70 per cent in
sovember and leveled off at 69 per cent again in December,
the came aa it had het^n a year earlier.
Yet, there was still considerable gnashinc. of teeth
in the Havy over the wisdom of ttaly announcements of ship
lessee. An article in ImnflMinr Havy 1**900 maoasine, in
discussing the congressional and other criticism over news
policies and the navy's entire strategy in the Pacific,
opined that this "clamor . « . goaded and worried* the navy
into prematurely announcing the sinking of the ABCOttl "hen
it was "certain that no Jap eye actually witnessed her end,





life of many & J.S. sailor.
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Cagttin. Lovftttti .Succeed*. MmlarrU ifagfrmrn
Xn August 1942* Admiral Hepburn, the first director
of the Office of Public delations in its new status under
tils Secretary of the Havy, was named to be chairman of the
Mavy'a General Board. Picked fm his successor was Captain
Leland P. Lovette. The choice represented a decision on
the part of Secretary Knox in fever of experience over
rank. Captain Lovette, it will be remembered, served first
as press chief and then director of the old Public Rela-
tions Branch in OKI. Ms returned to public relations
duties from command at sea in February 1942 , serving as
Assistant Director to Admiral Hepburn.
Captain Lovette immediately addreased himself to
the overriding issue facing Navy public relations at the
tine. Re told the press c "Your Government is trying to
give you the facts—when they do not in any manner give aid
and comfort to the enemy ... The good news and the bad
will be toid."Ua Be still had some "rough-sledding* ahead
before this issue was resolved.
Shortly after he became director* Lovette* at the
suggestion of Secretary Knox, began the first of three
tours around the nation for the specific purpose of elicit-
ing opinions from the news media on how to improve the
navy's public relations program. Bis first trip tooX him










throughout the Kiddle West, where he- held many conference*
with press and radio representative* and answered questions
on news policy and the war in general. On subsequent tours
in the early fall, ha traveled to the Wast Coast and along
the East Coast. 119
flthnr Paraonnej and.,Organisationel Changai
With Captain novette moving up to the post of
director* Commander Bob Berry, who had been acting as an
assistant to Admiral Hepburn since Lovette's arrival,
became the Assistant Director of QPR. His title was
changed to "Deputy Director" in October* Lieutenant Com-
mander W. G. (Slim) lieecher, Jr., USS, who also had a tour
in the old Public Relations Branch from 1933 to 1940 and
then several sea commands, returned to OPR in early July
and assumed Berry's former position of Assistant to the
director. Captain Lovette also appointed Lieutenant Cost*
wander A. fc. Bill, the communique officer, to be his
special assistant for liaison with Admiral King's two
staffs. Hill still prepared the naval communiques, but
now worked independently from the Press Section.
Another significant personnel change occurred in
August when Paul Smith, the erstwhile editor and general
manager of the San Francisco e>Mrenig?i». suddenly resigned
from the Navy tavd his position as head of the Press Section*
to take a similar job with owl. The unpredictable Smith
mjmhmJ
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quit OWI three months later to onlist in the Merino Corp©
ee e private . selected to replace him as head of OPR's
Press Section was lieutenant W. Marvin i^cCexthy, USi»# who
had served as a press officer in the section since the
start of the war.
In November. Lieutenant Commander William L.
Muggins. Jr., USMR, relieved lieutenant Commander Bernrieder
as head of the Naval Pistricts Section. In December,
Lieutenant Max Miller, USHR, author of I Cov*r tha- M§p&r-
frontL and other novels, reported for duty in the Magazine
Section. The writer had been training recruits in
Sheepshead Bay, Mew York, when he was "discovered" by the
Magazine Section, "which took Immediate steps to put his
120talents to work for public relations.
*
The year 1942 saw the creation of three new
sections and the loss of an old one in the Office of Public
Relations. One of the new sections was forbad out of the
Pictorial Section, which now concentrated only on still
photography and art. In the fall, a separate Combat
Photography Section waa set up to supplement the work of
Navy photographers and civilian war correspondents. It had
been recognized for some tine that photographic coverage of
the Bevy's war role left such to be desired. Accordingly,
the acrobat photography program begun a year earlier waa
expanded to include ten field units consisting of one




photographers and one still photographer. The teams were
trained in Mew York by March of Tiese. Inc., with Louis
De ftoehemont* the producer of the newareel* serving as
advisor. They were then assigned to the fleets* naval
forces and other naval activities. Lieutenant Carlton
Mitchell* Jr., USMR, formerly with the Carl Byior public
relations firm in fcfew York, who had supervised combat
photography in the Pictorial Section for the last year* was
chosen to head the new section.
The decision to upgrade the navy's photographic
coverage of the war coincided with the promulgation of
General Order 179* which replaced General Order 96 on
August 26, 1942* as the governing document for the photo*
graphing of naval subjects. The revision was much more
flexible. It canceled the -carte blanch** authority which
naval officers had in the past to halt pictare-taking on
naval installations at any moment they believed security
was being violated. They now could interfere only if they
had definite reason to believe that such photography would
pass out of naval control or jurisdiction before it could
be reviewed. The new directive made clear that all Kavy
photographs taken by commercial photographers* including
war correspondents* had to be forwarded to ©PR for security
review. Further* photographs showing damage or loss of
U.S. Navy combat ships or classified fleet operations had
to be routed via the office of the Commander in Chief*
Qd tB6- '•••' '• - -; -' *
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U.S. Fleet.
In early August* a new sect Ion—Special 2vests~~
had been added to meet a need for community relatione
services. One of its first assignments was to establlah
liaison with the Havy Lsague in making plans for the forth-
coming Hevy Day celebrations. The section also obtained
Navy speakers for civilian audiences and handled tours*
exhibits and other promotional projects* including ones on
behalf of the Wavy melief Society. Its first director was
Lieutenant Commander Frank J* Courtney* U8WU
Zn the fall* another new section—-Review—was
created. This section was established to more effectively
accomplish security review of all types of copy and
manuscripts referring to the Wavy* thereby centralising in
one section the clearance of material formerly handled by
*Se^# mme» ^e^eP^wsm ssms>%fr w<s»^#A6ss? *v mwaaifc%(#*4 e>w jeW*^* e*ms*iB>ssweej» s> s^^si js*^s>mr msjtJssmiF
took over the tssk of clearing speeches by naval personnel
to insure conformance with policy and the protection of
naval security matters* and maintained liaison with the
Office of Censorship and owl on classified matters.
Lieutenant Commander Victor Blakeslee transferred from his
position as head of the Magazine Section to take over
Review; and Lieutenant Commander Walter Karig* USSR,
reported to OPR to replace Blakeslee in Magasine. During
the first three weeks of its existence* over 500 manuscripts*
press stories* magasine articles* radio scripts*
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advertising copy and speeches %#ere channeled through the
Review Seetion.
The section lost to OPR daring the* year was the one
heeded by Rear Admiral Henry A. Wiley that began in the
fall of 1941 as "Industrial Morale'' and later assumed the
title of "Board for Production Awards. • Zn July 1942,
Secretary Knox established a new Incentive Division
directly under his control to supervise the coordination of
Kavy liaison with the civilian da fens© industry. He
appointed Rear Admiral Clark H. Woodward* U8S (Retired)* as
chief of the division, while Admiral Wiley became Chairman
of the Board of Awards.
The Incentive Division was tasfcsd with improving
the Navy's labor relatione, which were not very good at the
start of the war* It was organised into three sections.
The first, called Creative Material Production, dealt in
the areaa of production and labor incentive. It released
data on war materials directly to war industry companiea,
letting them and their employees know how their particular
products performed in combat situations. The aecond
section. Operations, was involved in plant visits and
rallies, tours of war plants by naval heroes, civic
meetings and other special activities. The third section,
Press, handled liaison with the labor press and forwarded
i II
material to industrial house organs.











function from the Offie* of Public Relations in Washington,
but the naval district public relations officers retained
their responsibilities in the area of industrial morale.
for instance* they handled all liaison with Artsy public
relations officers surrounding joint Army-»avy Production
Award ceremonies and in many cases issued press releases
and other material connected with these presentations. Xn
the fall of 1942. Brigadier General Hobert L. Denis , USNC,
Director of the Marine Corps Division of Public deletions*
represented the Kavy Department in an extensive tour of
companies whose production records were named outstanding.
It will be recalled that in August 1940 the Public
Relations Branch of (MX moved to larger and more accessible
quarters on the first floor near the main entrance to the
Navy Department Building. The rapid expansion in numbers
of personnel in OPR following the commencement of hostil-
ities necessitated still another move two years later.
This time* with the exception of the Arts sub-section which
remained in the Lars Anderson Mansion, the office began
occupying the "aero wing 4* at the extreme eastern end of the
llavy building. Baay accessibility was retained, since
there was a separate entrance at this ^nS of the building.
The move actually was not completed until March of 1943.
Cn April 30, 1942, a major Havy organisational
change took place when Secretary Knox established a








to the Navy Departs nt in Washington. The st#p was part of
the policy shift in the navy in 1943 to concentrate on
building aircraft carriers instead of more battleships and
to generally upgrade the role of naval air powwr. A rear
admiral, headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, was
assigned as Chief of Air Operational Training, with subsid-
iary coxaaanda scattered througnout the country*
The new setup required chances in the tfavy*s public
relations organisation as well. "Flight* public relations
officers assigned to the various air commands now func-
tioned directly under their station ccca&anders and the
Office of Public delations in Washington instead of under
the naval district public relations offloors as they had in
the past. The naval Districts Section of OPR supervised
their activities in close coordination with the Bureau of
Aeronautics; and an Aviation Assistant to the Director of
Public Relations, lieutenant Robert A. Winston, USM, was
assigned as a special liaison officer. The change in
effect placed naval air public relations in a special
status which it has maintained to the present day, with
officers assigned to conduct air public relations activ-
ities normally being naval aviators rather than public
information specialists. A detailed "Guide for Flight
Public Relations'* was issued on August 1, 1942, setting
forth directives covering *re-flight and naval aviation
publicity.
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Another change in navy public relations occurred on
September 23* 1942* when the Bureau of navigation (later
redesignated the Bureau of Naval Personnel) established its
own Public Halations division. The move had been recom-
mended in August by a survey team from the first of Boos,
rry. Allen & Hamilton* which had bean retained to help
atreamline the bureau's administration of the tiavy's man-
power resources. The study group pointed out that the
bureau had a "profound effect 1* on public relations in the
sea service. *Mext to the degree of success in combat
operations. ... the policies and methods employed in
handling the personnel of the Bavy are the most important
single factor in determining what the public thinks of the
iiavy.**
Khen the war began, the Bureau of navigation was
flooded with inquiries from the public, press, members of
Congress and other government agencies. It was ill*
prepared to handle this volume of questions and soon gained
a reputation for being "rather indifferent" to such
requests for information. In early 1942. when the Office
of Public Relatione instituted its "beat system" of
covering navy bureaus and offices in Washington, many of
these queries were answered by officers from its Press
Section. However, these young 0*R officers came to be
considered "nuisances" by many senior officers in the
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seeking out details of personnel policies.
Upon orestion of the bureau's Public Relations
Division* resentment over the intrusion into personnel
matters by public relations officers gradually disappeared;
and the Bureau of Personnel became more responsive to the
public needs, h naval reserve lieutenant commander who had
been a lawyer in civilian life was appointed to head the
new division. He was assisted by four other officers and
two enlisted men along with stenographers.
In addition to answering queries and furnishing
news about the bureau and Navy personnel information to
OPR, the division assumed responsibility for the naming of
ships and designation of their sponsors; the preparation of
the Bureau of Naval Personnel Bulletin (later renamed ftii
&ajQdjL) and a daily bulletin for the information of officers
within the bureau called "The BuPers Daily Register"; the
operation of a congressional information service; and the
supervision of a Documentary Photography Section* whose
function was "to obtain and assemble for the permanent
records of the Bureau documentary portrait photographs of
123
Maval personnel especially active in the war."
The U.S. Coast Guard took steps to upgrade its
public relations program in the summer of 1942 also, with a
directive on the subject being disseminated to the service
by the Coast Guard Commandant. II year earlier* Captain
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Kills ctaed-Hill, as Public Relation* Officer of the Coast
Guard stationed at headquarters in Washington, was the only
offiear in tha entire aarviea performing the function full-
time. Ha had one civilian aaeietant. By lata September
1942, two junior officers were added to his staff, but one
operated out of New York. There ware plans to assign three
others to Sew York, two each to Boston and Chicago and one
to each of the other continental Coaat Guard Districts.
Since the Coaat Guard had been transferred to U.S. Wavy
control in November 1941, all of ita public relations
activities cam under the jurisdiction of the respective
naval district public relations officers. Any Coast Guard
release or statement had to be cleared through the* or the
Office of Public Relations in Washington.
Marine Corpa public relations also was under the
cognizance of Of* and tha naval districts, in accordance
with a directive iaeued by the Secretary of the Emvy on
July 24, 1942. However, the Marines—with a small but
aggressive public relations organization—operated more
independently of the ttavy than did the Coast Guard. In
late euranser of 1942, there were five Marine public rela-
tions officers attached to Haadquartera of the Marine Corpa
in Washington under General Denig. Most of them ware young
second lieutenants who ware being trained for field
assignments. As they moved on, they were replaced on the
headquarters staff by new second lieutenants who likewise
:• :'.ij -
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served an apprenticeship in public relations.
Ths Marine Corps Division of Public Relations was
organised differently from the Mavy QPR. There were no
separate sections; each of the five officers performed
general duties. There also were five regional public
relations offices—in Philadelphia, Mew York, Atlanta,
Chicago ttnd San Francisco. These were manned by one public
relations officer with a single assistant, usually a second
lieutenant. In addition, the Corps assigned non-
commissioned officers as "Public Relations sergeants'* to
local recruiting stations throughout the country.
By the ststtssr of 1942, the famed Marine Combat
Correspondent program was fully operative, too. The
program was begun after the fall of Wake Island and the
Philippines, engagements in which the Corps was "placed in
a very embarrassing position of having practically no
information to feed to the press of any fcind." This
experience led to the recruitment of newspapermen and news
photographers who had a "minimum of two years" experience
for assignment to Marine detachments outside the continental
united States as enlisted Combat Correspondents. These
journalists were sent through regular training at Parris
Island, brought back to the Division of Public Relations
for a brief indoctrination, and then dispatched in pairs as
reporter-photographer teams to the combat units. The first
stories and pictures generated by these Marine fighting
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correspondents came out of Guadalcanal.
Marine Corps headquarters was somewhat concerned in
the fall of 1942 over what it considered to be a lack of
cooperation on the part of naval district public relations
officers in the clearance of Marine press material. In the
words of Major George T. Van der Hoef, an assistant to
General Denig in the Division of Public Relations, there
were certain incidences in which marine stories "were
turned over to the Wavy Department Public Relations man in




The bone of contention was
that assertions by Marine officers that specific material
did not violate censorship rules were not being given
proper credence.
On July 30* 1942* the President signed into law a
bill creating a Woman's Reserve in the Wavy. The HAVES, as
they cans to be known, from their very beginning affected
the Bevy's public relations program in one way or another.
OFR was deluged with requests for photographs of uniforms
to be worn by the distaff Havy meisbers almost before the
ink on the President's signature was dry. Initial release
of these photographs was made in Washington with consider-
able ceremony. In October, the Bureau of uaval Personnel
requested assistance frost OPR in bringing up to strength
the lagging recruiting quotas for the Women's Reserve




public relations officers began reporting to various naval
commands. Ensign Mona Baldwin* Jam, former member of tha
Mashington bureau of tha Slew York Xiafcs* joined the Preas
Section of 0t& on November 6 to handle press matters
related to the women 'a Reserve.
After the initial expansion following Pearl Harbor*
the number of personnel in the Office of Public Halations
leveled off at a fairly constant figure* On July 1, there
was a total of 145* again exclusive of branch office per-
sonnel in Hew York* This figure dropped to 135 in October*
reflecting the loss of the Industrial Morale Section. Of
these* fifty-six were officers (five Regular and fifty-one
reserve)* sixty-two were civilians and seventeen were
enlisted men. By the middle of November 1942* there were
215 naval officers serving in public relations in the naval
districts* air commands* and fleet and overseas forces*
Again* wm a year ago* the vast majority of these were in
the continental united Statea* There still were only two
officers attached to the fleets in the Pacific* and the
Atlantic Fleet waa now without a public relations officer
at all. 127
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Weekly Press seminars—sagular ly scheduled *off-
the -record" discussion periods for members of the Navy
Department press corps—were begun in the summsr of 1942
Mit i
lag {•••I
<£« .AMI 1 8t»
000 ii» .Jit'
132
by OPR. These meetings proved to be extremely popular with
the media representative*, since t)iay provided background
information of a confidential nature which could not be
released but nevertheless gave these a sense of understanding
of the savy's wartime problems. Rules for the seminar were
rigid t no notes were to be taken; all information was to be
treated as confidential And not to be relayed to a second
person; and there was to be no continuation of the discus-
sion following each meeting. In other words, any question
could be ask&d but not one answer was to be printed or
repeated. Havel speakers were scheduled to talk on
specific aspects of the war end naval operations in general.
The sessions also were used to further explain and clarify
128
security and other information policies.
Another public relations tool instituted in 1942
was an internal one. Beginning on November 1, the Kaval
Districts Section published a monthly Public ami** loam
muHmtir. "to aid Puoiic Relation© Officers of the »evy.
Marine Corps and Coast Guard in carrying out their duties
in coordination with each other, and in conformity with the
general policy of the Office of Public Relations, Savy
Department. H
During 1942* media anci public interest in anyone
or anything directly connected with combat was at a peak,
wavy raan returning from battle areas, for instance, were














public relations officers were kept quite busy with
arrangements for such participation by naval personnel*
since all interviews for both officers and enlisted n»n had
to be channeled through the nearest public relations
office. In addition* if a radio appearance—as most of
them did—concerned a nan's experience at sea* military
actions* or Mavy* Marine Corps or Coast Guard operations
since the war started* a written script had to be reviewed
130for security and policy In advance of broadcast.
Numerous requests for exhibition of war materials*
both ours and the enemy's* sent back from the combat sones
also were received by the summer of 1942. To fill these
requests* Admiral Hepburn asked the tiavy bureaus to make
available to OJPR such items as Japanese two-man submarines*
131life rafts used by naval aviators* and enemy war planes.
In late September* another naval district public
relatione officers conference was held in Washington—this
time* however* for only the first through ninth naval
districts. The western districts were not included due to
the wartiiae travel restrictions. Representatives from each
section of OFR* the Office of Censorship* the Army Bureau
of Public Relations* Marine Corps and Coast Guard Public
13?
Relations divisions* and OWZ addressed the group.





the Kavy during 1942 despite the fact that it night have
been of soioc value to the enemy was the iaanchir*y ol new
•hips. Mhothe r or not to release information on new con*
struction was discussed isottdiately after Pearl Harbor alone
with the other security treasures. Secretary *Cnox admitted
at that tine that the enemy would benefit from such
publicity; hut his view, which prevailed* was that it would
ha more valuable for morale purposea to have the American
public know that we were striking back from the war
production standpoint.
Security precautions on many aspects of the new
construction programs regained quite rigid, however. A
directive hy the Secretary of the tiavy issued on March 30,
1942, retained the prewar ban on visiting by the general
public to ships either in the building or conversion
process. Further, all information and photographs
regarding new construction or conversion of submarines,
destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers and battleships
was to be classified as confidential and not released
unless specifically authorised by the Secretary of the
133
lfavy. Is a clarification of this directive issued to
public relations officers a month later, the policy was not
e;uita so restrictive. Ml puolic*ty about snip
gflsmi IIU""1"^ was prohibited and that concerning conver-
sions had to be referred to Washington. Launching, how-
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to the actual day of launching* provided auch publicity waa
strictly limited to the ceremonial aspects of the occasion
134
and only general information about the ship was released.
The security issue about ship launchings came to
the fore again in early April* however, when Canadian naval
intelligence source a mad* available to the Commandant
Thirteenth Maval District in Seattle a list of U.S. naval
veaaela recently launched* which had been compiled from
American press reports. The district commandant relayed
this list to Admiral Hepburn with the somewhat caustic
comment t Inasmuch as Canada allows no publicity concern!
its launching* it is a matter of some interest to observe
the amount of detail ... it is still possible to obtain
from the public press regarding naval launchings in the
13S
United States. **
Admiral Hepburn* s reply to this letter was signif-
icant in that it represents one of the few cases found by
the author of definite evidence that public relations
considerations were a major factor in determining Wavy
release of information policies early in the war. The
Admiral stated that when the directive on publicity for new
ahip construction was in the process of being; prepared* it
had been propoeed to flatly prohibit launching publicity of
any nature. The Office of Public Relations argued against
thia restriction on the following basis
*
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Having in mind the state of public morale and naval
public relations, this Office advised against such a
step at this tins* pointing out that all leunchings for
a considerable period would Involve only ships publicly
authorised by Congress, the laying of whose keels had
been publicised, and the rates of construction rather
accurately announced before the sudden outbreak of
war.***
In the same letter, it was mentioned that OFfl did
advise certain specific restrictions on launching publicity
along with the complete ban on commissioning publicity
previously cited. It also was stated that further
restrictions on launching publicity could be expected when
ships not publicly authorised by Congress were built,
eventually leading to a future total ban on publicity for
launching s as well as commissioning s.
In late summer of 1942, plans were made by various
government agencies and representatives of labor and
management throughout the country to give war industry
workers special recognition for their contributions to the
war effort on the forthcoming Labor Day. September 7. The
occasion was tailor-made for ship launohimjs and other
ceremonies connected with the Navy's shipbuilding program*
Accordingly, Secretary Knox authorised and encouraged as
many launching and keel-laying observances as could
possibly be scheduled for the Labor Day celebrations. The
ban on public visiting was even to be lifted so that











Havel district public relations officers were
directed to extend full cooperation to the business and
labor representatives in making arrangements for the Labor
Day ceremonies and to assist the news stadia in gaining full
coverage of them compatible with security. A general press
release announcing the mass launchinga and Heel layings was
Issued by OPR on August 30. Mo complete list of names of
ships was given out* but the districts could publish ship
names involved in their own ceremonies.
In late September* an extensive public relations
campaign waa conducted by the Kavy surrounding the
launching in Boston of the new T,*«*ing fc.o*>- which replaced
the carrier of the* same name that was lost in the Battle of
the Coral Sea. The campaign was tied in with a massive
recruiting drive for aviation cadets and enlisted air
personnel. The theme* "Be s 1942 Minute mn—Join the
Lexington Volunteers*" was emphasised. Congratulatory
messages were solicited from the mayors of twenty-eight
communities named Lexington* along with gubernatorial
proclamations and similar endorsements from community
leaders. Naval speakers were scheduled* window display
contests arranged* and radio interviews with personnel from
138the former Lmxlnff*Qn eet up. the effort represented the
first truly coordinated and creative public relations




•aCBQ ?.*7S4M « -•; rA"tti
i'.v I v;> | >V
rf*iv
-














ion ra f.ia War
The iirst ya«r of hostilities for the United States
was primarily a naval war. Except for the delaying action
in the Fhilippinee and the ground eoafcat in the Solcoon
Islands lata in tha suansr of 1942, laost of the fighting
either took place on tha high a*. a* or originator fro* there
aa did tha ttoolittl* Tokyo raids.
Crippled by the eneak attack on fear! Harbor, tha
Navy operate on a shoestring capability in tha first
ttonthe of tha war and concentrated on keeping tha enessy in
tha dark on any information which adght conceivably help
hiau It was inevitable that this eaphasi* on security wee
to run at cross purposes with the public' a eageracea to
know and the press' aggressiveness to tail what waa
happening. As a reaalt # the sea service absorbed the brant
of public and press criticism of war news policies during
the first year of tha conflict, primarily for ita delays in
^weoee^^^es^we ^ee*fte ^s^w^iaajB^ jfc»ew(^(iw^ai^p s>
By year's end* however, there were faint stirrings
of a more positive public relations stance by the Havy*
£ later Davis—the Devil' a advocate, so to apeak—forced
speedier revelations of ahip loss©a and damage j and the
statue of aviators in tha naval hierarchy was upgraded by
the policy decision in June to build aircraft carriftre
rather than battleahips* Whether by nature or by long
experience at fighting for a proper niche in the wavy, the
-
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airtaen assmad to be more public relations conscious than
their surface and submarine colleagues. This was also true
of their counterparts in the Army.
But the evolutionary process is a slow one. The
liavy public relatione ship still had "shoal waters'* to
navigate. However, the war began to take a new turn with
the invasion of Worth Africa on November 8« 1942. With the
ensuing land battles taking away much of the news spotlight
from sea engagements* the Navy was able to focus on
improving its public relations program minus certain of the
severe pressures it encountered during the first twelve
months of the war.
*
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tion to "COMINCH* ("The Navy and the Havy. " partuna .
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CHAPTSM XV
wwm mrmmm to offensive
By Deceaber 7, 1942* the first anniversary of
U.S. entry into the war, the military situation for the
AXiias had begun to Changs frost a defensive to an offensive
posture. American troops were advancing on Tunis, follow-
ing the successful landinga in north Africa in early
Vovenber. Soviet armies had launched a powerful counter-
offensive after halting the Germane at Stalingrad. And in
the Pacific* where the offensive phase actually commenced
in August with the landing of U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal,
desperate Japanese atteapts to reinforce their garrisons on
the island ware being repeatedly rapulsed.
On Pearl Harbor Day, 1942* the Mavy announced for
the first tine the complete losses sustained in the attack
on Hawaii a year earlier. The anniversary statement
admitted that eight battleehipe had been "knocked out,**
five of which were either sunk or damaged "so severely thst
2
they would serve no useful purpose for eome time." Five
other ships were listed as damaged in addition to those
reported aa sunk or damaged a year earlier. Total casualty











grass, and JNhlAft lafurinn Aasaaaert
The Analysis section of tins Office of Public
Relations cars fully screened newspaper editorials and radio
commentaries for reaction to the Pearl Harbor anniversary
aiinounceaent. An initial flurry of critical press and radio
cotweant about censorship and the flow of war information
was observed, but after two weeks tna issue subsided
•
Asfleeting the fact that public and press attention bad
been diverted sonswhat from naval actions in tna war. the
analysis report stated i 'Criticism of the Kavy continues to
decrease on about the sane scale that dissatisfaction
aounta over certain aspects of the north African news
situation. **
Despite an improvement in the flow of war news
following the atorth African landings, the news media
continued to criticise military control of the release of
information. Concerned about the pereistent press dis-
sat iafaction* OKI conducted a series of nationwide surveys
to measure public attitudes toward the handling of war
news* These opinion polls showed that the public, in
contrast with the newa aedia, was generally sat is find with
nilitaxy disclosures* In a February 1943 survey, 71 pttx
cent of those queried gave the Amy a "very wall" rating on
its news release policies, while 63 par cent thought the
Mavy also waa doing well in this regard* However, there
was a certain carry-over of adverse public opinion
•
153
surrounding the savy** earlier delays in announcing ship
losses. Thirty~i»ight per cent of the public believed th*
ttavy was rami** in not leaking more prompt Announcements,
whereas only 11 per cent accused the Arssy of tardiness in
it* releases. On the other hand* the Army was biassed for
s
not giving enough details about land battles.
Captain &ovett*« in a fearl Harbor anniversary
article written for ftrmv flfflffi *»"* ^marnai. attempted to
explain the navy's dilemma over the timing of ship-loss
releasee!
Th. ugm of tUm /in—! .hip lo.~«7 to
not, as so**) would have you think, baaed on a desire on
our part to withhold news from the public. On th*
contrary we realise a* well a* anyone how vital
complete coverage regarding the scope of battle* won
and lost is to the moral© of those on the hoses front.
But it must be remembered that when th* enemy attack*
our ship* in the heat of battle the issue is often
unknown to hisv. He cannot always tell whether hi*
bomb* or torpedoes have struck how, or ju*t how badly
damaged our unit* may be. If we were to i**ue com*
muniques regarding the immediate fat* of our ships it
would indeed constitute aid and comfort to the enemy. *
In the article* the navy's chief information officer
also summsd up the role of K*vy public relations a* he saw
it after one year of wartime experience. Me divided the
30b into four specific functions!
(1) ¥0 inform the public of the progress of the war
at sea through official communiques.
(a) To a**i*t the new* media in covering naval
activities and using Savy material.
Ml tff
IB4
(3) To act as "appropriate authority" in assisting
the media to release news and photographs on subjects
restricted under the censorship code.
(4) To answer inquiries fro* the general public on
naval personnel and sotivities.
IM of ftwagity Ufts Slightly
On December 2t* 1942, restrictions on the una of
complete casualty lists by the news nsdia ware removed*
inertly thereafter* the Office of Public Relations began
sending full casualty lists dally to the naval district
public relations officers and authorised their release in
7
*nmnx to queries*
On January 11, 1943, the previous rigid restrictions
on the release of Information about u.8. submarine activ-
ities were eodifled to allow news itee* en the underseas
craft to be issued by individual submarine cosaaands.
ftowevar, in the Kavy-wide directive authorising this
asodification, Acting Secretary of the Savy forrestal warned
za to aaercise caution "to insure that no inforaa-




The relaxation of security about submarine opera-
tions caee in the wake of a aharp revival of public interest
in the Carman submarine campaign in the Atlantic. George
Fielding Eliot* desiring to change this interest to concern*

153
wrote to Secretary Knox in March 134$
t
X wish it were possible to .nsl«ase more aaterial on the
U-Boat war, specifically human interest stories of a
dramatic and appealing nature. • . • In other words,
what I a» anxious fox is that there should be behind
the Navy • • • th® full pressure of an aroused and
vigilant public opinion* X know that what 1 an
suggesting is in many ways a departure frost precedent ~~
the navy as* always been here as in Britain the
"silent service" • . . but • * « there is need for
public pressure to keep the 9-leet war at th» top of
the priority list* 9
Know replied to Eliot that the £avy had at last
adopted a more liberal policy on releasing; information
about ths it-Boat war* ma added i "I certainly intend to
s^WsmPa^ <e-<ss4e>• flm*e> erW^m m» AmPs* "We W Wtw em <•#•* «**as s^MpjpisVwi^r' WS^km^oa tvVepf m»mP
prepare them for the very probable losses and to secure
. I
their support in taking remedial measures*
*
In addition to partially lifting the lid of
security on U.S. submarine operations* the wavy for the
first time began permitting normal publicity about the
anti-submarine role of the new escort carriers*
Previously* these ships had been in a strictly classified
status*
Admiral King was worried that the relaxation of
security restrictions on anti-submarine warfare might 90
too far* In June 1943* he sent a letter to all ships and
stations directing that atrict secrecy be maintainsd as to
tactics* methods and new weapons being used against the
12
u-Boate* Urn particularly warned against any disclosure
concerning ths use of radar* a aubjeot closely safeguarded
.Ml
••
throughout the war* Xn a significant departure fro** his
pravioua adiaonitions to the fleet on security matturs.
of anti-Siibearifie warfare were unclassified and invited
there to submit new* releasee on thea* subjects.
It ia interesting to not* that during a period when
certain reatrictiona on publicity ware toeing reaeved by the
y.&. #avy, mpaeitic requests to ensure aecreoy ware
received trota the Sritiah and French navies. In Oeceaiher
1942, the British Admiralty aent a Message to Admiral King
eoMpiaining that a U.S. navy photograph violated British
13
security about a new type of corvette. The message elao
objected to a photograph of a British ship published toy
Henry Kaiser's Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation and
reiterated British censorship rules on new merchant ship
construction. In February 1*43, the French Havel Mission
in tfsshi&yton es*e<2 that no Mention be suede of the awve-
Ksnts of French naval veaaela currently in Aseriean harbors
or watera.
InprofTwiwint la Kavy Ralttajtaaft
ay the end of May 1943 , Captain Lovetta, speaking
on s network radio prograe, coaaaeated that "because of a
speed-up of communication* and improved technique* in
getting conmuniquee cleared, the Kavy ia now releaaing news
faster than at the beginning of the war." 15 Be cautioned.
.
157
however* that <**laye in releasing news of value to the
enemy would at times bo necessary In the future as they
have been in the past* One eueh delay occurred prior to
Hie statement* The occupation of the Aleutian island of
Amchltks by toaerican troops, which took place in January
1943, was not officially announced until May 7, almost four
16
months after the mvmnt.
Despite the delay in the Amanitas announcement
.
Elmer Davis also reported in the spring of 1943 that soli-
tary news* especially naval news, was being released more
17promptly and in a.renter detail than before. The OtfX
director at this time was meeting, frecfuently with Army and
Havy representatives to discuss the content and form of
military news releases* Moreover* a system had been set up
whereby OHX cleared in advance the communiques to be issued
by the services in Washington. This gave ©avis and his
staff an opportunity to rebut if they felt more information
could be given without impairing security* Davis credited
the services with keeping his agency more fully informed
about military operations than they had in the past* One
oswwsjwm 4s»a*T;s» e»as^m> iimews ^mw•teM**|W v* e4v e>vej #w^*va»v»* ee^sess' eifw
establishment in May 1943 of a security advisory board
within OKI. This board was made up of Army and Wavy
officers under the chairmanship of Hear Admiral Richard ?*






*hs <mt director told * group of Havy public
relations offleers in late April 1943
1
Wo have always had the utmost friendly relations and
the best possible cooperation with the Office of Public
Halation*. And whan we disagree, iiwlo only
occasionally, aa to whether a certain item ia a matter
of security or not, we do not question that the naval
authorities have the last warti. ... Since X have cose
over to this sine of the fence* t realise a greet many
things that t vts not aware of as a reporter* The
question of security ... has a 3000* many angles* many
of which an outsider might not see at all but which
actually exist* and may not be revealed until perhaps
three months later. 1*
As we shall see* Davie* magnanimous attitude toward
the problems of aavy security was to chance later in the
year as the press and OKI launched a new attach on military
information policies*
Speaking at the sane conference as Elwer Davis,
secretary tfnox also keynote* the improvement ia Havy public
relations. "There has cone about a considerable /«W
greater degree of enlightenment among high officers of the
kurtrv about the jMConer elaee and , . . Jjuoortaaoe of
information to the public.* Knox noted that there was
currently in progress a reorganisation of Kavy intelligence*
which "will result in s hotter understanding of exactly what
kind of information is desired and what hind of information
must be sept secret." as added that the JSavy in Washington
did not receive nearly as msny complaints about news hand*
ling as it did earlier la the war. "Today the news is
dished out as fast aa it comes in* Us don't hold up

IS*
anything for a press conference. The communique* are read
as rapioly as p©*eibl& and banded out*
"
In his speech* however* the secretary leveled a
charge of irresponsibility in protecting security at his
former newspaper colleagues*
Captain Lovatte and his staff are dealing with a
lot of prima donnas* who unfortunately • • • think the
story is more important than security. X have been
frankly disappointed in the lack of imagination and
understanding on the part of a good many newspaper rasa*
• . . They seam to think that it*s smart and clever to
get something into the newspapers that they themselves
know ou^ht* for the safes of security* not to he
printed.
2a a letter to a newspaper friend about three
months earlier* Knox criticised the editorial judgment of
Washington's two morning newspapers!
X am in the middle of an amusing controversy here right
now* The Japs have been making some extravagant and
fanatical claims of damage done our ships, and then
when a communique was published of a very indefinite
character explaining that the hruahes now occurring may
he the preliminary to a heavy engagement later* both
moraine, papers here ... assumed that this meant an
engagement was actually In progress sad added that oa
the outcome of this battle now in progress rested the
control of the South Pacific. X had a press conference
the next day and corrected the misinterpretation of
both newspapers and now they are sealousiy trying to
prove that the Secretary of the wavy and the Press
delations department of the »avy have a difference of
opinion—kind of a silly performance which shows
beautifully the irresponsible character of the editor-
ial management of both papers, 21
An analysis of media itesss during the four weeks
ending June 14. 1943* showed that the volume of comment on
the Hmvy*m information policy was declining, *although such
mm





items, twenty-two were uncoilimentary, five favorable and
eight "balanced,* reported the Analysis Section of o«u
4 met. tonttivA .JPUhUc.JRnlatiflna Aagroftflh
la conjunction with the gradual relaxation of
security restrictions and tha speedup in releasing proce-
dures, steps wars bain? taken by the Kavy to actively
interest the preas and public in specific naval activities.
As discussed in Chapter 111, this more "creative" approach
to public relations began in September 1942 with ths
extensive publicity effort aurroundimg the launching of the
saw JAUiftsXSXi*
In December 1942* the director of Public Relations
forwarded to the Commandants of tha first* Eighth and ninth
naval Districts a detailed plan for publicising tha transit
of a new submarine, ths OSS £*£&, along inland waterways
from Manitowoc, Wisconsin, to Sew Orleans. 33 ¥he trip was
considered an excellent opportunity to dramatize for tha
people residing in Hid-Amarica, who seldom saw a Wavy ship*
tha sole played by submarines in ths wax* Madia repre-
sentative? were encouraged to accompany the £&&& from St.
Louis to hew Orleans* and unrestricted photographs by the
press and public were allowed at any point during the
Also in December 1942* arrangements were made by
Captain Lovette to embark a selected group of media repre-





exercises during the ehip*s w3hakadow»* cruise* As la
the ease of ttie j&ttft campaign, these plans had the full
support of til* Offie* of tlis Chief of Jteval Operations.
During the iftllhmni. field trials , color photographs were
taken for the first time by navy photographera*
By fehruary 1*43, the fcavy*» combat photography
units were is full operation in the floats* There wsrs
fivo teams ia ths field at this tic**—one oach aasigaed to
ths Pacific float, Atlantic Pleat, South Pacific Pores,
^T%#lm Wea^^WV W WMV *» * J»^*» VwaVW ^mmJPm VMw spS)^s# WTV* «^#a»^^^rW# aw*e*ei^|^W#
Sy June, ths oyster of units had grown to eleven*
As a raault of ths combat: photography unit system,
ths roeaptura of Attu Island in ths Aleutians in lata May
1943 became oao of ths most photographed American military
Operations in the war up to that tiao. navy Lieutenant
Dewey Wriglcy, USlfla, a former Paramount films motion
picture photographer, and his combat film team want with
the convoy to Attu and accompanies the troops ashore* They
spent four daya and aighte on the front line, photographing
all phaaaa of the battle*
To affect additional and mora officiant diatribu-
tlon of the increasing number of still photographs that
ware being forwarded to Washington daily by field commands*
a photographic reference library was established in January
1943 as s sub-section of the Pictorial Section in the
--
1*2
Office of Public Relations. Initially, are* than 17,000
different photographs of Savy subject* were placed in this
library. All of these pictures wen cleared for release.
and writers and editors were encouraged to "browse" through
25
the library and max© their own selections.
Also in January 1943, the Audio Section of OHI took
atepa to improve broadcast coverage of mevy activities.
Field and fleet public relations officers ware urged to he
on the lookout for creative ideas for radio progresses
aroducera, writers and sponsors will welcome guidance
in making radio programs dealing with the savy. Marine
Corps mv& Coast Guard Affirmative in their effect upon
th© listener. Sy lUirgafcira is meant the presentation
of facta—in dramatic interviews or any other form
suitable to the particular program—on problems of the
Havy in this war. Every script, whether for network,
regional or local broadcast, is important enough to
contribute something of the tremendous job the Savy la
doing. 26
At least one result of the increased effort in the
area of broadcasting occurred in August 1943, when BBC
turned over four hours of network time to the Havy for a
special broadcaat entitled "Battle Stations*" The first
two hours covered the Battle of the Atlantic, while the
second half of the program dealt with naval aviation. 37
The medium of radio was the primary vehicle in the
first years of the war for dispensing internal information
to military personnel. In early 1943, the Overseas Divi-
sion of OHX, in cooperation with the savy and Marine Corps
public relations offices, was short~waving two programs to




of service news and personal messages from next of kin. mi
well ** musical *n& other entertainment* The 8nvy program*
-Calling the yavy. * was broadcast six days a week three
times a day all over the vox Id. direct contact with the
cmI Overseas Division was maintained by GFR's radio branch
in Maw York in connection with thia program. 38
Arrangements were also made with the OKI Radio
Bureau in February 1943 for a network and local radio cam-
paign to assist a recruiting drive for the women's Reserve
of both the savy and Coast Guard. The campaign haqmn with
daily spot announcements on network-affiliated and non-
affiliated atatioaa throughout the nation. It continued in
the second weak with appeals being broadcast on leading
network programs* including the appearance of five admirals
on five different shows, in the third week, a fifteen-
minute recorded program was aired on 800 stations*
featuring Lieutenant Commander Mildred H. McAfee. U8NR,
director of the WAVES and former president of Wellesley
College*
This radio publicity was the beginning of an extea-
aive effort in 1943 to recruit women for all the sea
services. A decline in the enlistment of women reservists
occurred at a time when they were critically needed to
release mmn for combat duty*
The public relations aspects of the campaign
centered around the first anniversary of the WAVES on
.
1*4
July 30, The Office of Public Relation* and the Director
of the Women* • Reserve of the Jtavy cooperated in a nation-
wide publicity effort to observe this event* Th© Preea
•action of OfX iesued an advance release, containing
atatiatical information and a summary of the firat year*
a
history of the WAVES* Feature stories, including photo-
graphic feature*, ware prepared for newspapera and maga-
zine** Radio programs and interview* were conducted, with
a second intensive national radio drive staged in the
latter part of July. Arrangements also ware made for
M
newareel coverage of anniversary carenonias*
The a**i»tanoe rendered by the Office of Public
Relatione waa praleed by Lieutenant Conevander tfoRfsa, who
wrote to Captain Lovettet
X suppose that the Public Relation* Office consider*
that ita recant activity on behalf of the ftoaan**
Reaerve ia in it* normal line of duty. May 1 assure
you, however, that thoae of us who have watched the
efforta to celebrate the first anniversary of the
Women's Reserve are impressed by the remarkable
achievement which resulted from effort* far in excess
of what we would normally expect in the line of any-
body•• duty* Every branch of your organisation waa
untiring in it* effort to present the women** Reserve
to the public. 30
lauarjuifing Brivsa and Qtfoftir
*trjM*SBL*y*MJ»l
, Ajstivit JMB
Throughout 1943, naval district and branch public
relation* officer* were asked to provide publicity assis-
tance for various other recruiting program*, *uch as the




classes. In the latter case* each college at which a
Class v-ia unit was located handled publicity about the
unit as a whole* However* Mavy public relations officers
released stories about individual class aeabers to aasdia in
the enrollee's hosts area.
In August 1943* the Bureau of Aeronautics requested
the Office of Public Relations to coordinate publicity for
the Mavy* a pre^flight training program* Because of the
strong athletic esphasis at the pre*flight schools* 0*»
recoatoonded that leading sports writers be invited to spend
a week at the various schools during the opanlwg of football
season* The plan called for twenty writers to visit each
•rtool. 31
AavNsfch earlier* a en Ten f ml aroun of aevenaaer
writers from around the country were given a flying tour of
naval air facilities* Cowaands visited included the Kaval
Air Stations at Glenview* 111.* Norraan* Qfela** and Corpus
Christ! * Tex** and the naval Air Gunners School at furcell*
Okla* In early Itecosfcer 1343* a special tour was conducted
of naval activities in Charleston* 5.C. * by the Sixth Msval
District Public Relations Office for newspapermen frost
Georgia and South Carolina* The highlight of this tour was
a one-day cruise at sea aboard a new destroyer* in which
the newsmen were given gunfire and sko^s-screen-laying
deaonetrations and were "subjected* to dive bosabing and





By 1943* public relation* assistance in recruiting
was much more coordinated than it had been earlier in the
war. One previous problen was the lac* of centralised
control over requests for recruiting publicity. lor
instance in the staaner of 1942, the Bureau of Yards and
Pocks asXed the Radio Section of OP* to enlist the coopera-
tion of the broadcasting industry in a "crash** program to
recruit 60,000 Seabeea in ninety days. The goal not only
was aet tout exceeded. However, due to the lack of
training facilities tor seabees* many plumbers, electricians
and others who had given up their jobs or private businesses
to enlist "cooled their heels 4* at hone waiting for the Wavy
to process them. 0*a shortly thereafter arranged to clear
ail such requests in the future with the Director of
33
Recruiting.
A series of 'Battle Reports , " authored by the head
of the Magasias Section of 0J*R, Lieutenant Commander Walter
Xarig, began in the fall of 1943, supplementing for the news
34
madia the official communiques and Bavy press releases.
The first full volume waa published in 1944. four addi-
tional voluees were prepared as the war progressed.
In 1943, aa in the previous year* naval district
and branch office public relations officers also were
involved in publicising the national war bond program.
*•
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Much of their effort in this regard was directed toward en
internal audience—naval personnel and civilians working
for the navy. In 1942* the internal informational
campaign to encourage war bond purchases resulted i.n a $100
million investment in bonds by Kavy &eparts*nt personnel.
Purchases in 1943 amounted to $300 Million* and the 8ecre~
35
tary of the Navy assigned a quota in 1944 of $60J Million.
Mot all of the tiavy's promotional activities on
behalf of war bonds were internal, however. Early in 1943
,
there were several notable efforts to raise woney for the
oonstruction of naval vessels to be naned after specific
cities. The popularity and success of these promotions led
to an increasing nuaxber of requests by cities to have ships
nested in their honor. Consequently, the Kavy appealed to
the Treasury Department to discourage this type of bond
campaign , since ship naaes ordinarily were approved far in
advance or reserved for other subject areas. The "Sponsor
a Fighting Ship** prograau however, in which local cossmuni-
ties received credit for defraying the cost of a ship
through bond purchases by having a plaque displayed on the
ship's quarterdeck, continued.
Another fund-raising drive in which navy public
relations was eskeO to assist in early 1943 waa the Bod
Cross war Fund Cas^aign. President aoosevelt designated
March of that year as Esd Cross Month* In preparation for
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Cross* asked the Secretary of the-. Mavy in January to
previa* photographs showing feed Cross activities in conn»c~
tion with the tfavy at war, Pictures of blood plasma being
of ship sinkings wore the type desired. Secretary Knox
took a personal Interest in the Red Cross drive and urged
Navy public relations officers to cooperate to the maximam
extent with Hod Croas officials to "help promote public
-i -
understand ins* of tied Cross work with the armed forces*"
A unique public relations program* begun in 1942
and continued in 1943, was the Model Aircraft Project,
co*sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education and the JUavy'e
Bureau of Aeronautics* for 1943* a quota of 303,000 solid
model planes was assigned to the nation* s school students
for the study of aircraft recognition by military personnel
and civilian plane spotters* The mods Is were built to
scale, so that at a distance of thirty-five feet each plane
nodal appeared the sise of a real plane at a distance of
half a mile* Models of enemy planes and those of Allied
nations were built by boys and girls under school super-
vision nsia then shipped to tfevy receiving depots for
distribution to naval schools, ships at sea. Army commence
and other centers where accurate models were needed to
teach aircraft recognition* About 3$ per cent of the
models were used by the Bftvy itself in training






from "Cadet Aircraftmen" to "Admiral Aircraftsman" were




during the war. the United States Havy was the
4 J
nation's largest single employer of labor. Labor rela-*
tiona not only was of vast importance to the Wavy's effortf
it also required extensive public relations activity*
particularly on the part of naval district and branch
public relations offices.
2n December 1942. Hear Admiral Clark woodward • who
headed the navy* a Incentive Piviaion, wrote to Captain
fcevette expressing his appreciation for the assistance
provided by public relatione personnel
i
Since its creation in July of this year, the
Incentive Division has had occasion to lean heavily on
the various Public Relatione offices throughout the
country for assistance in Arsty-Mavy *B" awards.
staging rallies, visits of combat personnel to Indus*
trial plants and other sindlar activities.
The splendid cooperation which hae been afforded
this Division by Athene office^/ • • • hae enabled us
to extend greatly our reaponee to the need for
incentive wm industry supplying the navy with war
materials. 4i
Admirai Woodward etreeeed that the need for incen-
tive work in the nation's wer industry was increasing*
"Hew actnode must continually be devieed to meet the
changing psychology of management and labor, and en even
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renewed an earlier request to Captain Lovette for alt pos-
sible public relation* assistance to his division in the
future.
In June 1943* Admiral Woodward specifically asked
that branch public relation© officers contact local radio
stations in their areas to arrange for the inclusion of
incentive messages in public service prof^ssiaing. It was
particularly desired that these massa$os be broadcast
during the morning hours when workers were enroute to their
planta. the announces**nts were definitely "hard sell. " as
evidenced by the following example t
"*ick out the biggest ships and let *ea have it.*
That* a what Captain Jack Mcran told his crew before
going into battle with the Japs* His snip—the US*
B0XfE>-sent six Jap warships to the bottom. Build more
ships for your navy* and help send more Jap ships to
the bottom:**
As discussed in the last chapter, the Incentive
Division provided many other services in addition to radio
massages to help public relations mM incentive officers in
their liaison with industry. Photographs showing Wavy
products in action* communiques reporting on the perform-
ance of certain equipment under combat conditions, notorial
for employee publications, exhibits of finished Savy
products in settings approximating their use in combat,
posters, motion pictures, speafeera and special recordings—





In September 1943* at the urging of Under secretary
Fcrrestal, * plan was initiated Whinky two newscasts {Mir
employee shift would be broadcast directly to public
address systems at wer plants on leased lines from local
radio stationa. The newscasts would consist primarily of
war news* especially about naval actions. Local it«aaa of
llavy intsrsat would be provided by the nearest savy public
relations office, and incentive messages would ba incorpor-
ated into the opening and close of each newscast. District
public relations officers had the responsibility of
arranging with local radio stations to originate the
newscasts. Charges for telephone lines and fees for the
stations ware treated as regular production costs.
In July 1943* the separate awards previously
presented by the services to individual plants for out-
standing performance in war production—the Navy *£#*
Amy "A* * and the Army~»avy Star—were combined into one
joint Arsy-«avy Production Award. Six months later* Sear
Admiral Henry A, Wiley* Chairman of the Kavy Board for
Production Awards, complained that the new award was being
aspresented too often and to too many plants. 8a felt that
the number of firms receiving the award should be reduced
in order to "accentuate* its value* Accordingly* all
agencies reccasaendin? the Army~8avy Production Award were
requested to exercise more stringent supervision of their
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only to "those contractors who** product ton performance ham
boon outstanding end who are really deserving of the
award."
Physically* the award consisted ci a special flag
to be flown above the industrial plant and a pin to be worn
by ovary employee of the plant as a symbol of outstanding
contributions to the war effort. As mentioned previously
*
the cognisant naval district public relations officer or
his branch representative handled all arrangement* in eon*
neetion with the presentation of award*. To demonstrate
the joint character of tho award* an Army officer* if
available* presented the pin* to individual employee* at
navy-sponsored ceres©niee, while a Mavy officer mad* the
presentations at the Army-epoaaored event*.
Under Secretary rorreatal* who had the over-all
responsibility for the industrial incentive program*
arranged in Kay 1944 a tour tor selected newspaperman and
radio commentator* to savy establishments "where they could
see the result* of the Bevy production program.*^ The
tour consisted of two tripe t a one-day visit to Philadelphia
and Camden* iiew Jersey* on Hay 20 j and a three-day visit to
maw York City* Kearny* Hew Jersey* Dahlgren, Virginia* and
Patement* Maryland* on May 29-31* The purpose we* to
acquaint the newsman with improvements made during the p**t
year in fiavy ship** aircraft and ordnance. Many of the
weapon* systems shown could not be written about because of
tttl
173
iteitt clarification j however* forreatel was anxious that
the newsmen a** them, so that they would be "better able to
write about future war developments.
"
On March 1# 1943, the £Uft« ftavy ffjlhlig Rolfitiflum
Manual was issued by the Office of Public Relations (see
note 40). It was the first compilation of directives*
instractions end guidance for sea service public re1stions
personnel since the Office of J*aval Intelligence published




The now manual contained the federal statutes, Hairy
Regulations and General Orders, sections of the Bureau of
naval Personnel Manual, directives, letters* ssssoranda and
excerpts from the jfobllftJlalajfcitraa, JBttllfetija which related
to th*-: sublet of public relations on a permanent or aesi-
psrauurent basis. It also included, where pertinent,
letters of the Office; of Civilian fcefenee, the codes
published by the Office of Censorship *m$ th® regulations
•f the Office of War Information. It was divided into
•even sections t administration, Kedla~~$eneral, saedia—
press, »edia—radio, media—pictures, special events and
security. Purposefully issued in loose leaf notebook forai
so that supplemental and correctional pagea could be easily
inserted* the manual also had a simplified numbering syste*
and an index whereby the user could quickly locate the

m
eubject for which he was looking* It was tally intended to
bo an up-"to-dat« reference book and « text for indoctrinat-
ing personnel mm to the field, and it served that purpose
throughout ths remainder of ths war.
CutlHKtx in JEtiblic Baltiiana Pntjisonnel
fraredoxicaiiy, at a time whan ISavy public relations
was gradually coming out front under the "heavy hand of
security** ana beginning to pursue a more aggressive course
in informing the public, steps ware being taken to reduce
the number of personnel engaged in the function. The
reasons for this action weret (1) an urgent need for aooi"
tional personnel to man the rapidly expanding naval forces.
and (2) concomitant criticism from various sources over the
utilisation of combat~elicihle males in non-combat
aesignments.
A Wavy that had bean "starved for funds" in the
past waa now being permitted . even encouraged, by Congress
to "spend like a drun)(an sailor. Xn May 1943, with leas
than thirty members on the floor, the noose appropriated
$30 billion for the tfavy in Fiscal Year 1944 in just twenty
minutes. This prompted one representative to remark
sarcastically that he thought there should be at least one
47
r present for each billion dollars voted.
Xn January 1943, Captain Lovette wrote to public
relations officers in the continental United States that a
••
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congressional investigation of tins Office of Public
Relations* as wail a* other offices and bureaus of the Wavy
4 I
Department* probably was forthcoming. Be added that the
Secretary of the Kavy wanted to ensure in advance of any
investigation that all mala personnel qualified for duty
afloat were feeing nade available for such duty. Accordingly*
the field public relations officers were requested to
furnish as soon as possible the names of their officer
and enlisted personnel up to thirty-five years of age who
were physically qualified for sea assignments. Despite
Lovette*s warning* the congressional inveatigation of
military public relations did not materialise; however* the
aevy continued to assume that it might take place.
The Chief of naval Personnel, in late April 1943*
stressed the need for qualified officer personnel in the
fleets hy citing figures showing the tremendous increase in
officers in the aiavy since the war began. -The Havy had
35*000 officers before Pearl Harbor. Today* we have 147*000
• • • and by January 1* 1944* we shall need an additional




February 1943* it was estimated that in the near future
there also would exist a shortage of 100*000 enlisted men
50in the Havy. v
The acute manpower shortage caused Admiral King to
write to secretary Knox in March 1943 recommending that
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intelligence, photography and piifrUfl raiatiflfit be •topped,
the admiral observ&d, "2 nave come to the conclusion that
certain military activities are now adequately scanned to
SiMet all essential requirements. ' 4
there seemed to be a certain amount of justifica-
tion for Admiral Kind's assessment. A postwar history of
the Public illations Office, fourth Kaval District,
Philadelphia, noted with considerable candors
• * • the war-time strength estimated to have been
necessary in July, 1941, has never been required* This
early set-up called for 29 officers, 8 enlisted
personnel and 15 civil service clerical employees—'a
l&tal of 52. The fact is that &he total complement
/pf the public relations office/ has never exceeded
e*^o
Secretary Knox immediately approved Admiral King's
recommendations and further directed a reduction in public
relations personnel wherever possible* Zn response.
Captain Lovette informed the naval district commandants,
the chiefs of naval air functional training commands, and
the commandants of the Marine Corps and Coast tfuerd that
revised complements for their public relations offices
would be forthcoming. 53
By September 1943, the entire public relations
manning level for the Kavy had been reduced by 20 per cent.
Priority was given to fulfilling requests for additional
public relations officers for fleet commanders, but
officers so ordered had to be taken away from public
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procedure* a request fro® the Corcmander, U.S. stavel Forces.
Europe, for four additloaal public relations officer* was
filled with only *%#©
The public relatione personnel •squeese" became
even more acute in Movasteer 1943, whan the Secretary of the
Savy and the Chief of Naval Personnel in joint conference
ordered the Director of Public Halations to "reduce to a
ainisnum* the officer and enlisted personnel attached to the
various public relations offices* Complying with this
directive. Captain Lovett* recowaended to district
commandants that an iansdlate survey he mad* of public
<•" ^^ da^w^* ^fcee^ee^a js^^a^a ai^awsaa^^v 4S> *•* a^^•'^f ^w»f^e w^w eee^wa ^preo^»%» as'ss^p^p W'tSrew
officers and enlisted personnel who can be certified as
being absolutely necessary for Public Halations duties be
retained* "^
Despite the eisphasis on cutting personnel in the
firat half of 1943, the total strength of the Office of
Public Relations increased trow 135 in October 1942 to 158
on June 30, 1943. The additional personnel, however , ware
civilians and Htm*, both officer and enlisted. There was
a decrease of eight male officers and four stale enlisted
asn In the office during this period. Throughout the
remainder of 1943 and daring the first four aonths of' 1944*
the officer strength in 0** remained constant, fluctuating
between sixty-two and sixty-four.
There waa a drastic reduction in the number of
.*» • *«**
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officers in the field and fleet public relations of fices
daring 1943, however. A January directory in that year
listed the nana* of 274 officers attached to thirteen naval
district, fifty-nine branch* thirty-aifht air cocssead and
two fleet public relations offices* ay august 15* 1943*
the number had decreased to 218 and to 185 by May 1,
1944 . The redaction was achieved primarily by the
closing of twelve naval district branch offices in saetro-
politan centers.
Compared to the war Department Bureau of tublie
Relations in mid-1943, the »avy*s office in Washington did
not seea to be over-staffed* An August 15th Ansy directory
listed 129 officers in its Bureau of Public Relations,
twice as many as in OF»—ana over three tlnw* as t&aay
civilians* 306 to 76. $7
ftslntlons , Activities,
The variety and magnitude of Office of Mobile
Relations activities ware kaynoted in an annual report
submitted by Captain lovetta to Secretary Knox, covering
the fiscal year period frow July 1, 1942-June 30, 1943.
Rose of the statistical highlights wares
(1) Issuance of 335 eoossuniques and 2*446 press
releases.
<2) Distribution of 178,630 still photographs.
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(4) Security review of 4,500 article* submitted by
newspaper and magaaine correspondents* 2*012 radio script*;
1,684 advertisement*} 276 epeechesi end 102 book*.
(5) Supply of material and/or personnel for 1*571 radio
(6) Preparation of 704 speeches for navy officials and
409 articles for magazine and other periodicals.
(7) Answering of 13*482 queries submitted by the new*
media and general public.
There were twelve section* in 0#?K in January 1943s
administrative, press, radio* pictorial* notion pictures*
naval districts* analysis* magasine, combat photography*
special events* review and aviation. The last four had
been added since June 1942 snd represented additional war-
tin* services provided by the office.
A new post of Credentials Officer for war
correspondents was created in January 1943 under the Execu-
tive Assistant to the Director* Coca&ander seecher.
Initially, Lieutenant D. C. Slythe* (law* who had relieved
Lieutenant cordon as head of the Administrative Section in
the foil of 1942* assumed this position, while Lieutenant
f>. G. Fariter, USSR, became the new administrative head.
Blytha was relieved as Credentials Officer in April 1943 by
Lieutenant Thomas Pinckney* U8S3U
taring Fiscal Year 1943* 113 war correspondents
were accredited to the various fleets and sea frontier

l« ami now correeponoente w»r<* oeiny accredited at
the rate of eeventeen par jeenth. Approxiaately 140
authoriaatione par saonth war* oeiag ieaueci to correeponacnte
for vieiting naval shore activities in the continental
United State** These *tttaorlr*tion* did not repair© the
full security investifatione necessary for war eocreapond'-
snt accreditation*
four personnel chaneea occurred in the Office of
Public deletions in March 1£43. Lieutenant Cowaander
Seward M. Stay, iimm, replaced Lieutenant Coantanoer Mucins
aa head of the fcevel Districts section* with Uuggina
reporting to the U.S. tiaval Operating Lass, Bermuda* to
head up a new public relatione office therei Lieutenant
Caawandeg Karoid B. Say, US!**, noved up aa head of the
Review Section* relieving Lieutenant Oinsnanrtmr alaxesleei
Lieutenant Coauaaader Salter H. etoff* U&m, beeas* the new
head of the Aviation Section in place of Lieutenant Gear-
^B^^esees^w^* ae^*eaaw !»•# *0 ^a»eaP§a. ^pe^ppj^jHaaaa^^P-'A wWa%IW ^* a> ^e^NHMpsiMar4a a wWPW^^
relieved Lieutenant Coasttnder Hill aa the Assistant to the
Director for Coiwiuniques* * uoatn later* Coamander
canpball'a title waa changed frees 'Cca^unisiuca officer" to
"Security officer * with hie nein function atill being the
preparation of coassuniques*
Lxcept for rotation of junior offleera* there were
no additional personnel changee in OJm until October 1943
«
when Cowwenoer deeeher replaced Captain tterry aa Deputy
ft
latt
Director, serry had bNR promoted to the rank of captain
in May and was anxious to return to *«a duty. Be became
commanding officer of the UtS p^fcaiie after leaving 0P&.
Relieving Coiiwnanrier Seecher aa Sxecutive Aaaiatant to the
director waa Comaand*r J. L* Collie* USUI, Who recently had
been awarded the Lagion of Merit for services aa oonmander
of a minesweeping division in the Pacific*
The naval Eiatricte Section of OPK waa absorbed
into the Administrative Section in December 1943. Lieuten-
ant Commander Seay, Who had headed the section, waa now in
charge of a branch of the Special Events Section called
'Organisational Centacta. mb9
There were changes in the Bureau of Naval
Personnel's Public Relatione Division in 1943 also* On
April 16* at the request of Captain Lovette* ita nam was
changed to "Special Services Division a to svoid possible
confusion with the Office of Public Relations* Two weeks
later* the first director of the division waa transferred
to other duty* and his executive officer* a reserve lieuten-
ant eoaaaander who had been a public relations counselor in
civilian life* waa appointed acting director* On June 12*
the diviaion as such waa dissolved* with the acting
director being naaiad as Special Aaaiatant for Public Rela-
tione to the Assistant Chief of the bureau* This move was
significant in that it represented an awareneas on the part
of the bureau that ita public relations advisor should have
,..-.-










direct access to the top level of eot3nan£* So that he
could concentrate full-time on the job of advising and
counseling, the Special Assistant for Public Relations also
was relieved of *>any of the borderline public relations
tasks previously perforated by the Public Relations Division
—including the preparation and release of Air frauds * which
was transferred to the bureau's Welfare Division.
Poor handling by local public relations officers of
an inspection trip by the Secretary of the Havy to the
Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts in July 1943 led to
a recosmendation for and subsequent establishment of a West
Coast branch of the Office of Public Relations.
Jack Hartley, head of the Radio Section of OFK. who
accompanied Secretary Knox on the trip, reported to Captain
Lovette that no contact was made by local public relations
officers in San Francisco with the secretary's party until
twenty-two hours after their arrival* He added that
contact then was made only after Frank Mason telephoned the
Chief of Staff of the Twelfth &aval District and pointed
out that it was usual for the district public relations
officer to aeet the secretary on arrival* discuss with his
aide what was desired, price* hist on questions that sight
arise at a preas conference, and suggest to neabers of the
press questions which might bring forth quotable cossaent.
Mi
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Hartley continued in a caastie vein by saying that the
press conference finally held was one of the poorest he had
ever attended* The Secretary had to ask each representa-
tive or the press his or her naaas instead of being Intro-
tiuced** *
In Seattle* Secretary Knox attended a launching
ceremony for a new destroyer* The district public rela-
tions officer* said Hartley* Mdid not appear at the
launching and the Assistant PRO that did appear wasn't even
able to supply the name of the vessel being launched;*
Other factors contributed to the decision to set up
a supervisory Meet Coast public relations office* One was
the need which had existed for some time to expedite the
clearance and release in that area of information which
bordered on being classified* Previously* such news items
had to be sent to Washington for approval* causing
considerable delay* In general* there also was an increase
in public relations activities on the Mast Coast at this
tims.*2
On September 28* 1943* Commander Alfred J* Bolton*
US* (Retired), was named as the Assistant Director of
Public Relations* (fast Coast* with additional duty as
notion Picture and Radio Liaison Officer* Bis office was
in Los Angeles* where he had been serving as liaison
officer with the Motion picture industry for the Eleventh










assistant iiiatriet public relations offloor.
A directive spelling out hi* supervisory responsi-
bilities was Issued by Commander Bolton to all public
relations officers on the Hast Coast in October 1943*
All press material, including photographs* previously seat
to Washington for security review* would now be submitted
to him* Arrangements for radio programs over national and
coastal networks* end ail contact with the notion picture
industry would be made through his office* And, whenever
possible * his office would assist public relations officers
with the handling of local visits by high Navy officials.
T<i a ifliin With, Motion Pigturf tngMatsy
Shortly before the *fest Coast office was created,
lieutenant Alan Brown* head of the Motion Picture Section
of OPR* »ads a liaison trip to Hollywood. Be reported that
a majority of the motion picture studios *seewmd to under-
stand the navy's problems and ware anxious to be of
assistance. as was disturbed to fire, however, that the
Bureau of Yards and Pocks had arranged with Warner Brothers
to release a seabees short subject motion picture without
consulting the Office of Public Relations. The Seabees
also had cooperated Independently with Republic Pictures on
the production* "The Fighting Seabees* M authorising camera
crewa to visit Seabse Training Centers without proper








Bureau of Yards and Socks had replaced the bureau of
Aeronautics as the ^nuiabor ons problem child" in the area
of independent arrantresent a and releases*
In September 1943* Warner Brothers was filming a
technicolor short subject about 9t hosts entitled "Devil
Boots. * mm also was shooting a short subject to he
narrated by i*eta Smith, concerning naval aviation and the
safeguards the Kavy employed. During the same month* two
combat photography unit fiJjas covering the landing on Kiska
and the landings at Salerno were released to newsreel
companies, as was a special 16mm. film of the surrender of
the Italian Fleet.
The Motion Picture Section of QV* also made avail-
able to the newsreels an official Kavy film of the
September 1943 Morfolk Haval Air Station fire, in which
twenty-eight persons ware killed and 250 injured. The
handling of the disaster by the Fifth Naval District Public
Relatione Office received praise from members of the news
media in the area. Information personnel were on the scene
within three minutes after the fixe broke out. supplying
eyewitness accounts and photographs and compiling the first
casualty lists. The public relations office itself was
transformed into a workshop for press and radio representa-
tives, and special telephone lines were installed to
facilitate clearance and transmission of reports. 65
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Eleven film releases were made by the Motion
Picture Section in the early months of 1944. The most
widely used of these covered the seisure of the Marshall
Islands and the first raids on Saipan and Tru*. The latter
footage was taken with leam. gun cameraa mounted in the
wings of the striking carrier planes*
Army subjects appearing in the newsreels during the
same period outnumbered Bevy subjects about two to one*
The continuing Italian campaign* Army Air force bombing of
Germany, the bombing of the caaiao Abbey mna General
MecArthur's personal occupation of the Admiralty la lands
kept the Army films in the spotlight. The Savy^sbtaimed
excellent footage of the Hmajalsin and Makln island
landings* but delays in transporting the films back to the
United States detracted from their timeliness and eventual
At the request of the Commander* Amphibious force*
0.8. Atlantic Fleet* Commander Bolton approached mm in
early 1$44 to encourage that studio to produce a feature
motion picture about the amphibious forces. MOM seemed
receptive and indicated they would probably make the film.
The Mavy*e amphibious arm was not alone in seeking
publicity for its activities at this stage of the war. The
Deputy Chief of travel Operations for Air and the Assistant
secretary of the Kavy for Air asked the Director of Public










of the wartime rol* of naval aviation. Xn response to
these requests, the fiction Picture Section arranged for
Path© photographera to shoot a carrier "shakedown" cruise
film for public reIs tee* The film was made aboard the new
JKmmB end released in April 1944 aa part of the Path© eeriee
entitled This ie America.*
Xn further cooperation with the Assistant Secretary
for Mr, Mr, Artemis Gates* plsns were formulated in the
spring of 1944 to interest a Hollywood motion picture
studio to release a color film made by Ksvy casmramen
aboard the new Xas&ttam***
Xn march 1944* the Office of Strategic services
(OSS) • in coordination with Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary force (SHAgtf, developed plsns to make a
documentary motion picture covering Wavy participation in
the forthcoming landings in Prance. OSS effected a trans-
fer of one of its officers in feosdon. Lieutenant Commander
John McClain, USSR, to the staff of Commander, U.S. Ifaval
forces, Europe, for the purpose of supervising the use of
as
Jfavy combat photography units in the project. When OSS
director, General William Donovan, informed Captain lovette
that he intended to substitute Commander John Ford for
HoClain, the Mavy Director of Public Relations immediately
mscamff concerned. Ford, the Hollywood movie director, had
affronted the navy in the past by "pirating" some of its
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aaaiataat* Commander Colli*, wrot© to Lieutenant Commander
Harry Bingham. USm, the public relatione officer for the
tfavy European ccgsmAnd, cautioning him to retain complete
control ever the Kavy photographer* in the OSS project*
•we franxXy doubt," Colli* said* "that ^BoawanSar Ford/
en
would ha content to remain in an *edviaory* capacity* *
"Visiting* Corraaponitnta nflflraditati
m imltia riaat
Early in i»43, the Office of Fubiic Relatione
initiated a plan whereby correapondsnta could accompany
Pacific Fleet ahipe during operationa on a rotating or
•vieiting" baeia* Prior to this, only those permanently
accreditee to the fleet were permitted to embark during
''fVa ^m w* ^e>^*^eaae m men^w^^eB^pBtae^^wa* am^^^m^** awar«fc wra* a»viimw evmF mpmeafli*ttw»wassae^p mi ^m^^^fcrneaie
Crake in early January, "The favorable reaction of Admiral
Simita i • and your*•If to the propoaal to aeeign eix
hillsta to vieiting war Correaposdenta was indeed
am
gratifying* w
The first of the billete mere made available to
•SfcttEtiay, Evening Fost » CoUI*ir.s and other leading magasiaea.
Commander Beecher estimated that about fifteen magaaiam
vritera had indicated they wished to take advantage of tarn
new "vieiting correapondenta * plan*
Meanwhile* Commander Drake deereaaed the number of
aeagoing hilleta for the wire aervioea to eix apiece,




correspondent* in the Central Pacific to the statu* of baa*
correspondents. Strategic placement of tlia six seemed to
defer any immediate protests from tba wire services over
this limitation*
Because of the visiting correspondent* plan, there
was lesa room also to ac<sommodate representatives of the
for*ign media* A request from Walter Farr of the London
nmiiy Mail to return to the Pacific fleet as a permanent
correspondent was held in abeyance because "if Farr is sent
back out there it would be increasingly difficult to hold
70
off the London Xfcasju A plan to sat definite limits on
the numbers of British* Australian and ISew Zealand corre*
spondenta and to rotate them was considered*
Admiral Kimits hosted about thirty correspondents
for a luncheon at his quartera in January 1943 during a
visit by Secretary Knox to Jteaxl Harbor. The admiral also
took time out from his busy schedule at this time to give a
lone "backgrounder" interview to Carleton Kent of the
71Chicago XimtUk* who was returning home from Australia*
while the effort was being made in 1943 to expand
war correspondents* coverage of the Pacific war* diffi-
culties in transportation for the newsmen wore being
encountered* Commander Drake wrote to Commander seecher in
September* complaining that three correspondents had to
arrange their own transportation from the Wast Coast
,






passage they each had to pay ?110. * * Drake requeated that
the Office of Pufclic delations writ* a letter to tha
Comandaat, Twelfth liaval District* rewinding hisa that
accredited correspondents traveling under ordera rated tha
aana transportation facilities aa naval officers.
DraHe alao referred la hie latter to aa incident la
which a correspondent had hia accreditation rescinded
because of "vitriolic criticiere of tha high noaaimd . • «
together with tone of hia copy.* Tha coaoMKadinc officer of
tha ship in which tha nawaoan waa embarked nade a epecial
trip to Year1 Harbor to urge that he not be oiven further
navy credentlala. According to Drake* the ooamandar
involved waa an officer *of excellent judgement and in full
aynspathy with the prase. *
.gra lai.da,afc,. l |>.igj>,cta filfta#g.£rOffi^raj^oji Kith „lBWI
During 1943* tha tide of battle continued to turn
dramatically in favor of the Allies. On February 9*
organised Japanese raaiatanca on Guadalcanal ended
*
Bringing to a eucceeeful conclusion the initial tf.S.
offensive aove in the war. On Nay 13* enawy resistance in
north Africa came to a close; and on June 10* Marina and
Army troops were landed on Randova and other islands in tha
Sew Georgia area* Solowon Islands. On July 10* Sicily waa
invaded* followed by landings on tha Italian mainland in
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Aleutians by July 2df and on Rovsmher 20. naval, warine and
Army forces landed an Tarawa and Makln in the Gilbert
Islands* 7*
Media interest in the 1943 offensive operations was
entreat*ly high* resulting in a continuation by the press of
the earlier complaints about military handling of was news*
In May 1943, £• Palmar Hoyt. former editor of the
Portland fistttmiem* replaced Gardner Cowlea as head of
OKI's Domestic Breach* Hoyt was a firm believer in the
right and capability of the press to inform the public
about the war; and from the moment of his appointment. OKI
began to take a stronger stand in supporting the acwuae-
tlons leveled against the military by the news media*
Zn August 1943. Nicholas Roosevelt resigned from
his post as OKI's liaison officer with the Army and fcavy.
With a note of bitterness, he wrote in his letter of
resignation to Elamr ©avis that *so long as the relations
of the OKI with the Kar and Havy departments rest solely on
the basis of petition and suggestion • • • only you * • •
can do anything further to improve the public relations
policies of the Army and Havy**75
I avis accepted the challenge from his former
liaison officer* He once again approached President
Roosevelt concerning OKI's problems with the armed services*
As a result* the President, on September 1. 1943. sent






coordinate nor* closely the release of military war
information with OKI* Tt» President's latter to the
Secretary of the Havy ia quoted la parti
The intensification of the war has increased the
necessity of a foliar public un£@ratending of the
progress of military affaire* Closer relationships
between the Wavy Department and the Office of war
Information are therefore highly desirable* • • • Z
should liice to request you to put the following
instructions into offset in your Departments
1* Whenever the Director of war Information
determines that the public interest will be served by
the release of Information (including motion pictures
and photograph*) in the possession of the Navy Depart-
meat* such information ehail be released by the Havy
department at such ti*a» and in auch form tm the
director shall determine*
2* Where objection is made by the Havy Department
to the release of information on the ground that auch
release may prejudice the security of naval operations*
the Director and the Secretary of the Havy shall
attempt to arrive at a satis factory solution* giving
due consideration to the interests of public dis-
closure on the one hand and of military security on the
other* If an agreement cannot be reached by discus-
sion* the matter shall be laid before me at once,
3* AH news relasses and etatemsnte concerned with
material other than naval action* prepared for iaauance
in Washington by the Havy Department* ehall be cleared
before issuance with the Haws Bureau of the Office of
statements concerned with naval action* prepared for
issuance in Washington* shall ba cleared before
issuance with the Director*
4* In the event of dieagreeaent as to the form or
phraseology of a news release* communique or etetemeat
px%pmg94 for iaauance by the Kavy Department* the
deciaion of the Director shall be binding on the
Department*
5* The Director aha11 have aceeee to all
restricted and confidential (but not secret) motion
pictures* photographs* and information in the liavy
Department whenever such acceae is necessary in connec-








Secretary Knox taaadlately s<?nt a letter to Captain
Lovotte, with copies to Admirala Kins and Borne and the
Coaniandanta of tha Coast Guard and Harina Corpa, quoting
almoet varbatim tha contents of tha President's letter.
In early October 1943* President Jtoosevelt atated
•t a px**» conference that asora war news would be given out
in Washington* At about tha same time* tha Havy announced
that an attack was underway against tha Marcus Islands.
This represented an important departure from previous tfavy
nawa policy of disclosing an action only after it was
completed. Another change in military information policy
was tha release for the first time in the war of official
photographs showing American ceeualtiee.
While ftavla did not have to refer any decisions to
the President, he reported that the services ware still
slow in cooperating with QHX* and in many caaaa failed to
observe the directive to clear through him materiala other
77
than military operations*
On September 18* 1943, Priam Stinieter Churchill
a apeech before the Sritiah House of Comtaons, in which
he revealed soaai good news about the war which had been
withheld from publication in tha American press on tha
grounds of security* He announced the following information
which, from the asavy standpoint, Admiral King in particular
:• .'. -.
f
had bean highly desirous of keeping sacrati
ao sesrchant vassal had been sunk by enemy action in
the fcorth Miantic is four months* fewer ships were
loat by tha Allies in August than in any south sine*
tha U**» entered tha war, and in tha first two weeks of
Ssptataber not one United Nations ship was sank by Axis
submarines anywhere •?&
Churchill further revealed that tha "nasaive ship-
building program of tha U*». had fulfilled all that had
been hoped for and more* and tha not gain of new building
over loaaaa since tha beginning of tha year axeeedert
a laillion tone.**
Tha American press reacted strongly and immediately
to the ravalationa of tha British Prime Minister. Criti~
eiaat was directed at tha President, OWX* *n& tha public
ye
relations officee of tha Army and navy. Raymond J».
Brandt of the St* Louie s«*«*^ni*p»fafo aug$eeted that tha
President appoint "aggressive civilians* preferably news-
papermen* mm assistant secretaries of war and sevy, to
handle public relations* • • • * ftoscoe Druataond of tha
flMfllHim jfi&ana* HmXXttL atatad that Elmer Davis was *too
frequently vetoed by tha Army and ffavy on thin grounds of
military security* • Ha racosn»nded tha application of
strong praaaura on Washington "to wake aura that over-
cautious arguments of military security ahall not perpetu-
ally defeat the causa of adequately informed public
opinion* *







«H a planned joint monthly communique fey the i>resident and
the FriMi Minister on submarine operations* The texts of
^••^^^p ^m^« ^**"*'wp#*w^wiww*w ^^ »v^w ^v-^v ^*^^f ^^w* ^* *w^^^w^^ww™ www ^jww v ^^^eeee^p ^w Mb< ^*ee
American and British naval officials* as well as with OWX
and the British Ministry of information. However* Davis
estive* • because the President and Prime Minister too often
supported the security decisions of their respective naval
officials. 81
Meanwhile* the attacks by the press on military
poblie relations policies continued. Crew fearson even
charged that naval intelligence* orfleers "shadowed* his
hone after he revealed in a story certain naval losses
ill
sustained in a Guadalcanal sea engagement. tearoom
obtained the information from the testimony of a vies
admiral before the House Maval Affairs Committee*
The Mewspapar Advisory Committee to OWX issued a
statement on September 30* 1943* to the effect that the
American people were not being fully informed about the war.
The Committee stated
i
The responsibility for this cannot be attributed
altogether to the OWI nor to public relations officers
of the armed services* nor to the established media of
communication. Xt stems from the disinclination on the
part of soma high naval and military authorities to
evaluate what is information to which the public is
entitled.*3
£ laser Davis himself at this time joined in the
attack on the military. In a speech in Mew York City in
-
late October 1943* ha *ai<* that official reporting of
©vent* "had been worst 1* in the Solomons and the Aleutians*
both of which were "under the control of the Mavy* not only
as to giving out news to correspondents but also as to
censoring dispatches**
As criticise of military information policies
reached its pinnacle in October 1943* Metfflf , ft . Euta. itflftE
reported that the navy was relaxing "its tight trip on the
news.'*
85 The publication cited ^m evidence an announcement
identifying the US* Sf^^K a*ko^ as the "famous battleship"
which shot down a great number of enemy planes during a
Japanese air raid in 1942* The nans of the battleship had
been withheld for raore than a year* 'The Kavy also released
for the first tjuae details surrounding the sinking of the
Xn December 1943* Admiral Kimits announced a change
in navy censorship policy concerning the use of nanus in
press copy and news releases about the Pacific war* In the
past the names of naval personnel included in correspondents*
stories wore deleted by censors "unless they had been
previously mentioned in a Washington communique reporting
the action*" As a result* many stories of personal
bravery were related anonymously* leading to poor morale on
the part of Bevy men who noticed that men in the other
services were "^getting high praises* while their work




reported by foster Bailey, « atsw Tork lifflajl correspondent
in the Pacific, who elairaed that jsany of hie etoriee ware
delayed up to eight "souths is some esses because the Savy
•sew no reason for expediting them* * Bailey added, *Zt*s
the fi^htingest Wavy in the world, sat it doesn't know
public relations**
As the central Pacific Ferae, under Vice Admiral
Raymond A. 8pruance, poised to begin the meaaivc amphibious
thrusts designed to place U*S. troops on Japan's doorstep*
there was evidence of a significant change in Msvy public
relations policy in the Pacific. On the eve of the Tarawa
invasion, Admiral nimits released to tha media at Pearl
Harbor the text of a directive he sent to all Pacific Fleet
and Maval Shore Activities in the Feciflei
Projective offensive operations in the Pacific
provide opportunity to present to the American people
and to our allies throughout the world the accomplish-
ments and needs of our fighting forces* It is to the
benefit of the Army, the navy and our Country that we
develop this opportunity to the utmost*
Fleet, force and unit commanders mx^ directed to
provide all practicable cooperation, including informa-
tion and physical faciiitiea, consistent with security
operations, to accredited representatives of the
press and of the naval and military forces assigned to
coverage of the Pacific campaign*'7
At Tarawa, a new amphibious flagship, the Aoc,
equipped to handle the myriad communications needs of a
landing operation, was introduced into the fleet* The AOC
permitted a major atep forward in reporting the news*
v -J




Previously, press copy had to bo *ont by moil to Pacific
Fleet headquarters or other authorised commanda for
censorship ond onward transiniseiono Rear Admiral A. K*
Turner, the amphibious coemander at Tarawa and MaXin* waa
tha first Savy era—isaner In tba var to allow press copy to
bo filed "literally from the beach-head • through the radio
facilities of his flagship.
This "play-byplay" report of the Tarawa invasion
received hish praise froa Palaer Hoyt* who resigned from
his post as 0WX domestic director at the end of 1943. In a
farewell speech* lloyt complimented Admiral Kirait* and the
navy* the Marine Corps and Coast Guard for arranging the
fast accounts of the battle which in his view was "the
,».te.t job of oovro»o i° tfa. history of varf.ro.-89
Respite the great distaaoes involved—Tarawa was 5*000
miles from the &•*• West Coast and over 2*090 miles from
the nearest telegraph—news stories of the battle ware on
editors* desks in twenty-four hours and still photographs
within forty-eight*
Although Tarawa marked a breakthrough in wavy radio
transmission of news copy* the practice was not to become
standard for many months. As late a* June 1944* Admiral
•pTttanoe issposed complete radio silence during the Battle
of the Philippine Sea (see note SS)«
full publicity for the amphibious forces also was







national news release concerning the training of these
forces in June 194J. However, throughout the susaser and
fall, restrictions were placed on release of information
about eapbibieue activities. Uto local publicity of any
kind was authorised* and all uateriai and photograph* had
to ba cleared through the Director of Public delations*
In December 1943, it was concluded that a publicity
campaign was necessary for speeding the production of
landing craft, so vitally needed for both the continuing
Pacific amphibious operations and the forthcoming invasion
of France* Accordingly, a statement by Under Secretary
Forrestal, directed primarily at shipyard workers, was
MB$iven wide dissemination throughout the naval districts.
On January 31, 1944, Marine and! Army troops wore
landed on Kwajalein and Hajuro Atolls in the Marshall
Islands, This was followed by the seizure of Bniwetok
Island a few wee its later.
While the "island-hopping in the Pacific continued,
an attempt waa aide by Adairal Harold C Stark, Commander
of 11*0. Saval Forces in Europe* to enhance the coverage in
the British press of the Kavy'a Pacific war role, lie wrote
to Secretary Knox in March 11*44 , requesting that a naval
expert on the Pacific war be assigned to his staff.
Specifically, he asked for captain K. at. Jftsttajiea, who
handled U.S. xavy news at the weekly Ministry of Information





The need to improve coverage of the Pacific
conflict was recognised on a very hisjh policy level in
London* It was felt that more complete coverage prior to
the noraaady invaaion would seem normal to the British
public, whereas an effort in that direction later might
appear too obvioua a device to stimulate Anglo enthusiasm
for fuller participation in the Pacific war* OWX had been
working for some time on a proposal £or a special Pacific
preaa conference to be held weekly in London, and 0.8. Army
and Australian officera already had been nominated as
spokesman. In urging Captain Lovette to push for quick
action on Admiral Stark's request, TJLeutenant Commander
Binghan wrote, "A Pacific conference without the U.S. navy
91
would he like 'Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark.*
Although Admiral Ring had approved the relaxation
of news restrictions in the Pacific, tm late as October
1943 he was still holding to his previously rigid position
with regard to submarine publicity. Be wrote to Secretary
HMSsti
# . • because of the far-reaching and harmful results
of any incorrect decision wa might make aa to the
publication of information having to do with the opera*
tlons of our aubmarinee, the matter haa been under
careful scrutiny for some time*
While Z am adverse to any step that might result in
deprivation to the public of m^ information we might
properly give them* X feel that in this instance none
of us is able to state categorically the amount of "aid





snail piece of apparently innocuous infon&ation. Z a*
reluctantly constraint, therefore, to reeonsasnd to you
that until Japan haa capitulated* no book or articles
dealing with our euboarine eoofcat operations he
pobliahed,"
Knox's reply was esthetic and aarcaatic in tono*
Zt eapreesed vividly hia bitter frustration through two
years of war ovsr what ha coneiderod to be an over-saaloua
application by King of the security arguiafcnt in the rslaasa
of information. "Z have just road your noaoranduat dealing
with tha publication of hooka on submarine ooarationa . • *
01
and must aay that Z an not at all ioprsssed.* * ha told tho
oifail i-ttl. "Tha offset . . . is to argue that nothing at ail
ba printed about attearine activities until tha war is over*
and tha justification of thia position ia • security. •" Tha
saeratary elaiaod that tha sans position could ba taken
about aircraft carriera* sine* "tha tsctics of tha opera-
tion from air ia /slfi/ exactly as difficult as attack under
tha water," He continued!
From the point of view of a aaa who only mmm
security involved* it would be infinitely wiser to not
print any newa at all until the war ia over* and this
type of aaa constitutes the Majority in tha Kavy, but
this aiaply cannot ba done*
unfortunately tha war ia not being fought by the
Savy alone and the navy is utterly dependent for both
personnel and material upon the public. The public*
properly and naturally, want to know everything that
can be told the* about tha progreae of the war. To say
that nothing can be told them about aubnarine opera-
tions because that would be giving sway secrets to the
essay is tantamount to aay that we can tell them
nothing about deetroyere* or cruisers* or battieahipa,




Knox accused Kin? of returning to the same type of
opposition to publicity that the admiral evinced aarly in
the war. The secretary reiterated that he* personally, hod
taken over the conduct of navy public relations in October
1942 to "prevent a rapidly growing public resentment. * He
added that there had bean a definite improvement in both
the speed and comprehensiveness of Havy news in the paat
year, and pointedly stated, "X propose to maintain complete
control of this particular part of Havy activities,
caustic admonition to King to k*ep oat of the publicity
busineas and oonfine himself to matters of legitimate
security review
i
X observed in a meaorandta* X received fro?* you a
disposition to put someone in the Combat Intelligence
into some position of authority over publicity. X wish
this order to be promptXy canoelied. X want no further
interference with Public Relations save only that
defined in a recent memorandum to you which provided
that a member of the Public Halations staff would ha
named by you to represent the Commander in Chief*m
office* as was to paas upon all questions of security
involved. Xn case the decision involved questions
which he did not feel competent to paaa upon* he was to
refer these questions either to you or your Chief of
Staff. X want this condition continued without elabor*
ation , and oertainly X want no changee made, in the way
of creation of new authority over publicity, without my
approval. To put the matter bluntly and briefly— I know
X have the authority and X know X have the experience
to handle, without nasistance, the question of Public
Halations of the navy* X propose to eaaume that
responsibility and exercise that authority with the
sol© provision that questions of security will toe dealt




lMspita the authoritarian tone of tint secretary *s
memorandum, Admiral King still vm able to place an alsaost
complete embargo on submarine stories that remained in
effect until a few months before the end of the war. Bin
edict resulted from the publication of several stories
which ho considered harmful to our submarine ©paratione.
trior to hie notion* thoro had boon a trickle of submarine
publicity, particularly in the Pacific Fleet* tn 1942 and
^p eee» ^a> y *e* ^r^9 wF <se<a»^w wm^s^^^on^^pomn^ ^^,wa8^s^B^^^tO"^miwwe* m^e*1 ^^sc^^^e 9 ^*a^^^^ »^ i^b^^^^^^p •^^^ hp^^^hp ^B'^m^v
relationa officer* allowed a limited number of correspond"
enta to interview returning submarine commanding officers
on an individual basis in Hawaii. Xn the summer of 1943,
Commander K* If* Orenfell* USB, the newly appointed public
relatione officer for Commander Submarine force* tf.S.
Pacific Fleet* refined thin procedure by having the war
correspondents question the submarine skippers in group
meetings* with public relations officers present to give
prompt rulings on matters of security*
The early submarine atoriea* for the most part
positive in nature* were credited with raising morale on
the hone front. These included the observation of horse
races in Japan by one of our submarines operating close-in
to the enemy shore* a periscope photograph of Mount
Fujiyama* and the sinking of a Japanese carrier in the
Battle of Midway, until May of 1944* however* when the










announced, very stini&al publicity about auboarinss waa
permitted other than in the general language of the
official navy Department communiquea ieeued from Washing"
ton. It was daring this eiabargo period that the subnerine
branch beeawe Known aa the "Silent Service.
*
An exasaple of how stringent the censorship rules
were concerning submarine publicity occurred in the South-
weat Pacific early in 194$. A Dutch suboerine departed
Auetraiia on patrol with mn accredited Patch war corre-
apondent ewbarked. When word of thia reached the Commander
Submarine fores* 13. 6* Seventh Fleet* the subatarlne isaaedi-
ately waa recalled to port to debark the unauthorised
correapondent and confiscate* hia film.
<
In Decesaber 1943* the Savy*e strict security
^*e^*»e efrati Ma*ev *a^ a ^•^a a^Msr^a^v s**s.'>e e^fc*#^s^a^wa %tS4^v ^^^^sae^^sftee* ^a -^pw^^w ^*> ^a^wa^ .aias ^jfS^WK>
Atlantic caiae to an end* A new revision of the ^fY** af
JOafBflklaMH|BwiiMk^Ki^ftwRHftn*asH S^fiaMr «e> a*'#a* %* a*fjr In*v
Office of Censorship* no longer listed the Savy Department
as the sole appropriate authority for the release of news
about the ainking or damaging of merchant vessels. The ***
•hipping Administration (wca) now was authorised to
announce such news. If matters of naval security were
involved* MSA had to clear its releases first with OWZ*
which Nin practice ... will check with the tfavy Department
m. MK&« **«*




on cases involving security.
*
In the ao*)adaaats to the censorship code* the
Office of Censorship easuaed wore authority for the clear-
ance of oil news materials about the war, including
announcexaonts made officially by other government agencies.
Byron Price admitted that the revisions reflected the
opinion by government leaders that laore war information
could now bo disseminated without endangering national
security. "This conclusion la no way presupposes an early
end to the war. Xt does ta&e account of the fact that the
war has taken an issportent turn from the defensive to the
aj
offensive."
IM&ffi nflbftftjjfli oj? ft fitthl id flu Itttlona
The improvement of the Allied position in the war
contributed to a relaxation of censorship procedures and a
wore positive approach to public relations by the Military.
By 1944, naval reserve officers were clearing stories sent
to Washington and Pearl Harbor with "little reference to
Of
higher authority.* Public relations considerations worn
an Integral part of the planning for the Kormaady operation.
OWI was working closely with both the Army and navy on the
proposed press coverage of the European invasion* and Elisor
as
Davis also met with the President to discuss these plans*
As a result of premature disclosures of happenings at the





President Roosevelt directed the War end Kavy Jtepartaents
and OKI in Uecember If4J to eliminate their practice of
issuing advance releasee for publication at a specified
future time and date* Instead, the President ordered,
Mall such information will tee given out » . . at the
earliest possible moment consistent with national security*
tax immediate publication and broadcast. *
In April 1944, an agreement reached with the Army
and navy by OWI brought about a closer control over the
authority exercised by theater commanders in the release of
fl~.. 100 Xh. iff > c«U.«S toe tadim MtaiMton for
review in Washington of any news iteats withheld for secur~
ity or other military reasons.
Captain Iovetts, in a letter to the Commandant of
the First ttaval District just prior to Christians* 1943,
expressed an optimistic viewpoint over the progress made in
the past year by navy public relations* *ione of our work
has been very uphill, but we do feel here in Washington
that strides have been made, mM that, both in policy and
organisation, we are well out of the woods* * Lovetta
acconpaniad Secretary Knoac on a tour of European and
Atlantic theaters two months earlier, and he reported in
his letter thatt
The whole subject 2&f public relation*/ ia very near
the heart of the secretary* With his broad and long
experience in the field of news, public opinion, and









the public and of the legislators will be a sfcjac
factor in ©atenaining the sis* of th* navy . . . after
the cassation of hostilities* Much of tha groundwork
in the way of public opinion and food will oust ba laid
now,
The observation wan th* first hint curing the wax
that tha Kavy was beginning to think in t*sraa of long-range
planning in its public relations program.
Despite the store liberal approach to public rela-
tions by the silitary in late 1943 and early 1944* public
satiafaction with government infornation policies decline**
tn April 1944* a final survey conducted by OSTX's Survey
division prior to its abolishment* showed that only 57 per
cent of the public thought that the ataount and quality of
war news was adequate, cotspared to 74 per cent in Ftebruary
1943, as far as handling of news by the Amy and fcavy
was concerned, there also was a downward tread in public
confidence* but it was much wor<* pronounced for the Anay
than the Kavy. Seventy-one par cent of those polled had
given tha War Department a "well done* rating in this area
in early 1943* but only 58 par cent voiced this opinion In
April 1944* Ces^arative figurea for the navy during the
same periods were S3 per cent and 3S pmz cent* a decreaae
of only 8 per cent. The Havy still drew more cos&laints
for not releasing news soon enough* while tha Aray was






In «ay 1944. H*«r Admiral Aaron Star.ton Merrill,
VBX. relieved Captain Mwttl aa l>ir«*ctor of Fublic Rela-
tione. Tip* Merrill, aa he waa known, was a combat
la^er %flPei ^Baa \* a* a«*a3^Bi evsmFeaainWl e» "eemseV eVe*™ aea^^KBMe^eeiNpwam ae^PelenMem»eme'eae» *jFe» aa
cruieer-deetroyer tea* force, ha led naval gunfire attaclca
on japaneee position* in tha Solomon Islands in March and
June of 1943. Xn Mavember of that year, his force sunk two
enemy erulaara and two deetroyere during tha Battle of
103
Ba^raaa Auguata Bay.* for bravery and efficiency In
thaaa operations, ha waa awardad tha navy Croaa and tha
1*9ion of Merit.
Secretary Knox, daring hia visit to feearl Harbor in
January 1943. had been impreeaed by tha energy and congen-
iality displayed by Admiral Merrill when ha "vaulted up tha
.fir. vith . bi, mwUm ~ hi. i^..*104 MM c**1n
Levatte, after almost two yeara in Washington* yearned for
a return to aaa duty* tha secretary personally aalooted
Merrill to be hia successor. •The admiral had no public
relations experience and "he grumbled at taking hia ewival-
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chair assignment." But ha had a $raat deal of "battla
lore and personality.'* and officers who aervad under him
predicted ha would do a creditable 30b.
Captain Lovetta had eerved aa Director of Public
Relatione during a difficult and critical time for tha






paid liia the fallowing tribute
t
Lovette was fully aware of the barnacles encrusting
naval press procedure* Ma nevertheless scraped
willingly, with Xncuc, ha inaugurated of f-the-record
background conferences* saw that comuniquea froa»
con&at araaa were, issued aimultanaouely in Washington
to give the hone front a swift i»raak on new*, and
established so close a working tie with the War
Department and OWX that he elicited the heartfelt
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THE FXKAL VKAS8 QW THE WAR
On April 28, X944* Frank Knox died unexpectedly of
ft heart attack. Twelve days later, Under Secretary
Forreetai v»i named by President Rposevelt to replace hira.
Welting of Knox's death, the Little Hock Atkaaa&ft-
IfrlMffiirffif' stressed the importance of hia public relatione
role aa Secretary of toe navy*
Hia concept of thift job did not call for interfer-
ence with the trained career leaders of the fleet—the
admirala headed by stern-visa^ed Ernest •*• King* • . *
for standing between the navy and the public.
1
Knox alao aerved as ft buffer between the etrong
willa of his two chief subordinate* Kin^ and forraetal.
The Under Secretary and the admiral were vastly different
in temperament and method* of operation. They often
opposed each other* a plans and recommendation* , particularly
in the matter of logistics! support for the fleet. Mad it
not been for Knox's conciliatory efforts* the two might
have clashed openly early in the war. As it was* they were
"held at bay." so to apeak* until they could develop ft
"kind of frosty mutual self-respect.
"
The strained relationehip between fOrreatftl and
219
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Xing did net prevent the new Secretary of the Wavy from
planning and implementing a greatly accelerated navy public
relation* program in the final year of th« war. According
to Rear Admiral Robert ft. Berry, V$B (Retire*), the former
deputy director of the Office of Public Relatione,
fOrreetal wee ^toiayrher than Anox • • • and thue overcame
King* a eeeurity^onacioueneea.
•
»y this tinm* however. Admiral King obviously did
not feel the neeesaity for aa atrict a aecurity poeture aa
he did earlier in the conflict* 3ttmi» coawenting on the
admiral's firat report of the war, iaaued on April 23, 1944,
obaerveds *fhe navy, Ernie King could new nay, waa in good
shape* . . . now he could afford to let the aecurity hare
dawn and tell what aad ehape it had been in, early in the
«4
war**
The King report waa the counterpart of General
George Marshall's account of U.S. Army activitiee in the
war, released in September 1943* the Chief of naval Opera-
tiona* 50,000-vord etateaent told for the firat tine many
detaila of naval battles that had net been revealed in the
official communiquee* For instance, the public had not
bean informed that ten U.S. navy combat ahipe were sunk or
damaged in the "firat thundering quarter hour** of the naval
settle of Guadalcanal, Sovember 13-15, 1942*







jefet but please when you writes the story* would you *sind
—
s
well* leaving out the dxXn?*
Although the** words were spoken by Jsmes forrestal
during en interview with s reporter who was writing s
"Horatio Alger-type success story* about the now Mmvy
secretary himself, they provide an excellent insight into
his over-all public relations philosophy. Like Frank Knox*
rorrestal was intensely mindful of the need to inform the
public of the navy's role in the wart yet* ualitee his
predecessor* he was determined and prepared to exercise
direct personal control over the navy's public relations,
Unyuided information efforts* in his opinion* would result
in inconsequential "drip" that would not accomplish the
important tasks of gaining recognition for the Navy* a war-
time achievements and support for a strong postwar navy,
Forrestal *s remark to his interviewer also was
indicative of his inherent modesty; he shunned personal
publicity throughout his governmental career. On the day
of the Bormandy invasion* he called reporters into his
office and immediately turned them over to an assembled
group of admirals with the crisp remark* "You've come here
for combat news,**6 Although he had a personal hand in
procuring the swarm of landing craft and other vessels that
carried our troops into France* forrestal did not want to
"shoulder his way into the limelight* *
Later in the summer* following a trip to the
mm tm
•a
:»tj ik * «*£
1 : MM - M I • -
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mediterranean to observe the landing* in Southern France,
the aeoretary wrote to Carl Vinaon, chairman of til* House
Havel Affaira Coemitteei
X an enclosing a diary of jay viait to Admiral
Hewitt* a Float which X saade primarily with a view of
getting for nia the credit which it seema to aa lie
deserved. The newa out of the Mediterranean area ao
far ae the Wavy ia concerned haa been rather alight,
but I think there will now be aorwe inqerovaaiant • **y
niaaion I think waa fairly eucceaeful on thia acora*
with the qualification that X cot a little too much
publicity rayeelf • • . It ia say view that the Secretary
of the 2favy can be of only alight uae in augaenting
Mavy publicity*
?
Although ha avoided pergonal exposure in the news
media* Forrental did uae the medio® of public speaking to
gat his aeeaage acroas to the American people. Sot a
dynamic speaker, the taek waa difficult for him* Keverths~
lose, ha spofee to a variety of audiences throughout the
nation* 84a flrat talke ware written by the Office of
Public delations* which "was accuatoiead to grinding out
speeches by the doaan for delivery by officials and
officers too busy to write their own*" After listening to
hisa drone through these early "canoed* addresses* however*
Forreat*i*s ataff encouraged hi*a to do &uch of hia own
epeech-wrlting in order to be effective*
The san Francisco Qujmi£*m\» in July 1944* coaoantad
favorably about the secretary's personal public relations
effortat
• • • Forreetal talke to the Aaer&ean netwite about **»*
situation in the 9aci£i& like an adult oan talking to





fttit he talks frankly and officially to the people with
a etatement of tiutix case that la without needless and
mysterious concealment. It la an agreeable novelty. 9
forreetel read six newspapers ovary morning and
almost daily telephoned OIK to discuss Itana appearing in
them. So kept a personal clipping ill®, vita »aay of the
articles feeing sent to kin by acquaintancea in the news-
10
paper and publishing fields. ay cultivating the friend-
ship of such columnists and coanantators aa Hanson Baldwin.
Halter Millie* Arthur Krook* Halter blppmaan* James Weston
aad the Alsops* he sought to reach the *thinking " minority
swing the public* In a letter to Krock* he expounded upon
his personal philosophy concerning public relations and
government services "When 2 caae down hare* Z remarked* and
X think it may have bean to you* that anyone serving in
Government had really two functions s CD he had to do a
good job* and (2) he had to convince the public that a good
job was being d*aa.*U
Rear Admiral Harold a. (Kin) Miliar* vmu (Retired)*
said that Forrestal "likened the American public to stock
-
12holders in the Havy. ** The secretary felt that if the
people at home who were working in the war Industries ware
fully apprised of the realities of war and the difficulties
faced by tfavyman in the Atlantic and the Pacific* they
would "redouble their offorte. - Be also thought that this
"deairahla public reaction 1* could be achieved without
violating security* by concentrating on full disclosure of
-
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events that had happened and not en what was going to take
place*
Harqag Throat Spur* Mavy to Aurtinn
On April 24. 1944* four daya hefox* Frank Knox
died, hearings beyaa In Congress before the fcoodrum Commit-
tee to consider an Army plan to marge the armed services
into a ainglo department. The long-standing unification
issue had remained comparatively dormant in tha early part
of tha war. until it was resurrected by tha War department
in 1943 with a specific proposal to create a single chief
of staff tor tha anaad forces*
The Army stove represented a switch in position.
Prior to 1943* the war department had joined the navy in
opposing the Arajy Air JPorce fight to become a separate
service within a unified system. The change in attitude by
the Army evoked an immediate and predictable reaction from
the Siavy. Fearing that it would be *eubaerged* * not
"merged** tha sea service trained its biggest guns on tha
unification concept. Secretary For re atal testified at the
congressional hearing that* in his opinion* no one person
was capable of administering a single service with an
annual budget of almost $100 billion. Admiral King and
Marine Corps Commandant doneral Alexander A. vandegrlft
also spoke out against the plani and Assistant Secretary of




was necess&ry, the navy ehould serve as its fciaai* because
it could operate ok the see, urater tha se*» in the air and
13
on the land.
Tlie opposition by the Ravy influenced tha Woodrum
Committee not to mafce any changes in the cosmosition of the
•rased forces at that time. But Forrestal knew that the
truce was only temporary, and he felt a crave necessity for
instilling in the 8T«vy*a military hierarchy a sonaa of
urgency to take action before it was too lata* In Sapteafear
1944* ha wrote to Maimer Hoyt* who had resumed his duties
aa publisher of the Portland o*»ffmnie» following his resig-
nation from WX* "X have hmmn telling King* Kimltx &st&
Company it ia my judojsmnt that aa of today tha SSavy has
loat ita case and that* either in Congress, or in a public
14
poll* tha Army's point of view would prevail,"*
One of tha first actions tha new secretary took to
involve naval officers in tha political anal public rela-
tione arena surrounding tha meroar iaaoa waa tha establish-
ment of a unique "ad hoc* committee in tha lata spring and
early summer of 1944. Consisting primarily of naval
officers* with no civilian public relatione specialists
included in ita membership, the committee waa charged with
"cultivating viewe favorable to tha Navy among carefully
is
ealectod groups in the public at large. * It waa chaired
by Captain jbovette* Who had been aefcad by forrestal to
forego for the time being his desires to take command Of a
1*
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major ship. When the Woedrum Committee hearings endo4 in
JUiw with no immediate threat to the Kavy, the w« eoeacy
was dissolved by Forr«stal, primarily in response to
Lovette's plea to be sllowed to 90 to sea. Such duty was
imperative to a Regular navy officer's changes for
promotion*
Although this first "ad hoc* committee never
actually began operations* its establishment was signif-
icant in several respects. St marked the first tins that
such a group* whose tasks were quesl-political ami involved
•behind-the-scenes " public relations activities* had ever
existed in the Kavy* And it becsne the prototype for
similar agencies set up by Forrestsl in the immediate post-
war years* when the merger issue erupted into full-scale
and bitter inter-service rivalry. It also was an indica-
tion of Forrestsl*s determination to blend into the £avy*s
over-all political strategy an organised and systematic
public relations campaign* using Regular navy offlcera as
well as reservists and civilians* "Probably no leader in
the navy's history up to that tlms, either civilian or
uniformed* was more convinced than Forrestsl of the polit-
ical importance of effectively utilising public relations
techniques • • • "
In a graduation address at the Naval Academy
shortly after he took office* the secretary stressed that
each naval officer should consider himself a public
a mm*
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relation* specialist . A year later, again speaXing at the
Annapolie graduation 4hkstcx*gb, ha elaborated oa thia
thtMi
. • • I ask each of you . . . to consider yourself a
purveyor of information about the Mavy and about our
national tmarft for its continuance. Bever fat tired of
tha repetition of thia story, aor take it for granted
that it is already known to your listeners.
Thar* are many barriers to each communication
between tha officers of tha naval service and tha
public but those barriers must be leveled if we are not
to return to ths inertia of the 20 yfta&s before tha war
on national defanse . . . you have 2*n/ obligation
• • • to constitute in youraalves ona means of keeping
tha American public informed of what tha mavy is and
what its needs are.*?
Thus, in the summer of 1944 Forrastel undertook tha
education of tha navy* a officer corps on the necessity for
a continuing and expansive public relatione program on the
Kavy'a behalf. In thia effort, ha enjoyed two advantages
which Prank Knox did not possess* First, there was ths
dire threat posed by the merger plan* This alone gave the
secretary tha attentive ears of the officers. Secondly* by
this stage of the war* many of tha naval aviators who had
•had their public relations inhibitions in tha prewar fight
ageinet General silly Mitchell m*& his supporters wars mem
in positions of authority and influence in the navy's
leadership structure. These officers—Admirals Marc
tfitscher, Ralph Ofetie, Arthur Had ford* Thomas H. Robbins,
Jr., and Forrest Sherman among others—were more receptive
to forrestal's arguments than the older admirals had bean




Davis* » perceptible change in the attitude of Regular navy
officers to public relatione activities already was notice-
is
able in the spring of 1944.
JraaxL
. JUgbox Invc. ftfeiffstinns*
Another tank facing Forrestel in the first month
after he because secretary tree to direct a Navy Court of
Inquiry into the Pearl Harbor disaster. The President had
appoints the Roberta Commission to investigate the circuar-
atancea surrounding the attack abort iy after it occurred.
This body hag placed the ma^or ahare of blame for the lack
of military readineea before the attack on the Army and
Kavy commanders in Hawaii at the tin** Lieutenant General
Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. These officers
vera relieved of their commands and had not been given any
request an opportunity to present their easaa before duly
constituted military courts-martial. Congress intervened
in their behalf in Hay 1944* directing the Secretaries of
war and Mavy to conduct new investigations.
The resulting Mavy Court of Inquiry began holding
hearings on July 24* 1944. and completed its sessions in
October of that year. It reversed the fiadin^e of the
Roberts Commission* clearing the Savy of any blame in the
disaster except for questioning the judgment of Admiral
Harold C. Stark* Chief of gavel Operations at the time of
Hgf
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the attack. The Array court cs&m to similar conclusions.
Secretary Forrest*! and the tthita House warded to
give wide publicity to the findings of tha two courts.
However, Admiral Kla§ objected etreauouely on tha baeis
that thia might laad inadvertently to tha Japanese aimpact*
ing that their military and diplomatic codes had Towm
broken. King* a vi*w prevailea, and complete Information on
tha Jteaxl Harbor investigationa waa not mada available to
tha public until after tha war was concluded.
Tha Mavy public ralations rola in Operation Over-
lord, tha invasion of franca on June 6* 1944* was a
complicated ona in that plana had to be coordinated with
tha British and tha U.S. Army for embarfcin? a large number
of correspondents in tha invaaion fleet. These reporters
vara to be briefed in advance and their copy had to ha
ceneored once they were aboard. Admiral stark* tha Wavy
commander in Europe • recreated from Secretary ftnex several
months earlier the personal aseietance of Captain iovatts
in directing theae public relations operations. However,
Lovette waa not available, and the responsibility for
supervising tha Navy's efforts in this area remained in tha
hands of Lieutenant Commander Barry Bingham, USBR, Admiral
Stark's public relations officer, who before the war and





One of aiaghom*s assistants* lieutenant Jay B.
Smith, uSiSi* was assigned the primary duty of conducting
the public relations briefings for the correspondents,
According to Smith* these briefings were given on almost a
daily basis several weeks before th© landings* partially as
a device to deceive ths ensmy as to the exact data for tha
2"
operation. These "false alarm* sessions cam to be
recognised as such by the correspondents* who for the most
part accepted than graciously if not enthusiastically*
tthen tha time cams for ths actual final briefing to
tha proas prior to embarkation- aob Casey of tha Chicago
Tribune sskmd Smith to be excused for a moment to get his
typewriter. Knowing the past history of the ** fluffy for
receiving "signals* from its reporters when something big
was about to happen* the Lieutenant refused. In fact* all
of the correspondents ware immediately placed under guard
and taken directly to the individual ships in which they
were to be embarked. One writer* Ernest Bemincntny* was ill
that day and thus missed the initial coverage of the
invasion*
Commander Harold B, Say, the head of the Security
Review Section in 0PR« had been dispatched by Secretary
Knox to assist Admiral Stark in the handling of censorship
for the Normandy operation. Procedures for censoring copy
aboard ship. Say reported* were refined to the extent that
22





pre-D~I>ay meeting with correspondents, public relations
offlours SMI censors explained in detail what news could be
cleared and what could not. As a result, a g»»*f»*^
Ew^nln^ g««* story of MM $.000 words wm cabled back
shortly after the beginning of the operation with only one
word changed*
A significant departure from past censorship rules
occurred at nonaandy when Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay* the
British commander of the naval operations, allowed the
names of capital ships participating in the landing to be
used by the correspondents* Ramsay told Say. "The Germans
esa tell these 14-inch shells are not coming from
destroyers, and they can aee the ships front their airplanes
anyway, so why not identify the Xsuuut. toftfHWHM- JSsxAdft*
WaXSflits. etc.?-
23
Matters of real security were protected assiduously,
however* for instance, no mention was allowed in press
copy of the artificial ports constructed by the Allies to
receive supplies*
During the Kormendy landings, as at Tarawa, facil-
ities were available aboard the Add command ships for com-
msntators to radio back direct reports of the action*
Sftsslfafts! Qi
while the Bormandy invasion was in progress, a task
forc& of 535 ships, carrying soma 130.000 Marine and Army
troops, was enroute to the Mariana Islands to conduct
.• ;. •
' - . 1 .. .
..;.,: JH^U : ' :-''-
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landings on Saipen* Tiaian and Guam* The first island to
be invaded was &aipan on June 15* &-Day for Guam*
originally aat for Juna 18 • was postponed whan a largo
Japanese naval forct* vaa sighted steaming eastward fron tho
Philippines* The force was intercepted* and during the
ensuing Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19*20* an
overwhelming defeat was administered to the Imperial Float
by ships and airoraft of the U*6. Fifth Float. 24
Guam and Tinian were invaded in July* and organised
enemy resistance on both islands aadad in early August*
The ioaa of the Marianas* representing a penetration by
U.S. forces of the Japanese inner defense ring* resulted in
the downfall of the Tojo government* which had ruled Japan
since before the war* The victory gave the United States
advanced naval and air bases within striking distance of
the Japanese hosts islands* Additionally* the defeat of the
Japanese savy in the Battle of the Philippine Sea virtually
destroyed its capability to interfere with future Allied
operations in the Fecifie.
While the Marianas campaign played a vital role in
the ultimate victory in the Fecifie $ there was a growing
feeling ob the part of Secretary Forrestal and others that
MaeArthur and the Aray in the Southwest Facific were out-
flanking the Havy on the publicity front* Even before
Saipan fell* the Colombia, S.C* smSOfid. took note of this




The awry is beginning to be jealoua of whet it
cells the «r«jy*« "hi^h-powered publicity setup* *
• « • But apparently the nevy # s only remedy ie to com*
plain of whet the army is doing instead of making
available navy information to correspondents* for the
navy is itself responsible for its own bad press* St
should have corrected this situation long ago* It
should correct it now instead of complaining. 25
Prior to the Tarawa invasion in the fall of 1943*
Admiral Kimits had directed his commanders to cooperate
fully with war correspondents and give eosmtand attention to
the public relations aapects of forthcoming operations.
Yet* film taken by civilian and navy photographers at
ftaipan arrived in the United States too late to be of
timely use« and press copy on the operation also was
delayed* Censorship officers steamed away with the fleet
while correspondents were left ashore for five days unable
to clear their stories* In addition* as was previously
mentioned* Admiral Bpruence imposed radio silence during!
the Battle of the Philippine Sea, thus preventing the
broadcast transmittal of news reports*
Ms evidence was found to indicate that Admiral
fpruance in any way interfered with or discouraged public
relations coverage of the Marianas* campaign other than to
impose radio alienee for security reasons* However* it is
interesting to note that the over-ell commander for the
operations in the Gilbert* Marshall mnA Mariana Islands*
and later Xwo Jima and Okinawa* avoided personal publicity





Spruanc* ia known only va$u*ly to many in connection with
the Pacific war of 1*41-45, and too few can recall juet
27
What net did, or why they remember the name at ail.*
aw m™^^™*»m»™* ^w^hp ^(^ e ^s^^^* *»e*^B^*imw ™»*" ^^^ae^mw*^*^^^^^4Sf ^w*^ps*me^^^•^m.^w ^^ •»
Admiral William r. (Boll) ttaisey in the Pacific ara well-
known. Halsey had a colorful personality and a flair for
the dramatic—ha laade good preas copy. Spruanc*?, en the
other band, waa a r^s^rv^d, intellectual* aliaoat withdrawn
individual, The nawa media experienced great difficulty
in glamorising him. At one point, Spruenc* explained his
reaaona for ehunning the spotlight to a classmate from the
Haval Academy. Hia philoaophy on thia aubject ia euffi-
ciontly thought-provoking to merit mention in aome detail*
Peraonal publicity in a war can be a drawback
because it may affect a man's thinking* A commander
may not have sought it? it may have bean forced upon
him by sealoua subordinates or imaginative war corre-
spondents* One* started, however, it ia hard to keep
in check. In the early daya of a war, when littla
about the various commandera is known to the public,
and some Admiral or General deee a good and perhaps
spectacular job, he geta a head etart in publicity*
Anything ha does thereafter tends toward greater head-
line value than the asms thing done by others,
following the journalistic rule that **fam*a make nawa*"
Thus his reputation anow-balla, and soon, probably
against hie will, he has become a colorful figure,
credited with fabuloua charactariatics over and above
the competence in war command for which ha haa been
conditioning himself all hie life.
His fame may not have gone to his head, but there
ia nevertheless danger in thia* Should he get to
identifying himself with the figure m» publicised, he
may subconsciously start thinking *» terms of what his
reputation calls for, rather than of how beat to meet
the actual problem eonfronting him* A man*a judgment
ia beat when he can forget himself and any reputation






raaking tha ri^ht decisions* Hsnee, if ha sees&s to jiv*
interview&rs and publicity men the brush-off* it i» not
through ungraciousness, but rather to fcoop his thinking
impersonal and r&aliatie* 23
Spruance did erect aufinito barriers for the press
when it esse to granting interviews or discussing his role
in the war* for instance, when hs was Chief of Staff to
Admiral Hiraits during the interim period between his
oomwand of naval forces during ths Battle of Kidwey and the
Tarawa landing, lis conducted interviews frost a stand-up desk
with no chairs for visitors* Heedless to say, under these
as
conditions, *fsw loitered and time was conserved.**^
Irrespective of Admiral spruance* a personal ideas
on publicity, the public relations efforts of the navy were
m^e*^ mw^f ™n%FeSmr«a»sa iimSji emip^w** ej^Pe* %K#e^e» ewHWei»ewwa> w|r Je fce^PS' WWe) WH ^Twwv,w
in the Pacific, since its role in ths Atlantic and European
theaters was now one primarily of support* In the sunns*
of 1944, however, there was considerable disaatiafaction
in nany quarters of the sea service over the Pacific
Fleet's handling of public relations*
This dissatisfaction actually surfaced earlier in
the year* Xn the spring of 1944, Emmett Crosier, a writer
for the Mow York Tims- conducted mn informal survey at the
request of Assistant Secretary dates into ways in which
naval aviation news and information services could be





sixteen newspepersem and naval officers who had been in
frequent contact with the I acific Float public relatione
offlea ia Honolulu. 2a the opinion of thorn interviewed,
*avy public relations ia tha Pacific la ft much to too
desired through 194$ an* aost of 1943, Tha primary coer*
plaint* revolved around "needless" delay of press copy aad
photograph* and "unreasonable and arbitrary'1 censorship*
As a result* there was considerable bitterness and tension
in the relationship between the preas and the fleet public
relatione officer* At one tiae* Crosier learned* certain
awafeere of the press corps in Honolulu actually decided to
boycott the navy ia the Pacific by writing no stories at
all about its activities* but their hone offices objected*
Crosier concluded that while conditions had iinpreved since
the fall of 1943* tha public relations situation in the
Pacific waa atill very bad.*
Going far afield frost his original assignment, to
study aviation publicity* the Mew York XJJMA writer leveled
a strong indictsaent against the Kavy's public relations
efforts in general. Re claimed that * there is no clear
conception at this critical period in the war of the Navy's
informational obligation to the AcerJean people or of the
sound advantagea »t> »h» ae^y of an enlightened* constructive
public relations policy." Be described the sea service's
public relations office as being that of a "cooperating*




modest, aloof* secretive awl arrogant in its dealings with
the press* radio aaA public, • Bo c<mtim»di
The »avy has failed to give the American people a
clear, comprehensive picture of its work and its
problems* It has failed to tell* or permit others to
tall, the human story of the men who are fighting and
dying in its service. Xt has failed to tell. » • • the
great story of naval air power*
If the American people ait by impasaively after the
war while the Navy's air arm is wrenched away • • * the
blame can be laid squarely on the present lack of a
constructive public relatione policy in the navy.
Crosier • a harsh analysis seems to have had a
profound effect en forrestal's direction of the navy a a
public relations program during the final phase of the war*
In future correspondence and discussions dealing with the
subject, the secretary continually stressed the themes
keynoted in the report to Secretary Gates* He also iaple~
memted many of the specific recojsaendations made by the Paw
York XiaUL staffer for improving the navy's image*
In June 1944 « forrestal wrote to Admiral Marrill
settlining his ideas for possible changes in the navy*
a
31public relations program. * Ha recommended that Captain
waldo Drake be replaced as Pacific Fleet public relations
officer by a "younger, more vigorous officer* mv& that soma
of the "able youne* public relations officers in Washington
and tendon be sent to the Pacific* *X believe our public
relations team in the Pacific should be the best we have
anywhere** He believed* too, that it was time for the navy
to urea the news media to send their best reporters and




they have sent their second-string men to the Pacific. H
For the Washington public relations office* ha had
the following suyaeations*
(1) jd^at ua/ a small staff of excellent reporters
*
officers »kill«6 in eliciting and synthesixin$ facts.
X have in ssind that they will handle special projects
which will occur to you and me from time to tine. r
(2) h ynjry small graphics section should he set up /fco
produce/ ... presentations for Congress as well as
the public of the Savy budget, its building programs
and personnel trends.
(3) we should consider actually making in the navy, net
turning over to movie companies, about six Kavy docu-
mentary films a year.
(4) Books on tfavy actions should as security permits ho
allowed to cover current actions.
The secretary concluded by saying, "The success of
public relations depends on the exeollmnoe of its staff* X
think wa should continue to insist upon the best possible
officers* releasing any who fall below standard. Be
particularly was interested in the quality of public rela-
tions personnel as opposed to quantity, emphasising that
any increase in numbers of people should be avoided.
The memorandum was a forerunner of many letters and
other correspondence by Forreatal which dealt in great
detail with specific procedures and activities in public
relations. It definitely signaled his intention to exer-
cise personal direction over the ttavy's entire information
pfts^pMaat
Inspection Trip ,to fchu .Pacific
In lata July 1944, Admiral Merrill headed an eight-




Forrestal to txplor* ways to speed the flew of press copy
ond film fro© t!t» aomfeat cones. Accompanying nisi ware
George H«aly, OKI's domestic director,- Ray aacklend, a
representative of th© Still Picture Pool; Major John Li lion,
USMC. who replaced Frank Mason as Special Assistant for
Public Relations to the Secretary of the navy shortly after
frank Knox died (Mr* liason returned to Dew Tforfc to give
full-ti&e attention to his position as vice-president of
mC )i three officers from OPR—including J. Harrison
Hartley, the head of the Radio Section* who recently had
received a lieutenant commander's commission in the naval
reserve—and a Savy radio technician.
With the full backing of the secretary* Merrill wee
able to gain Admiral simita* approval for the following
innovative measures in future operations t
(1) ?lan* service would be established between the
command ship and Guam as soon after &~Day as the mili-
tary situation and weather conditions permit. Copy and
photographs would be censored aboard the flagship and
then flown £ro*a Guan to the United states via regular
air mail service » without having to be censored at
Fearl Harbor as had been the case in the past. This
procedure would make it possible to deliver film and
stories to the Vest Coast within twenty- four hours
after release from the flagship.
(2) In order to provide for daily radio voice broad-
casts frCB the scene of action* a portable transmitter
would be installed in the ccssBand ship for transmission
of a five~mimute newscast each day* which would be re*
transmitted over a hi^h-powerod transmitter from Guam
for further relay to the mainland via Pearl Harbor.
(3) Facilities for shore press headquarters* to include
censorship capabilities, would be set up as soon after
XH&ey as the military situation permitted. 33
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71m at*jor ehangae from pant procfcdare* in the am
plan* war* the arrangawanta for radio kraadcaate and
apecial pr«a« pinnae* and the previaiona fee ceneoria? copy
«t the »c«m of the operation rather than at float haad*
ejoartere*
Two atudioa wore to ba oonatruotad to handle the
broadoaata from the forward arena* one at faarl Harbor and
the other at Guasu Both faeilitiaa war* to be equipped
with diac reoorderaf and the etadio at Oman won to be oeed
for voioa broadcast, filing proaa popy and radio picture
tranamieaioru The Gua» atation alao would earve aa a hone
for network eorreepondenta and recording toon*. The Uavy
staff whxch handled radio coverage of the Normandy landinga
waa to ha tranaferrod to ©uaw to operate the studio there*
••w## a#aw w^pw»^wwiw wea^*fl^o^ewaew^^wsp 4ao^wafc Ofctin^noj *e*™e*eaowMni*teae"nie^e aeee tii*aeow ^* a^wa«e>;e*'e»^e
to auperviee the inatailationa and the be$innJji$ of opera*
tione, A target data of early Septoafeer waa oat for the
coapietion of facilities.
In order to enanre uniformity in *1m> mm oonaoralhin
procedures* a eyoten of rotating offleera between the
Security Review faction in OP» and the Pacific Fleet
"awarafaanajaafc epao»»j^ ^e7 -a*aawai wt*e>0 ^o ^f*w we»^evw ai^Wa^a^^a^p* oe j^ nn^ejeipi^n;e^ia^W™e» %wa* aajnjji efe _j
hOale waa initiated.
Certain proeeduree ware left unchanged after
oonaidarabie diecuasioa between Admiral* Merrill and ttimits*




to the Pacific rieet would continue because of the lack of
proper facilities* particularly in the forward areas. And
any decision to allow the use of the names of conbat ships
and personnel in news releases and press copy waa to be
referred to Admiral King for consideration. It also was
decided to continue the simultaneous release of CISC*AC
communiques at Pearl Harbor and Washington.
In forwarding Admiral Merrill *s report on the
Pacific trip to Forrestai, Eugene S. Duffield, a staff
sssistant to the secretary* expressed his opinion that
substantial results had been achieved* However , Nuffield
cautioned that "we cannot reat on our laurels /because/
HacArthur is fitting out a special press ship • • • his
whole unit will be on the scene whereas we are dependent on
a plans courier service at the discretion of the local
•35
One area in which Merrill was unsuccessful in gain-
ins Admiral visits* approval concerned the replacement of
Captain Drake as Feci fie fleet public relations officer.
Captain Lovette had warned Merrill that Siaaita was extremely
fond of Eraka and very appreciative of the fact that he had
ee
"taken stoat of the early knocks."* However, after confer-
ring personally with Drake in waehington in September 1944,
Secretary fbrreatal wrote to Mimits that he definitely had
37decided to make a change* The secretary apologised to
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e^eo^ee* O •> • ^e^^Be^ei^ao^^^We* mP ^peea^eed*wd «Bt^B>w^f ^WBiB» saawefcW -^Ba^Vs^w JfcW*^* a» •A^pesw ^»m#
pick their own subordinates.* He justified his inter JBer-
ease on the basis of the vital i*mj>ortanc« of public rela-
tions lit this stage of the wur, claiming that it had two
aspects— *the treatment of news in the actios theater • . •
and the result* in this country.* Us added* "You* of
course* are the judge of the first; it is our responsibility
•r^aeft SBeBJB^B' ^^F i SSeo^jK^v VrSa^C B^^aX^r-^mB'SeS a)
On October 19* torrastal iaessaged Adairal Bimits
that he had procured an assignment for Captain Drake with
OWX and that Captain Harold b. (Mia) Miller* t&M* former
head of the Bureau of Aeronautics Training and Literature
section who had been assigned a month earlier as Pacific
as
Fleet Photographic Officer* was to be his relief.
In late August 1944* Admiral Kimits began to lapis-
went the improvements agreed upon in his discussions with
Admiral Merrill. In a letter to the Commander* Third Fleet*
he stated that public relations officers from his staff
would be assigned to the task force commanders of forth-
coming amphibious operations for the purpose of censoring
39
and releasing press copy. As to broadcasts* he instituted
an even more liberal policy than had been called for in the
plans* Civilian correspondents would be Allowed to








casts also were to be originated from shore-based naval
radio facilities in the forward areas. Written press copy,
too* would be sent ovar navel ccausunications circuits mm
operational aeasa^e traffic permittee. Hedia represents-
facilities as commissioned officers and would be landed with
the troops after the fifth assault wave.
•MmWrnai W'msVJ^ Siaswa w*e*a^P elw*sj^-iS)r*J&siawewli*eB#i^ip wa*«pw »* »» # **'**•* w^a*
tary Forrestal proposed still another innovative public
relations measure to admits, the secretary expressed his
desire to embark in as many ships as possible' naval officers
"who are capable of writing for prosit release tm account
of that ship** actio**.*40 These officers would not dupli-
cate the efforts of civilian war correspondents—since, in
* 9 wSass TV ws^Rf.ja* *? W-1W sjss^ jye A WmyajWwt sews warSSHaV^rsS W»••%*#• ass^Sw* *wSbf
In many respects* the plan was patterned
that all material written by the savy officers would be
forwarded to the fleet public relations office £or use by
the accredited civilian correspondents rather than being
released by the 8avy directly.
In esplaininu to Klmits his reasons for wanting
publicity on virtually every ship la the Pacific, yorrestal
unification planet
•-'•
i ::, p ftm
-
•' s
i i i - I „ • t,"
I would not impose this tuck upon '/©«
»llinf conviction that the future existence of
ttavy as an independent nllltary organisation depends
upon the publico appreciation of the Wavy daring the
next several months • • • • The people at teems, Who
cannot see a single »avy ship or piano let alona
imagine a task force in action* nay receive a very
isfealaneed picture in which the 8avy seems to bo only
the transportation service to the beachhead. *nd
people, through their representatives, will decide
whether the »avy la to be consolidated ont of
W9
for this reason, alone I comaiend for your very
consideration the whole subject of public
relations and particularly the new
in this letter.
A week later the secretary elaborated on bis views
"whether we like it or not* there is no question bat that
the Army, through its great sise and its isultiple avenues
^^s^Wf s^s^bs* *WeWWwf as^e^p sx^^es> ^b» jppeswiSwfcflyssjS^as w*- At xj^»v^» sf es^a* sv^H^SisV^sh^e
*41 Ski pointed out that other interests ware often
certain theaters in which the Savy operated.
•• KacArthur in the Southwest Pacific and the
British in the Mediterranean ... "not through any
conscious desire to bo unfair but just in the very
of human beinos. have certainly not been active In
log the American navy's part in the war."
for the navy** public relations problems * • • "but X e»
writing to you in this detail, as X have talicod to Admiral
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for you the drift of public opinion. tt» reiterated his
belief that at this tine th« public was ovarwheiainyly in
favor of a single dapartasnt of catenae* ana ho vx<$*& an
all-out navy attempt to reverse the trend
t
thm tine ia lata to effect a change bat I believe w*
should make tha a *fort* and I think the start »uat be
in a change of attitude which reaches fro® tha
Commander in Chief down to the skipper of the smallest
landing craft* to tha effect that we shall do our bast
tot (a) earn the good will of tha prase aa individuala*
(b) stake constructive use in every possible way of
whatever awdia ere available to sea that tha tmXJk of
tha navy's eocoapliahments are transmitted to the
people* • • • all handa need to be indoctrinated with
tha idea that intelligent transmission of newa ia as
much a part of war today as either training or
logistics*
In response* Admiral slmlts* on September 10*
directed his subordinate commanders to assign qualified
^sa im<e»Wempeit ^P *».»# »»e^w*e>e> ^see^^m w^S w^e* J^e»^e*JejF^Pio>^p 4awa9 msej*/*a*^^p/ wirVtViiisv a Wa»
their ship*a action, and any other material considered
newsworthy. *^* Significantly* he explained that the
improvement in the Allied position in tha Pacific now made
it possible for a more ooaplata account of navy operations
to be given—since security was no longer as vital a
consideration.
On September 30* 1944* Admiral King* at Secretary
9orrestal*s request* instructed all float comaaaders in the
Mavy to include in their future operation plana and orders
a public relatione annex "to systematise and clarify
43
arrangements for aawa eervicea. * Although &ins felt it





"nothing in th& foregoing is to tots construed us authorising
any relaxation ia standards of security, " the step was an
axtre*s&iy important one. Hot only did it require task
fore«* cosB&attders to plan in advance the information
of an operation, but it also placed upon them a direct
written responsibility S©r th*i proper conduct of
public relations coverage*
2n concert with hi* desire to facilitate
coverage from the Pacific, tforreetaX strongly believed that
the- war tlMix^i needed $a©r* *>oa.3C,aonaiiain^ WM"a"taat it
isentaily as noil aa geofraphioeXXy to the
i« "The sona, husbands and brothers *
to their famiXias to have disappeared into a void
containing nothing but a aariaa of strange place
The secretary's earlier suggestion to Kiwita to place naval
attempt to increase tho number of *per*oi*aJ
stories about the 8avy»sn in the Pacific* Ma
in October 1944 to dispatch to Fear I Harbor a close friend
,
Jtr« J« If* Martin, president of Advertisers Services* Sne*,
of Milwaukee, to discuss with Admiral Stiait* a
systea for "collecting m& distributing to small
newspapers—stories about the boya in the «
papers* areas** Hr, Martin had worked on a similar
in World war 1 at Groat Lakes, 111* , Naval Training Station,
hi am *»
... . ,« - ..... i t - .-.,<






With the Mandate provide by the Secretary of the
navy* the public relations or$aninati.on fine operations in
the Pacific began a perioa of accelerated expansion in the
fall of 1944. Xn addition to the sophisticated broadcast-
ing facilities discussed ea*l&er« « special audxtoriutu for
press conferences im building* to house eorrespondenta and
censors ware constructed on Guaa as part of the new
advanced fleet public relations office there. A buildup in
personnel actually had begun earlier* By September 1.
1944, there vera thirteen full~tis« public relatione
officers assigned to the Pacific Fleet staff and eight
others on duty in forward areas and with task force coar-
Bftnoars. Seven aore officers ware added to Captain
Killer's headquarters public relations section in Septeafoer
and early October. But this was only a sodeet beginning.
eWjf ^eWw uf a* *s*a $ waa^vav^o ^p^s* *& ar^# ^s* e> sV«ert#*«oeV sp ^s»«swe? e^Jriw7 ^eeoArtSaSs1 s^^ff^St sis^pm
in the Pacific Fleet public relatione section itself and
over 400 officers serving full-tine in public relations
throughout the Pacific. 45
In personal letters to Adsairal Merrill in the fall
of 1944* Captain Killer spelled out his plmsm for usinu
these personnel. There were to be experienced public
relations officers in the Third, Fifth and seventh Fleet
eonatands* as wall as with the subordinate division cear
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officar in each division ooswand would be to keep the
civilian war correspondents properly distributed on the
four ships within his division. In thia way* *»e should
have no difficulty in inauring that no lfi\&/ ship of the
float ia overloaded to the extent that a fiajamiwdlno. officer
eoncludea that wax Corraapondenta are a nuisance,* said
Miller*
A crucial atop undertaken by the captain waa the
"education'* of eanior operational officers on the necessity
and value of public relatione efforts* *X have begun the
practice of showing files to the dally 9 o'clock conference
of Admirals, Generals* etc. and they oat it up. he have
been fortunate in showing sone of the eeefeat pictures which
the senior officers mvz Knew existed* *
the Pacific were separated in the fall of 1944* ending the
"split personality" of public relations that had existed
since the beginning of the war* A special censorship
section was established on Adeiral Bimits* staff* and the
eeMBe^en^^e* ^& ^ee> ^^e*aaew^aia> sesssejej* va e*^a^e^a>^fc ew sane s^-e>sew *v js^w^ar s»> w^wsew ^eeeveje»we weejwe*si«
six- fold to handle the screening of press copy from the
combat sonss. According to Captain Killer* public relations
e» ^e*eie^B«e*oSwJoe epos ea> or s*s>wpshhb j'e'SSJhi%ifSfcwsss ewej^ Ai*m-**ww^imo ep(^WOSew^we»eweo^iwe« wss<eie»
we have liberalised their policy in absost every way***




Pacific already were paying cxviomnds in tine fom of
^Pwa<a»BWPw#^<p ^w^^v^w e» ^^wjw* aw ^^aa*w^^ ep^^e^^^^ne^^am ~*e> ^rae^ar^w w^^a^*^^1 a ^wes^a^^^a
friMfc mml* timed direct ion of Tiieiitenant* Ccoaaz^er Hartley*
the Pacific Fleet broedcaetin? statical at Pearl Harbor was
producing about forty programs par week* Captain Hiller
^^•ew^^^^m ••^^^^ (aa^w^ppea ^^^r^ i^te^ ev^a ^^^i**a^ ^^^e*eo ^^wee ^^^9S" ^^^^e^^^w• ^p a*w ^^^ww *"^wwepe^w|<w ^^^a<
liaieey to use the battleship J&tife for transmission of
direct radio broadcasts during future campaigns* Admiral
Spruanoe* however* remained adamantly opposed to br*akine
radio alienee to relay pi^mm copy* a»d &ill*r reported that
*it ia yoiag to be vary difficult to plead and prove our
cause with Sproance**
The Pacific Fleet public relations officer was
receiving full cooperation* though* from Admiral limits and
hie chief of operations* Hear admiral Forrest Sherman*
Sherman brie Sad the madia representatives on what was to
take place three or four days in advance of each forth-
coming event* $he eupport from the top echelon of command
promoted Millar to observe* "There is little question but
that in the past there have been many smiles cast in our
direction. 1 believe that in the past six weeks wa have
proven that this is a serious job which is closely allied
with the total wax effort." ne cited aa one example of the
new attitude on the part of the operators the fact that
















fleet submarine for * 45-day op01reta.cn. Since aiwost
cong>lete security wee still being inair.tained on aubmarine
operations* Baldwin wee not authorised to xelesse amy
information at the time, but was rather to record it for
future release when restrictions could toe lifted*
One problem feeing the public relations organisation
in the Pacific in the fall of 1944 was the lack of coordina-
tion with General J4ecArthur*s staff in announcing news
about joint Army-Bevy operations in the Southwest Pacific.
as a result* a "highly sarbied report" of the Battle of
Zmyts Gulf in late October reached the American public. In
the three-day en^agaejent* the Japanese float was turned
back fro* its attempt to disrupt Maoarthur's landing in the
Philippinea. although the battle was primarily a naval
one* amy bombers did assist navy carrier-baaed aircraft in
driving back the enemy warships* &acarthur*s assaasad
aids of the story* thus* "two different versions of the
battle cane out at widely-spaced intervals*
*
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Despite the absence of coordination* the navy waa
pleased with the coverage it received on the Philippine
operation* admiral Merrill wrote to Captain Miller
1
"Sana1lent photographs have been coming in with groat
regularity and the press just eats them up* admiral
at
Vimits* over-all communique waa a masterpiece of clarity."
0*1 took same of the credit for the improved
u.
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coverage of action* la the Pacific, Elwer Levis, in a
postwar report to the President* stated that his office
"cot ***«» »*>* Saw a aara enolicit anriniim of the battle of
X*yte «alf • . . than had originally baan proposed*
Zn tha weeks that followed this battle, tha Third
landings in tha Philippines. Sewever, aa wa ahall see, tha
probles of coordinating tha release of information between
tha Arsjy and navy in combined operations in tha pacific
remained a formidable one—until firm agreements were
reached between tha respective public ralation* offices
just bafora tha close of tha war,
aa^BK6afti<<if ion jQf,tha,.Qf lfAca af
fyjkl id.Mm 1 ititoni
At Secretary ftorreetai'e request, a survey of all
public relations activities of the bureaus ana offloan of
tha Kavy Department was made by tha savy'a Management
Engineers Offioa in tha sua**)? of 1944. tha study, which
^^^^#s* esse»viaw weyy ^esi^swBWiwsess^sms- *»*JOJ^esie^BMer^m ^^^p ^* ^^wisss %i*s '•assmw^ a*^^awt^e) s^^i^at? a*4
reoomnsntiations for improvements in tha navy* a public
relations organisation and ultimately led to significant
changea in tha makeup and objectivaa of tha Offioa of
tublle ftslationa.
One of the initial areas addressed by tha study
group was tha relationship between 00ft and the public rela-
tions offices of tha Marina Corps and Coast auard. A 8ECHAV
Ji
2S2
directive early in the war aaai^ned to QJHR the teak of
eupervieing the public relatione activities of all agencies
Of the ttavy fcepartamnt. inciting those of ita alater fti
a*rvices. The tfanageweat Engineers aurvey £ound, however*
that in actual praotioe the Kavy office exercised lit tla ox
no control over these organisations other than to provide
general policy guidance and eecurlty clearance and to act
aa a releasing outlet to the news media* Tha etudy froap
concluded that a vagueneee existed aa to tha prober
relationship between 0*» and tha Hsrine Corp* and Coaat
Guard, and that *m mora concrete definition would appear
ww :waJI flee!mMm • *HRBr w™aiWHW| wWap 1 a»%M«a«i|( eaw^^a^Pw^P-ei # H*%r *****«*>
W
wmP
that any apeoifio effort ever was made to do thia*
Aa a result of the survey* it waa determined that
^e*aye» ^wvran*ania ^ems*'iiPjeS'Sjfr ^a* j^aa**e>i^O' ^mwpwJ»Smoeslsse>™^s* ^v^menMP'Ss ^e)a(e> Jpyss*^hriSji^frw <sjoo ^it-a^Wr
discharge of ita responsibilities* To thia end, four
broad public relatione Objectivea were formulated t
a* To SATISFY tha American public's juatifiabla
intereat In the activitiea of the Kavy.
b* to PftOCft&E far tha peraonnel of tha »avy public
recognition communeurate with 'their ecconpliehsRente
•
c. To BStURl continuing public support for tha
JB^m* ^r^pw^p'W w^^mmPTse ^BFim ^•*e ,iwip ^pr^^p*m 9
d* To tOST&E a sustained intereat in the tfavy in the
poat-war neriod*$l
To help in achieving theae goals* each bureau and
office waa made responsible for gathering and preparing*
tor dissemination through the Office of Public delations*





review immediately the? currant statue of the public
relatione effort of eaen bureau and offie* sod to "lead
fall assistance in developing an adequate staff and
" official public relation* officers were to bo
efficere were to fc* assigned additional duty to the Director
%#* » ^o#i)|bA^ii- p™ ow%ovIMi ^W w*s^esi* lia.JWiP^P'Ww ^eefMSTSVe»^ajse^»^.*i^ps»|t ^e«rs*»e
plan for 0»» itself. Seer*tarv Forrestal
Admiral nerriil in early Pecessber a prooroaa report en the
fne contents of the secretary's wmim
in oxtail aa an additional asa&ole of hia
intoreat in ene attention to the public
relatione programs of the Savyi
i* What were tbm principal positions contest ia&ed by
iforganisation? Have they boon fillec
principal section needs and what
their qoaUfieationa?
2* What orogreas has been stse* in establishing our
Public Itelations objectives? What devices and
proiracaa have we underway to achieve ason of
objectives? »o we have any *a*thod for
objectives?
3. What
objectives to the Patriot Public Halations
Officers and for checking up on tbair activities?
4* Can you five sae each, week a very eoncensed report
of eetivltiea so that I can Seeeo track of what
Public delations is doir^ and How we are faring in
>» periodicals and photography? X ahould
ft*
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like this iwaort to wnnirw actual reeulte in
of the jtfML ** which owe material io put rather than
our gross output. $*
A week later Adair*! Morrill answered rorrestel's
inquiry, outlining ths organisational and paraonnal changes
in hi* office. The new organisation provided for three
principal executive **oi*t*nt* to ths director of Public
Relational Assistant Director, West Coast? deputy director;
and Administrative Officer. Commander Bolton continued to
fill the Meat Coast billot. Captain Campbell, the former
Caaasiinlqiis and security Officer who had been promoted in
the summer of 1944, relieved Commander Beecher aa Deputy
Director in August when the latter was detached to *ea
duty. The former position of Executive Assistant to the
Director was Merged with that of Deputy Director in the
reorganisation. Lieutenant Cowander H. &• drown, Jr.,
xmm. replaced lieutenant Commander Parker as Adstiniatrac-
tive Officer on August 1, 1944* with Parker being assigned
as executive assistant to Cossiander Bolton on the Heat
Coast.
The major reorganisation of the offlee consisted of
the placing of the individual sections under throe main
branch**
—
progress planning, media and technical services.
Commander William C Chambliss, mm, formerly
attached to the Incentive Division, beaded the now Program
Planning drench. Commander Chambliss, a naval aviator, had








entering the Navy, under His direction ware three mm
sections—evaluation* planning and liaison* and combat
typos* The evaluation Section replaced the old Analysis
taction and had expanded functions. It was to measure
usage of official releases to all reedia, evaluate coverage
and effectiveness of news regarding the Kavy, and determine
subjects in which the public was interested far the guid-
ance of all sections in the office. Lieutenant Joe fee Idea,
Jr., Uaem, was named acting head of this section* following
the departure from 0i*ft of Cosntaader aalvln, who had headed
the old Analysis Section since before the war. Lieutenant
San Clarfe, US«R, a aarieat analyst and opinion poll eapert
in civilian life, was retained on temporary duty to help
organise the new section, with BeIdea officially being
named aa head in ftarcft 1945.
The Planning and Liaison Section was set up to
perform some of the functions of the old naval Districts
•action. It assisted the bureaus, districts and madia
offices of Ota in doveloping public relations programs and
procedures. It was headed by ^Lieutenant Commander Arthur
Mewmyer, ittmtt. a former newspaperman and public relations
consultant. The Combat Types Section simply was an eaten-
sioa of the old Aviation Section, with the added responsi-
bility of disseminating special material an combat ships
aa well as aviation subjects. Commander Halter Keff, chief
of the Aviation Section, remained as officer-in-charge of
..•: y..--; |




• - ' '




Five of tfcs old scctiona—press, Jf®aio« pictorial,
aagasine and book, and motion picturea—vara placed under
too new jNtedia Branch* along with the former Special Events
Section Which waa renamed "Special Activities** The old
Combat Photography Section waa abolished, with its func-
tions being taken over by Pictorial. Commander Howard
dordon, VS&, who as a lieutenant served as OFR's Adminis-
trative. Officer from 1940 to 1942* returned from destroyer
comaande in both the Atlantic and Pacific to head the Madia
Branch* lieutenant Commander John I* Conley, USlSfc*
formerly with the Baltimore lu&, succeeded Lieutenant
Commander McCarthy aa chief of the Frees Section Whan
McCarthy was detached for sea duty in the Pacific in
December 1944. The other media section heads remained as
before—Hartley in radio, long in pictorial, Karle. In maga"
sine and book. Brown in faction pictures, and Courtney in
special activities* The separate positions of Communique
Officer and Security Officer were eliminated, with the
responsibility for preparing communiques being returned to
the Press Section* The sub-sect Ion within Special Events,
•Organisational Contacta, * also was abolished, with
Commander Edward «* Seay being transferred to other duty*
The Technical Services Branch was established to
coordinate the clearance of information with Admiral King's






security review, biographies and research, and the public
relations library. Connaad^r J. L. Coll is* USK. the former
Executive Assistant to the director, was named as acting
chief of this branch. Commander Harold B. Say remained as
head of the Security Review Section, while Lieutenant
(junior 9rede) Efloise English moved up frees the Photographic
Library to take charge of the expanded Public Halations
Library. Biographies and Research, a new section* compiled
background material on naval personnel and histories of
ships and other activities, and researched answers to
queries from the general public and navy public relations
offices. Xt was headed by Lieutenant Commander W. A.
Millen, USSR, a former newspaperman who had aervad in the
53
Press Beet ion.
On August 31, 1944. Secretary Forreetal eraated a
separate section picture office, which operated under his
control and was not a part of the? Office of Public
Relations. This agency, designated the Office of Navy
Photographic Services on Uovember 20, 1944, was under the
direction of captain Gen© Markey, 3SE8t, who had extensive
experience in the motion picture industry. Zt represented
the Secretary of the tfavy in all motion picture matters
pertaining to the Kavy, Coast auard and Marine Corps;
coordinated the planning and production of motion picture
combat reports that were required by the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Pleat; and served as a liaison office with the Army,
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other 90v«rn»ant agenciaa, and the rootion picture industry
in the production of entertaianent films pertaining to the
navy and the procureisent and distribution of film* to naval
Id
activities.
A significant achievement of the Office of i*avy
Photographic Services was the liaison with and provision of
film to Twentieth Century Fox for the production of "His
righting Lady." This documentary notion picture was made
frosi las*, color film tafcen by ttavy photographers aboard
the carrier VQriyfc«f« in the Pacific, it was released
nationally in February 1945 and subsequently shown to
millions of people in the United states. Ail profits froa
the filst were donated by Twentieth Century fOx to the Savy
Relief Society. 55
K fttflttast tor..tafrUUoflsJ gffxaflnml
In response to »n inquiry from Mr. Torrentel,
COenmwIft i Paget furniahed figures on the nuafeers of person-
nel engaged in public relations activities in the alavy,
sa
Marine Corps and Coast Guard in December 1944. Bis
personnel table showed a total of 2,156 people employed
full~tira in public relations Ln the three eervices~-625
officers, 1# 313 enlisted awn and 213 civilians. Of the
officers, 510 were Kavy—97 in the Washington area, 178 in
the continental united States and its territories and 235
in other areas, including nones of cos&at. The latter
.^tftfl
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fixture vividly illustrates the significant increase since
the suaataer of 1944 In the auafeer of public relation*
officer* assigned to the Pacific.
Officer personnel in OVfl remained at a stable level
throughout 1944. There were seventy-three attached to the
office on May 1 ami seventy-two on ttoveafrer 1* As officers
reported to the fleet canaiands in the Pacific, however * the
number attached to naval district* air training and other
field offices in the united States declined* On September 1*
1944* there vers 19$ of these* with this figure being
reduced* as we have seen* to 178 in iteceateer* The alack
was taken up by assigning officers to part-time or
"collateral * duty in public relatione* There ware ninety-
three of these part-time officers serving in district and
other field offices on September 1* 1944.
In late January 1945* Admiral Narrill requested an
increase in both officer and enlisted personnel for the
Office of Public Relations. 58 Citing the acceleration of
the war in the Pacific and additional functions assigned to
his office aa a result of its reorganisation* he asaad for
fifteen additional officers and eighteen more enlisted men.
The current allowance for OW. at the time was ninety-two
officers* eighty-two in the Washington office and ten on
the west Coast. However* as admiral Merrill pointed out*
the Washington office had htt^n operating at about 7 per









public relation* personnel in the Mavy was halted in rtarch
1943.
Secretary rorrestal endorsed Merrill *e request and
forwarded it to the Chief of saval Personnel. However, the
secretary did not give "carte blanche** approval to xaoro
public relations manpower in non-coiabat billets* In March
1945* he wrote to Merrill* *X would like to pass on the
increases in individual complements as they arise. Frankly*
some of fche*r. seen s little large to ns» especially if we
cannot find reductions elsewhere to offset then in large
part, *3W
A small reduction was found in March 1945 when the
Office of the Assistant director of Public Relations, Meat
Coast* was abolished* nine of the ten officers attached to
the west Coast office were assigned elsewhere* However*
Captain Bolton, who had been promoted from commander a few
weeks before, kept his status as Motion Picture and West
Coast Radio Liaison Officer of OPR and as Staff Public
Relations Officer for the Commander. Western Sea frontier
in San Francisco, s post which he had assumed a* additional
duty in the fall of 1943*
The San Francieco area, being the terminus for the
arrival of news copy and broadcasts from the Pacific Thea-
ter, was given top priority in public relations planning in
early 194i* To strengthen the organisation there.
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Twelfth aaval district as public relations officer, laaisa
ferrlag from his post «a head of sue trograa Planning tu-aaeh
to replace cordon an chie£ of the media Branch. Litotesnant
Commander aawmywr aov*c m> from the tlanalnc, and tiaiacn
Section to succeed Chafflfoliaa, ana lieutenant Commaader
a* »• *»©ias©ft* *J£^c# too* over fcawsyex'e formes position.
Mao ou £prii 2, the Comfcat ?ypes Section was roved
from the Jtto^ram £iaaain* liranch to the *?eiia Breach* with
ite title baing changed to *$mli u and Surface Types
Section '? unci tfcm Special Activities Section was traa*~
ferred from Madia to Program fclanning. Lisutsaant Commander
Beary Mohurts, usftfe* .'ilk.,, .-*&.- ateaan* Commander Cover
— offiear-jji-ttha*.,- _f Special Activities at tae seme time*
^maenm v*aww aa^v dkes e^aa • aa^a* dh*mbM>^*a* w w^nvmp aea^awWf^m stnCe aaa?^eaie ^a, "wwa •»e*^I
Research Projects in the Tochaical Service* Branca*
Aa earlier persomas1 change in 1941 saw kieutaaant
Cemaander Carlatoa tfitchei., ff*« 4 farmer haad of the Cosfcat
*aotc^rapi^ I a** repiaou Coamaaaar ijoag aa h&ad of tae
factorial *eccAOA. S0
gpecial Activities, an t3wL.*tt«in\ trans
Throughout 1944* navy public relations officer*
became involved in certain special activities connected
with the war effort on the home front. Xa early May* OJ?a
was requested by the director of naval Communications to
38tB
• " s . m -*•* ** I •* * *
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conduct a publicity campaign to inform the public of the
explicit reasons for th* unavoidable delays in delivering
mail to vavymen overseas and on ships. On July 30* the
second anniversary of the establishment of the WAVES was
commemorated with another extensive publicity drive. The
these for this observance was a salute by civilians and
Kavymen to the HAVES. The effort wee tied in with a i*avy
War Bond Drive scheduled in the first week of July, with
all bonds purchased by members of the Women's Reserv©
during this period being spoiled to the building of two
motor torpedo boats* which were launched on the day of the
WAVE Anniversary. 61
A national campaign aimed at civilian defense
workers was launched In the summer of 1944* involving
public relations and in-plant incentive action. "Victory*
flushed headlines* concern over cutbacks and desire for the
security of peacetime jobs" were contributing to an
alarming labor turnover rate in defense plants and
threatening Havy procurement contracts. One of the incen-
tive devices used Ln the campaign to keep workers on the
job was the production of three films in Hollywood and Mew
York* dramatising for workers the "long road traveled
before final victory can be claimed*'*
Bavy art exhibits were given extensive exposure
throughout the nation in the summer and fall of 1944. *Yha








drawings by official Savy combat artists was shown in
department stores in oonnaction with war bono promotion.
Paintings of naval aviation and of naval medicine and tha
submarine service, mads under private sponsorship by
S3
civilian artists* also wars exhibited*
A spacial photographic display, "Power in the
Pacific* " a pictorial record of aavy* Marina Corps and
Coast Guard combat operations in that theater* was featured
during tha year at tha Musaum of Modern Art in Haw York.
The collection of still photographs* compiled by Captain
Edward Bteichaa, USUR, was put into boo* for® in early
1943, "so that the largest possible number of Americans may
.64
t fit: »
In October 1944* all public relatione officers
again cooperated with tha Havy League in celebrating &&vf
Day, Posters were distributed* speakera' kite prepared and
Savy speakers furnished for the event. On the Wast Coast*
naval district officers provided a "mat service** of ready-
Race photographs for snail town newspapers in the area to
use in calling attention to the special ceremonies. The
Bevy Day observances throughout the war* aided by the ps&~
vailing patriotic fervor among the people* were a great
success. In 1944* 16*000 radio program* were arranged and
more than six million persons participated in luncheons*
1
1
dinners* school assemblies and parades*





relations officer* was to spotlight tha third anniversary
of ths Seabees on December 28. Seabee construction and
combat highlights in 1944 audi other feature material wars
given wide distribution to the media by the naval district
offices.
Xn January 1945* tha practice of issuing CUBCFAC
communiques simultaneously in Pearl Harbor and Washington
was discontinued, in accordance with tha wishes of corre-
spondents in tha Pacific. Tha dual-release procedure had
been established at ths request of publishers in the United
States. With cancellation of the simultaneous release* the
24-hour officer watch in the Press section of OPR, which
had been in effect since May 1941* also was aliasinated. n
press officer now was on duty in the Washington office only
from 8 a.m. to midnight.
M«yy,.gyfriifi ttttleUans Policy ilttt«aiafca
Xt will be recalled that one of the questions
Secretary Forreatal asked Admiral Merrill in Pecembor 1944
concerned the progress aade toward establishing Havy public
relations objectives* Merrill replied by reiterating that
in his opinion the primary objective should be the
"complete and accurate reporting to the American people of
the activities of the United States Uavy. " ' as added that
under this basic policy were three secondary objectives for




Mf9 to v-.iwflff**«l r *»«. \
a) Winning public understanding of the problems of the
war in the Pacific audi winning public support for
the vigorous prosacation of the Pacific war subse-
quent to the and of the European fight
t
to) &eeurin$ public support for a strong postwar savy?
c) Contributing to the maintenance of morale of the
men serving at aea and overseas by securing public
recognition of their outstanding serviee to their
The admiral then listed current individual project
a
which his office was engaged in or planning to support the
general objectives . fismnq these ware the publicising of
the 150th anniversary of Kavy Supply activities and
recruitment of workers for naval bases and &®&&&m plants.
Both programs were tied in with the necessity for all-out
support of the Pacific war and were built around the theme
of logistics in the Pacific* Two projects were mentioned
as being planned for the future--one designed to publicise
the $avy*s personnel rehabilitation program and the other
aimed at public understanding of the Hevy's demobilisation
plans and postwar personnel policies.
Admiral Merrill concluded his report by suggesting
that he md the secretary hold periodical conferences to
review current public relations objectives and prsjgrams and
to decide "whether any new program should be added to the
list.* forrestal responded favorably, agreeing to meat
regularly following hia receipt of Merrill's monthly report
on accomplishments. The secretary requested hia Director










of the major public relation* objectives and to
circulate this elaboration to the naval districts, bureaus
and fleets. "Then it should be made current and recircu-
lated each month in the MO news letter.*68
Thus began in January 1945 a series of monthly
statements on «evy public relations policy prepared by the
Office of Public Relations and distributed in memorandum
form to all navy public relations officers. These policy
statements were issued throughout the remainder of the war
and for several months following the cessation of hostil-
ities. They were prefaced with the remark* "This memorandum
is sent to you for guidance in the carrying out of your
duties. It includest a statement of our permanent basic
objective* all current secondary objectives* and all
specific programs which are to be given support in order to
attain our objectives." The statements also required a
monthly report from each public relations unit to the
Director of Public He1stions on the "concrete steps taken
to carry out the individual programs. M Xt was made
explicit that * these objectives require the use of methods
other than mere reporting of liavy news. They call for
vigorous and intelligent use of all of the tools at our
command—seminars* speeches and radio addresses? the
inspiring of magasine articles? the use of contacts with
civic and other organizations* etc."

















The objectives contained is the initial policy
statement in January 1945 closely paralleled those outlined
by Admiral Marrill in his Itocember memorandum to Secretary
forrsstai. Explicit procedures vera delineated to pursue
the over-all objective of winning public backing for a
strong postwar ifavy. Included ware efforts to ateId public
sentiment in favor of the Bavy aa a separate military
service and for the continuation of naval aviation as an
integral part of the Uavy. Also, plm%m were made to
solicit support for postwar compulsory asilltary training.
Examples of the type of activities undertaken in
early 1945 to promote naval aviation were a tour of air
facilities in the Fifth naval District for a group of
editora and publishers from the Eighth Saval District* and
a cruise at sea on board an aircraft carrier for persons
prominent in the theatrical world.
In March 1943. whan victory in Europe was imminent,
special projects were added to the policy statement to
prevent a 'let down" in the war effort after Germany's
capitulation. These consisted of the preparation of public
statements by appropriate Havel personnel for release on
VR-Day in conjunction with other government agencies* and
cooperation with the Aray-Kavy-Treasury department Pacific
War advertising campaign. The latter involved the use by
national advertisers of copy designated to maintain public
intereat in the Pacific war after VS-Day. ,v
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Also in March* media representatives were invited
to embark In the new cruisers gJU-ftmui *nd Cnigsqft during
their "shakedown" cruises, and arrangements were made to
have local correspondents cover portions of the shakedown
cruises of all newly commissioned cruisers and battleships.
In addition, twenty-three Washington correspondents and
five mealiers of the Bouse Naval Affairs Committee were
provided air transportation to and fro» morfolk, va*, for
the launching of the new Midway .
In April 1945, a apecifie program was designed for
the "selling" of delegates and correspondents in attendance
at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco.
Arrangements were made for daily visits to naval activities
in the area end flights in navy planes and blimps over San
Francisco* There also were air demonstrations, tours of
aircraft carriers, film presentations *ttd crip* within San
Francisco Bay by Navy small craft.
In Nay, a concerted effort was made to provide
public relations assistance for the recruitment of ship
repair workera for Heat Coast yards. The OSS fraff*»y wss
exhibited at Seattle and Taooma, drawing 100,000 visitors.
The Thirteenth Naval District Public Relations Office
arranged extensive local and national preaa, pictorial and
radio coverage for the ship's visit. Five newsreei
companies filmed the event, and there were broadcasts on
tour radio networks. Also in May, an invasion exercise
-.
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involving some 200 ships and landing craft was staged near
San Diego in connection with the Seventh War loan Drive.
71
This event attracted 80*000 parsons*
On January 1, 1945. the U.S. Atlantic fleet some-
what belatedly jumped on tha Wavy public relations band-
wagon toy appointing officers for this function in all float
units and issuing an extensive public relations manual for
their guidance. Sin months earlier, two admirals had
voiced concern over the amount of publicity gained by the
Coast Guard in tha Atlantic and European areas relative to
that received by the navy. One of the flag officers cow-
plained that it seemed to him "the public believed that all
attack cargo vessels and transports are Coast Guard-manned
and -operated. * *
To assess the impact of its programs, the Kavy took
steps in early 1945 to gauge the public pulse with regard
to the subjects addressed in the policy statements* Mr.
Duffield wrote to Secretary Forresta1 on December 28, 1944*
"A part of the rejuvenation in public relatione involves
keeping in touch with public opinion and our public rela-
tions effect on it. Fortran* has agreed to devote one of
its polls to the measuring of opinions in which the Savy is
interested. We »Mni to qiv® • • • Mr. Elmo Roper a list of
73questions by December 21. " Shortly thereafter. Lieutenant
Balden, 0*ft*s Evaluation Section chief, visited Princeton
University to discuss possible polls with the Office of
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Public Opinion Research there* He also planned to contact
X>r. Oallup. 74
As a result of these efforts* at least two surveys
ware conducted which war* pertinent to ths Navy's public
relations objectives* A Qallup Poll released in the sutaaer
of 1945 revealed that while 70 per cent of the public
favored cosEtpulsory military training after the war, less
than half of these thought that action should be taken
ieaediately to set up Machinery for such training. A
survey by fertanfl at about the eases time concluded that
most of the American people desired to depend on the air
area
war period.'" However* a June 1944 poll by the National
Opinion a*search Center* University of Denver* showed that
64 per cent of the public believed a Isrge Air force was
more important to have after the war than a large «avy. 7*
JrXJStfftj flBnOl JfiK%ffl ^SnWilS^fcl
The euophaaie on "personalising the news* about Wavy
fighting ®an in the pacific, begun by Secretary fforrestal
in the suaraer of 1944 and Made possible by the assignment
of naval officer and enlisted correspondents to ships and
fleet staffs* created the need for a separate office to
process ths thousands of stories to housetowr. newspapera. A
form was devised to record basic information in the person-
nel record of every Navynan* and the coal was set in ths
mi Jtsfifl itft fefflt «*•
-
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fall of 1944 to ••fxS in at least oa© story on each man in
tha Navy*
Initially* the naval district public relations
office in which the man's hometown was located received the
material and forwarded it to his area newspapers* This
procedure proved to be quite cumbersome* however* and on
March 29* 1945* the Secretary of the Kfavy directed the
Commandant of the ttinth naval District to establish in
Chicago a "Fleet Hometown Distribution Center* * The center
was to fas responsible for *the processing- of 'hometown*
news stories and pictures received from put.lie relations
officers attached to forces afloat and the transmission of
such stories to appropriate 'hometown* newspapers* radio
stationa and other media throughout the continental United
States* *77
named as tha first officer*in-charge of the new
activity* which came to be known as the Fleet Hometown Haws
Canter (FHTMC) later in 1945 and in subsequent years* was
Lieutenant Charles w. Payne* USSR* He was assigned twelve
other officers of the rank of lieutenant and lieutenant
(junior grade) to serve as editors and reviewers* and 194
enlisted personnel—clerical workers* writers and
photographers*
Tha first month's output in stories alone for tha
TBOUC was 10*340* This increased to 19*479 in May 194S*










picture* were processed by the center, A1toother, in a
seven-Month period frost April 1 to October 31* 1$4S# the
total nutaber of pieces stalled—including copies of stories*
picture prints and raats—sfaounted to 1*466*140.
The key to the success of the hometown news program
were the reporters on the firing line—the Enlisted Kavy
Correspondents (ESfCs) and collateral duty public relatione
officera.
In the fall of 1944* Captain Miller rounded up 100
experienced newspaperman fro© the enlisted ranks in the
Pacific fleet and assembled them at Pearl Harbor. As a
test* he eafearked all 100 in a battleship for three days to
write at least one story on each of the ship's crew wesibere
for hometown distribution. The battleship skipper was
extreaely reluctant at first to participate in this experi-
ment* but was finally pereuaded to do so. *tfithia three
weeks* " said Miller* "the clippings froa hone town papers
bagan to reach the ship fro® folks at hose). Suddenly this
ship's crew showed a .narked gain in selfiestas* resulting
frosa the personal recognition the sen had received frost
hoa*.*79
The 100 fiSCs were assigned to ships throughout the
Pacific for the express purpose of preparing notarial for
hometown release on individual navynea. The system was
late; refined to include "roster stories* in which a





processed by fHTMC and Mat to the hometown publications of
each crew member of that ship.
The roster-story system was described quits accur-
ately, albeit with a great deal of satire, in the following
passage from Uoa'J; -SO-M&»X.~.*fc8LJ&tfcaxt
The exec loaned forward excitedly,
•l>o you begin to got it? We got up a atory on the
event with some blank epacee in it* mimeograph it off*
then singly fill in the man's name from the ship's
roster, like 'Blank Blank of Blank was aboard the
«*•&•» • M^M^Qiyi reoently when that shin's sixteen*
inchers disabled Yokohama* * and fire it book to the
guy's home~town paper* Visualise it i The ttisftQUS,!
alone has 2*700 men aboard. Any time she did anything,
just anything at all, that would automatically wean
2,700 stories in p8p*x9 all over the States:
*.
• • Think of it! The thousands of ships we
have! The hundreds of thousands of men—navy men!—on
them! The millions of stories that would be gushing
from them to us! From us to the thousands of tanktown
papers in the U.S. We'd swamp them under! Why, this
thing might be to naval public relations what the
invention of the machine gun waa to land warfare! "*°
While not as flamboyant as the "ease* in this
fictionalised account. Captain Miller nevertheless was
enthusiastic about the potentiality of the EMCa and the
hometown news program* On June 1, 1945, he wrote to fcear
Admiral w. h. ?• Blandy, then commander of an amphibious
group in the Pacific, "We will need fifty to a hundred more
of these writers &&C&/ in order that the Kavy's atory can
be told more fully • • • * Out of these men Z expect to get
not less than 400,000 stories.'*81
fcuriag the Okinawan campaign in the spring of 1945.







ware credited with writing *ao many good action stories" of
the son who imnrwl the invasion ships that *the Anericsxt
public received the sort of information it ao deeply
craved. * . . Stories containing namea and addraaaaa of asm
who took part in the action proved to have high priority in
the columns of hoa*~town nawapapara*"
The news service on individual Xavymsa aaajnad to ho
vary ouch appreciated by newapapera throughout the country.
Typical of the enthusiastic response echoed by the smaller
newapapers in particular was the following excerpt fro* a
letter sent to fHrSC by the Ciareaont (K.H.) fraily JSnwfol
Your news release about the Landry boy frost Weat
lobaaon waa iadaad welcome. In the future we ahall
send you tearahoet* of the articlaa we receive from
you* ao that you oould aee the naafeer one apot the
story got on page 1. we are store than grateful at
being included on your sailing list. Keep the news
coating: ®*
In the summer of 1945 « a nationwide survey of 500
daily and weekly newspapera throughout the country-*
conducted for the Wavy by the National Opinion Research
Center*-found that American editora desired snore of these
hosetown stories, nearly 100 per cent of the editors
polled "agreed that distribution of a greater quantity of
news about local men is the most important single improve-
ment the fiavy can make in ita public information program."94
The editors also believed that the *hometownera* ware *<








Perhaps the toest evidence of the effectiveness of
the hoastown news program was obtained from * content
analysis of * representative group of newspaper• conducted
fey the Evaluation Section of 0*ft from Maseh 24 to July 21,
1945* during the first eight weeks of the study* the Kjtvy
received 12 per cent of the space allotted to individual
servicemen. In the last half of the period, the average
percentage devoted to iftavymsn jumpmd to 20 with a peak of
30 par cent reached on July 14* The Wavy at this tins had
2d per cent of all tf.a. personnel in uniform. The striking
increase in hometown coverage of Mavymsn waa attributed to
the greater nunteer of stories forwarded frost the Pacific to
the FWTKC and* as we shall see later* the relaxation of
censorship rules in the summer of 1945 with regard to
publicising the names of ships* battle damage sad sub-
serine operations,
radio interviews with fleet personnel to the naval dis-
tricts for delivery to local stations and subsequently to
the families of the nan. One hundred seventy-five of these
"Voices from the Fleet" recordings were processed in the
first month.
In June* a school was sat up at fcearl Harbor to
train Enlisted toavy Correspondents. Those who were already
petty officers kept their old ratings but were assigned





Specialists (X) (HC) and given similar assignments*
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The final phase of the naval war in tha Pacific
bagan with the invasion of two Jiaa on February 19* 1945*
follows*} by tha assault on Okinawa on April 1.
By tha time of tins 2wo Jiaa operation* public
relations planning and assets in tha Pacific had advanced
to tha stay© whereby full support to civilian correspondents
and navy raportars was being provided* Tha public rela-
tions annex to the Xwo Jima operations plan consisted of
detailed instructions on media coverage * including
provisions for a large number of well-qualified press
censors to accompany tha news media representatives and for
transmission of news copy from the A$C command ships* A
minimum of 5 #000 words was authorised for broadcast on
D-Day alone* The public relations plan was tested along
with other aspects of the operation in a rehearsal held on
Maui in the Hawaiian Islands.
Two weeks prior to the Xwo Jiaa landing* Admiral
Sherman briefed the civilian war correspondents in great
detail on tha strategy for the assault* using maps with
phase lines* forces involved* etc* Tha press representa-
tives "returned the confidence*" with no leafce of informa-
tion occurring* "Of course* it might be parenthetically
stated that the Havy controlled all outgoing communications
SO








"nevertheless* mutual confidence had been veil aetabiiahed
with • respect for common interests*"
During the movement ashore at two Jiaa. "125 saneraa
—
-hand-held, mounted in landing craft and aircraft—
90
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•
ass* ^m ,awjpp^**ep^m^m a»<aAM* ^w^m^^
collective shortly after the Marines landed and flown to
v« wws* aw w wwi^|fa*"^* e ^mmm^seB^*» ^aw ^s^Bi^n^ j^^*wm> wmwen^m ^>r^**mp «*m»r ^w^a*^* m>^wi**^»*
tiona personnel standing by on the ground and quickly
transmitted by radio photo to San Francieco* Hews of the
landing was flashed by radio direct from the UM ff1i*fflHMfri'T-
flayship of the amphibious force commander "while the
beach-head was still being secured* *
The arrangements made for rapidly catting the
photographs mn& press copy back to the United States and
other public relations handling of the operation received
high praise from Xiaa*
sos* of the war 'a best photographs cane out of the
Pacific last week* The up-close thick-©f-battl*
quality of the pictures was evidence of the bravery and
skill of the photographers on Iwo Jima. • « • The spsad
with which the picture* appeared in U.S. newspapera was
evidence of the Wavy* a growing press sense*
Just 17% hours after the Marine* landed on two* the
first invasion shots reached the u*s* • • • The news
traveled even quicker thanks to a radio transmitter
which the Savy had installed on a warship a mile off
the 2wo shore* Each day U.S. readers and radio
listeners thus got the direct reports of newsmen on the
The magasina characterised the 2wo Jima press
arrangement* aa "another notable atep toward bringing the







standard* , coatreating them with the courier arrangements
for delivering pxmmm copy daring tha invasions of Saipan
and Guam. *which meant it got to the a.8. eight to fourteen
days late." Major credit for tha savy*s improved praaa
relations in tha Pacific was given to Captain Millar* but
Secretary forreatal also was complimented by £im fox tha
impetus ha provided i
Captain Miller 'a 90-ahead stems from tha fight of
press-conscious Kavy Secretary Janes ftorrestai (a spec-
tator at Iwo Jims last wees) to loosen tha tongues of
tha Havy*s tight-lippesd top admirals. Secretary
forreatal has made it plain that tha Mevy must make
frieada with its employer, the U.S. people.
Earlier, in a typically modest gesture, Forrests!
himself paid special tribute to Admiral Rimit* for his
support of the public relations offensive. In a latter to
tha Pacific Float comwander. ha remarked!
X appreciate what you aay about hatter coverage
stemming from my own efforts* hut X am fully aware that
my efforts would ha meager and unrewarded in results if
you were not hacking them up. not merely with perfunc-
tory conformance hut strong personal interest. Success
in getting this tremendoua story • • • told to the
American people muet depend on awareness of its impor-
tance all tha way down to individual ship commandera.
You have been splendid in tha way you have 90ns at
this, and particularly in tha way you have hacked up
Captain Millar. 93
Despite the preesuree from tha news madia and public
relatione planners to *go all out 1* in coverage of tha Jwo
Jima landing* Admiral Spruance maintained his stubborn
stance against breaking radio silence whila at sea. He











Everything went along very smoothly at 9earl this time
except that I had to do some arguing with the public
relations people to stake them understand we ware
fighting a war and X would not break radio silence just
to satisfy the newspaper correspondents. There may ha
complaint* from the latter, but X intend to have T* $8
keep radio ailanca and lota of it* just aa we did going
into ¥ruk and ffalau* They can aand all they want from
the landing objective.*1*
Complainta from the preen were at a minimum,
however* an the correspondents ware well~eatiafisd with the
apaady transmittal of news copy from the invasion aits.
by their combat correspondents ware dispatched early in the
Xwo Jima action by wire eervice reportars embarked in the
command ahip lying offshore • Also, the fc-nny message by
tha Marina commander to his troops "Just before their
landing craft churned toward the beach* waa recorded by
combat correspond* *sta and delivered to the radio networks
at home the day after tha assault-,, resulting in its broad-
is I
cast over two national networke.
At Xwo Jima, for the firat time in tha war* woman
correspondents were allowed to cover operations in tha
forward areas* Captain Miller's office had been besieged
with requests from female reporters to travel to the combat
zones since the capture of Guam in Auguet 1944. Finally*
mm advance basea were built and other women such aa Sod
Croas workers and nurses ware stationed there, provisions
were made for the distaff writers to be represented at Xwo




















Barbara Finch. Admiral Miller later recalled an amusing
incident concurning Mrs. Finch (see note 90)
i
One unusual situation occurred in which Barbara and
Percy Finch* a husband and wife writing team for
Reuters* were on Guam. Percy covered the Xwe Jims
landings from a battleship and it was some time before
he got ashore* Imagine his surprise to find that we
had put his wife* Barbara* aboard the first plane
Iwo* Barbara thus scooped her husband on the actual
"I was there" story*
Before the change in policy. Miller had refused
Miss Chepelle's request to accompany the troops ashore at
two* exclaiming in a conversation with her* "I'm not going
to have 100*000 Marines pulling up their pants just because
you^re on the beach: m**
In the Okinawa invasion* one of the women corre-
spondents was embarked in a hospital ship during the
landings* She did not have permission to go ashore* but
through subterfuge persuaded a Mavy coxswain to take her to
the beach in a motor launch* This prompted writer John
Laxdner to include in a filed story the statement t "This Lb
B9
a new war* Me now h&ve a woman in the trenches* " Not
very long thereafter* Bear Admiral Kelly Turner* the
amphibious task force commander* sent a terse tasssage— "Get
that woman out of here: *
Curing the Qkinawan campaign* it was not feasible
to fly news copy and photographs to Guam as was dome at Xwo






over the island with four pool correspondents sboerd* t»be
plans flew to Manila for refueling the night before the
operation sod than took off frost the Philippines on a
schedule! Which put it over Okinawa at the exact time the
first wave of troops was moving ashore* It had just enough
fuel to cover the landings for two hours * than had to fly
to Jwo Jio»a for refueling and on to Guam, arriving there
eight hours after the start of the invasion* "frees copy
and photographs were transmitted to the united States and
immediately used nationwide. *
Plans were made to handle snore than 250 correspond-
ants at Okinawa. The operation was a difficult one from
the public relations standpoint * due to the length of the
battle and the med for daily coordination of news releases
and press relations with the Army eonaaends involved* How-
ever* again the aedia representatives were pleased with the
arrangements* John A* Booley of the Slue network wrote to
secretary fforrestal frost "aboard a very comfortable ship in
the cabin provided for the correspondents by the Mavy. *
which was, he said, *. . . symptomatic of the great and
real effort the navy has made to provide the conditions
which will help correspondents in their work."
A delicate aedia relations problem at Okinawa was
the censorship imposed by Admiral Vimits on the "kamikase"
damage to U.S. ships* Prom their inception in the fall of
1944* a cloak of secrecy enshrouded the suicide attacks by








Japanese pilots* Couplet* *8tops* were put on all informa-
tion concerning i#** ®* cies&agc to our ships fron those
raids. The rational* for such stringent security this late
in the war centered around the fact that the successful
pilot did not return. It was reasoned that the Japanese
high coraaad had no way of gauging the success or failure
of the kamikase operations unless we published the
100
results*
In January 1945, Janes F. Byrnes* director of the
Office of War Mobilization* wrote to Secretary forrestal
requesting that the tfavy publicise the effectiveness of the
kamikase attacks in order to solidify public support for
the war* particularly on the bona manpower front* The
secretary *s reply to Mr. Byrnes elaborated on the reasons
for withholding publicity on the raids. It was one of the
few instances in which Mr* forrestai went on record in
supporting fully his military contenders on a security
issue
i
AdaOxal King has given much consideration to the
natter Jfat publicising kamikase raid*/ and has advised
that the facts be spread aa widely as possible without
letting it coum to *t»io& ears* Xn accordance with this
policy* a full statement of recent damages was made to
Congress by Admiral King in confidence. • • • I hope
it will not be necessary to go beyond this restricted
distribution for the present.
• • • any wide publicising of Japanese suicide
bombing places in the hands of the Japanese exactly
the kind of hortatory material which they m^ to
persuade their pilots into these attacks, t think our
refusal to publicise suicide attacks has contributed to
the difficulty which the Japanese have had in procuring
volunteers for these attacks*








in order to arouse more enthusiasm «t
i 9 but I hop* that this will not be necessary during
the course of the current quite difficult operations in
the Pacific.* *
^^^^p 4fc^me* ^** ^mae^m* '^*»*^*see^^w^^w»e e^wpbt^sm « »s ^i»am^m ee^m'W xr «•wv*k ^m
problem of a different nature which wee at least partially
engendered by the publicity spotlight its own public rela-
tions activities had fooused on 2wo Jima. Zt was concerned
over the public's anguished reaction to the heavy losses
sustained by the marines during the bitter fighting on the
Pacific atoll, moping to offset this reaction. Mavy
spokesmen took special pains to explain why JDwo Jima's
capture was vital even though tragically costly in terms of
casualties* However, Ernest JC* Lindlay. writing in
mmmmmmftlfc* claimed there was an ulterior reason for the sea
service's uneasiness* namely Mthe affect of the Xwo Jima
lossss on the long rivalry between the Bavy and the General
of the Army macArthur over fact fie cowmand and strategy* **
ZJLndlay concluded thati
* * . the Navy, knowing from experience MaeArthur'e
grip on the imagination of the American people • • •
paj^m to see red last weak as stories appeared in the
daily press contrasting ttacArtbur*s landinge. made at
small cost on undefended or lightly defended Shores,
with the frontal assaults on such heavily fortified
bastions as Tarawa. Paleliu. end Sue Jima—ail Marine
Corps operations • • • under the ramiMil of Pleat
Admiral Himits*
forrestal expressed his anxiety over public
appraisal of the severe Marine losses in a March 1945
letter to Himits. in which he introduced Bill Lawrence of
the Haw York Xiafiua aa a "personal friend of mine who is
I4M& ••nil** *&# vi t-
••» -1




going * . . to the Pacific to too permanently assigmc*
The secretary told sialts that ho had asked Mr. Lawrence to
brief tha admiral on "the effect of the Iwo Jiraa reporting
on the public understanding and appreciation oft First* tha
oacoaaity of taking that GodforsaXen spot* and Second* the
difference inherent in that kind of aaaauXt aa opposed to a
Military caiqpaign on a substantial land maee*
The aecretary was quite active in early 1945 in
paraonal correspondence with aentoers of the news stadia*
Following Iwo Jis«a* he wrote to scores of reporters*
cooplitsenting. and thanking the® for their coverage of the
landing. 104
Xrjaasn'.ii YJLfiwa on nniftfffltjjwi
EvoXia .ffavy Coacsxp.
The Havy was anxious* too* in the spring of 1945
over the eucceasion of Harry Truman to the Presidency
following Roosevelt * s death* As wo have seen* such of the
effort exerted by Janes Forrestal to upgrade the Bevy's
public iaage sprang from his belief that the mm service
would be swept under the control of the Army after the war*
The secretary had plenty of reason to fear thia free*
President Truman*
As a candidate for vice president in 1944* Truman
had etrongly recc4ti*psna«d unification. And* before the year
was out* he was urging the Army's plan for merger of the
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1943 to a Washingto*t groups "During the Sfcooaevelt *d»lnia~
t ration. the Whit* House was a »avy wardrooa; we're going
to fix ail thatJ
*
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forraetal was hampered by personally cool relations
with Truman. The aecretary stood alone arong cabinet
neabers in opposing »any of tha key policies of the now
adainiatr at ion, and ha was navar personally lifted by
conviction that Preeident Tr\m&a*m thinking on tha unifica-
tion iaaua was "predicated upon his axparianew in tha toay
during tha last wax and in tha national Guarc aince then,
*
ha hoped that tha President was not ^elosad-aiindcd, and!
could be convinced of the reasonableness of the navy
view. *
Adniral Merrill was in ailing health early in 1945
#
and as far back as January of that year, forraetal wrote to
Admiral Kimita that he planned to bring Captain Millar back
as Director of Public Relations CB«0 in April or May, 107
When aounded out by tha secretary concerning thia mova,
Millar himself at first strenuously objected on the grounde
that he wanted an important sea msaimawrl in order to qualify
for promotion, forreetal allayed hia concern in thia





commodore upon hi* assumption of the duties of J3NWL* In
actuality, when Miller did relieve Admiral Norrill in JWay
li»45, he wae promoted to rear admiral instead, becoming at
the age of 42 the youngest raar admiral on the «avy*»
rolls.
A graduate of the Maval Academy and a naval
aviator. Admiral Wilier had a variety of a**igna»nt* prior
to hi* public relation* duties in the latter stages of
world War IX* Be had no formal training *» public rela-
tion*, but we* a short atory and magazine writer and the
author of a book entitled «»*»y "J'Wft- early in the war. aa
head of the Training Literature flection of the Bureau of
Aeronautic** he wrote instructional pamphleta for Wavy
pilota and crowns n, stressing the need for safety pr«ceu-
tion*.
From the rsoment he became the Wavy* a new information
chief . Admiral Miller made it clear that he planned to
change things. Wewsmcn were *bug~ey*d* and "pinched them-
•elves 4* to see if it were really true Whan he first briefed
them on hie public relation* philosophy*
Xt will be our policy while Z am here to tell you
juet what the hell i* going on* If national security
i* involved, we will tell you that. too. and try to
explain why* But we will tell you what** going on* Xt
is our job to tell the country about it* wavy* We will
try to feaep ahead of you in doing that job* My office
ha* three door*, and all of thorn will be open all
day**®*
This Hind of talk was no mare "snow job*1 for the
press* Admiral Miller meant what he said. In a subsequent
i nnllyiiii aJUf impi •vfttanao
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letter to Captain Flfcshugh Las, m*» another naval aviator
who had relieved him aa public relatione officer for
Admiral *imita in lata March 1945* Miliar atated* "There
me*
baa been a vary definite feeling of helpleeansae here /in
Mashington? which can be converted into one of reeponeibil-
ity and decision. Thia X propoaa to do* " li0 Kilter told
tea ha felt the public relatione organisation had become
"nothing more or laaa than a rassenger-boy outfit where
copy ia received and than ia run up to CQ&XBCB by one of
our boys." Thia* he indicated* was a reeult of the lack of
a meana of contact between working peraonael and "top-aide.
'
Be described copy being aent up through channela to a
captain and then four admiral* until it finally reached
Admiral King' a major deputy* Vice Admiral ft. 8, Edwarda*
who* Millar said* i*haan*t time to go into theee thlnge.*
for theee reasons* he continued* *I have changed
all thia and have forbidden the Review Section or anyone
alee to make direct contact top-aide* 2 propoaa to make
all decieiona down lm^ and if it gets out of hand and toe
hot for me* I will carry the ball up above myself** In
effect* Miller aaid* he planned to bring the reaponeibil-
itiea and prerogative8 of public relatione back to the
Office of Public delations where they belong.
l^atcr in the letter* the admiral wrote a lengthy
paragraph which summarised hie intentions and revealed a







X do not believe that Admiral King or Edward* will
in any way atifl« oar efforts. They appear entirely
cognisant of the need for this type of thing and X have
had no leaa than a half~dosen editors tell tm that thia
billet of mine la the jaoat important one in the Kavy.
there is a definite trend throughout all ranks and
branches to asaiat us and nake possible the accorapliah-
sent of our objectives which to am is to place the savy
in every home in this country* Granted—that in ay
tine it isay not happen* Also
—
granted that it stay be
the fear complex which has brought about the changed
viewpoint—the fear of losing the fiavy's identity*
But* whatever it may so* we will ®afce every effort to
do the thing we think should be done*
Partial evidence that Miller did have support from
within the savy was contained in separate correspondence to
his fron two admirals in the Pacific* In late May* AdasiraX
filandy wrote to complain that the SHSller ships were not
receiving sufficient publicity* In responding, Admiral
Miller declared enthusiastically (see notes Si) t
X can't tell you how encouraging it ia to ate to
have officers like you* who have seen the 8avy so
clearly both ashore and afloat* express their thoughts
regarding Public Relations* This perhaps im one of the
moat hopeful signs • • • that the Siavy has become aware
of the gr*at importance of its relations with the
public and the taxpayers*
On June 27* 1945* Hear Admiral Robert 3* Carney*
chief of staff to the Cosraander Third Fleet* expressed to
Miller that he thought the Kavy had a "great story** that
was not being told concerning the losses inflicted on
Japanese shipping in Manila »ay by Task force 38 during
1 i I
the re-taking of the Philippines* Be strongly raccer


















Xii the afcraamntioned June 4 letter to Captain La*.
Admiral Millar mtmamti that ire seemed *te detect a
da finite trend in the Fleet to desire saore and mora cover*
age . • • . " On June 2*. he wrote to Lieutenant Commander
officera. "frankly* I am delighted that they i£*mbere of
the cruiser-destroyex force In the Pacific/ are teeoming
oonesrned about the look of public relation* ia their
organisation* for this will provide the moat healthy
112
stimulus our program could possibly have. 1**** in the
letter* Miller denied that naval aviation was getting mora
publicity than the cxuiaera and destroyers "beceuae X
happen to wear wings* " Rather . ha emphasised, "the real
reason behind this is that some three years ago we made a
definite effort to make tfaval Aviation conscious of good
public relations and now »avel Aviation la beginning to
reap proper dividends*
"
Hiliar suggested to Captain i*ee that ha ash for
fifty more £nHated Ifaval Correspondenta to help the
individual ahipa in the Pacific get mora coverage. Be alao
noted that the number of re^uaata from- civilian correspond-
enta to be accredited to the Pacific Fleet had increased
significantly since V-E ©ay. Ha arranged to upgrade the
standing of war correspondents by gaining approval for a






oak loaf** Us informed &ee that the reason for this change
was "to get the offloors aboard ahip to give than /the
civilian correspondent*/ aome sort of humane treatment oanr
mensurats with what wo 4mmizm4. * The gold oak leaf was
similar to the rank device for a lieutenant commander*
of .Public.
as evidence of the now direction Admiral Mil 1st
planned for his office, ha instituted a change in nana*.
Millar had said that he felt "public re 1ations" was an
inappropriate title for the job his office was supposed to
be doing, so on June ld# 194$* the nans was officially
•hanged to Office of Public Information (OPX). U4 The
directive by the Secretary of the navy effecting the chance
at all navy Department* fleet and local activities*
"Public relations officers * would henceforth be called
"public information officera."
"The change was made in order that the title might
more accurately describe the activities of this Office* •
declared admiral Miller, whose title also was changed from
director of Public Relation* to Director of Public Informa-
tion* "Our mission is the distribution to the public of
information concerning the Mevy mad ita many activities*
we are essentially a news and information service.*
we^»™w^e *e##"*mB^*w ^w^s*^*^* BS'^^wi^^^a e^^m^i apesi^^p m*Moop mho^^^^ ^^m^s* ii^^m wwwb
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Coast Guard* too. The Marine Corp* Division of Public
Si*1stions became the Division of Public Information* and
the Cosst Guard Office of Public Relations became the
Office of Public Information.
Taking firmer control of public information activ-
ities and changing the name of his office were not the only
things Miller had in mind* Be promised Captain Lea that he
would *$o out and beat the bushes * in search of more quali-
fied public information officers to assign to the Pacific,
among them was the former chief of OPm*s Aviation Section*
Commander ftobert A. Winston* who was dispatched as Pacific
Pleat Pictorial Officer. At the request of Secretary
Forrestsi* tfinsten also assumed the task of assisting in
the establishment of a printed daily newspaper for fleet
personnel. The Kavy newspaper* with wire service copy
edited and forwarded from San Francisco* would eventually
become "the absolute source of news for ail of Guam*"
Miller oredicted. Be stem anticipated similar newmnaoara
for navy personnel on other islands* such as wanus and
Leyt*.Ue
The newspaper project proved to be difficult to get
off the ground* however* with one of the main obstacles
being the procurement of a pr^9Bm Finally* one was shipped
out to Commander Winston? and on July 25 the first edition
of «*^y M>*ff. a four-page tabloid-sis* daily paper waa












A sensitive problem Which Miller had to face wee
that of public relations officers doing writing and news -
work on their own—for reimbursement. Many of the tJawy
information officera, of couree, were active newspapermen
and writera before they want into the wavy, and it waa hard
to reetrain them* In a July 194$ latter to Lee* the
admiral expressed hia opinion that the 30b of public infor-
mation officera was to stimulate stories from civilian
correspondents. *X cannot help but feel that if our
officera were writing on the aide that they could not
honeatly find it within their power to give out idea* which
"* — 118they themeelves could uae after 1300 j£& p.3*/ at night."
Miller admitted that the Mavy information officera who were
professional writers could probably do the beat job for the
navy* but ha admoniehed Captain Lee to "by all meana* dis~
courage and prohibit columnist activities by our
personnel."
A July issue of the lfjbttl££2^S&£iXlc.. XnfarwftUfttt
naii^in. e new guidance directive for information person-
nel in the Pacific distributed twice monthly, spelled out
more precisely just what the rules were for "budding Savy
authors." All manuscripts had to be censored by a fleet
preaa cenaorr all material pertaining to profeaaional
matters, naval subjects* political or international sub-
jects had to be forwarded through the chain of command to
the Magazine and Book Section of the Office of Public
Mil MOT W$ k-*^ ±f'ti& doMlMMHIl ^v^ »*•»« *




Information; authors should always state whether or not
they are public information officers or Enlisted ilavy
Correspondents! and each article should include the state-
asnt that "the opinions or assertions contained herein are
the private ones of the writer and d&<* not to be construed
as official or re flectins the views of the »avy Departasnt
lift
or the naval Service at large.
Admiral Miller also faced public relations problems
engendered by race. In May of 1S4S. he told Captain Imm
that "four or five Megro enlisted correspondents have been
ordered to you." The reason* he maid, was "an effort to
head off any adverse criticise from the colored press*"
He noted that he wan about to receive several inquiries
about what work Off* had done for Megro personnel. Me alee
referred to an earlier "ssove* by Secretary forrestal to
have a Megro officer assigned as a correspondent aboard
each Me^ro-Rsanned vessel and shore establishaent. these
officers were to send stories through the Megro Frees
Section of OMFI to interested Megro newspapers* In actual-
ity, this plan never saw fruition, gather, the Megro SMC's
whoa Miller sent to the Feci fie ware by June 1945 forwarding
storias on Slack Mavyasn to the PHTKC. where a Megro






















The bid fey Secretary forreetal to publicise Negro
personnel in the) &avy wee spurred fey the launching in April
1944 of two ehlpe which vera manned entirely fey slack
crews, except for the officer* ami leading patty officers.
The experiment in wanning for the destroyer aacort Jfiftafift
and patrol craft 9C~1264 broke with Bavy policy and tradi-
tion and was an effort to "wipe out stereotype • about
1.22
Negroes and the navy.* *
The push to cat were material publiahed on Begroes
In the navy continued. In July 1945* Miller wrote Lea that




He suggested articles on all-Black cargo
handling companies. The admiral also said that the Bavy
was enjoying excellent relations with various "Segro
Societies* *
In August $ Killer noved in another area to gat aore
favorable press coverage on the Navy's treatment of Begroes*
8s sent a faaaorandua to Secretary forrestal relating the
efforts of a negro officer attached to the ninth Naval
District who, at the adt&iral** direction, attended a con-
ference of Begro publishers in Hew York* The reaction of
the press. Miller said, was "very good." 12 Re recommended
sanding the Megro officer, along with a white officer, to
stations in the United States with a large percentage of
Begro personnel, with a view toward stimulating the Kavy*s
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too* this
awssaga to the field with an article on the
Field In Ha^ro mmw§#*»#« which told of the 200
*aa.
ia5
Shortly after he assumed office, admiral Miller
lipping away at the security restrictions whiOla
plagued the navy's public relations efforts £©r so long.
In the aforementioned June I, i§4§, letter to Admiral
•'dhwwiww 9 aa^p ^w*w- wj» a^wp ^»'»s^pv 4fce» *s^a»*w ^^'k* *SMi>aspwyiss ^w^Eeie wwe sp h?> w ss^^^is »sf^w^wshp
overdone, "Even though extremely necessary in the early
days of the war* I feel the tins has cone to change the
policy. Our superiority is such today that we can afford
to fcee? up with the Has***
A week later, the new director of Foblie Relations
seat a aeries of isassorantia to Vice Masiral Edwards request-
veral heretofore
unmentionable subjects, 126 Anon? these ware the navy's
night fighter aircraft and advanced base sectional drydocks,
Xn the case of night fighter operations* Millar argued that
a "well-controlled Public Relations cesspaicn** waa necessary
in order to attract volunteers for this extremely hasardous
duty. &e Jterrino: to the drydooks, he pleaded that publicity
in$ that publicity "stops" be lifted on
^ fc-
,•;•
on their roi© in the Pacific would do much to "boost morale
of construction personnel."
In the area of submarine publicity. Hiliar asked
Admiral Edwards to lift the ban on war correspondenta
visiting or taking cruise* aboard submarines* pointing out
that any stories which might result would be subject to
strict censorship anyway* While he was still in the
Pacific, the then Captain Miller allowed Hartin Sheridan of
the Boston filatofc to embark on a war patrol in the
UBS n^ih«e*i- He later wrote to Captain X*e that when
Sheridan*a "I warn Aboard* story is released* *Xt may be
that X will have to eonfese that I put him aboard" (see
note 110)*
Miller waa aided in hie « fforte to publicise the
silent service by submarine officers* In January 1945*
Constancer Ell Reich* USB* the newly named public relations
officer for Commander Submarines Pacific* was dispatched
to Washington to discuss the issue with Admiral Edwards.
As a result of this trip* a certain amount of material was
permitted to be released after censorship at Pearl Harbor*
Xn May* at another Washington conference* the Pacific
submarine commander himself* vice Admiral Charles B*
Locfcwood, gained approval for submarine commands to release
stories on their own—provided these stories remained










By the middle of July 1245* these security confirm*
were expanded to the point where considerably more details
could be given out on submarine operations. The reason*
for this further relaxation were included in a message from
th© Secretary of the Savy prepared for tha rftOfURKT ftfhUff
Information mitotint
Tha war haa reached a atago where we can now relax
some* but not all* of the security restrictions that
have veiled the deeds of men in the silent era of the
Navy* the submarine service*
From the earliest days of the wax, they have
carried on their missions with a minimum of public
attention. Their own safety demanded this silence
during the years when they were ranging vast stretches
of the Pacific inside the Jap's lines* The reduction
of Japanese control and power* which makes a relaxation
of security rules possible* Is due In no small measure
to the submarines themselves. iJ*
By this time* submarines returning from Sea of
Japan patrols received complete photographic coverage at
Pearl Harbor* and their commanding officers filled in
details of each patrol at press conferences. Still* the
correspondents* copy and all film had to be sent back to
Washington for review* The material languished there until
a message by Admiral Lockwood In early August secured its
release. Ironically, the resulting stories and photographs
were published on tha same day the first atomic bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima* thus receiving '*somewhat lmtm" than
front-page attention*
Xn late 1944* periscope cameras using color film
were installed in submarines to obtain motion picture
footage for a special film about the underseas craft to be






...... ... ...; .•; . •-.
:ii*q* ft ?«& »tfft*P€t
patterned after the highly eucceeaful "fighting Lady."
Lieutenant Commande r Swight long* USSR, who had helped to
produce "Lady,* waa in charge of the project. Unfortu-
nately, although some excellent footago was obtained, the
project got underway too lata in the war to ba
pleted. 1**
iSvjM sImhp W^w eiseps^seme* ^ensmm^a %^f er^wswi*fca» ^*A ae^m^e^st^em^ea ^mfSji^sV^^w*-
alao addreased the problem* encountered in tha current
policy of withholding any announcementa that tf.8* Mmvy
™«»ai|rO jfli^Wia a^vwM ^^nfemaei» www u^m£*^B9wm& <w^a ^piKanvAa^p Mw^H^va •• s^me asms* ^^e^"^**
that Kaval personnel on leave had admittad aoeh sinkings by
tha "kamllcasea, • and warned that Mtha navy is getting into
a position where it can not control censorship on this
eabject**
There were other reaeona why Hillar wanted to
apring looae tha kamikaaa stories, ror one* ha waa deter*-
aiined to give tha American people an honaat report on the
realities of war* In hie earlier letter to Admiral slendy,
ha said, "X have had confirmation from many editors and
publiehere that tha American public la anxious to know the
tragic along with tha victorias. They have bean molly-
coddled long enough and X propose to inject some blood into
the picture. * In a June 4, 1945, latter to Captain Lao
referring to the new film* *To the Shores of Iwo Jims, * ha
declared, "Everyone ham reacted favorably to the grimneaa
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releaae of still photograph* showing son* of the nor*
unpleaaant things of this war,'*130 8a the a reiterated the
views of the preas in this regards Th«r« is s strong
deaand on the part of editors to show their reader* what a
tough tiaa the boys are having out there* We are relaxing
exwstdaranly . • • and hava the backing of both E laser
Davie ami syren *rie*.
*
Another purpose in emphasising damage to our ships
waa the acuta ahortage of worker* in Vast Coaat shipyard*
in tha spring and eu*n»r of 1945. Zt waa reasoned that an
emotional appaai wa* necessary to recruit new worker* and
retain tha present ones* who were sorely tssptsd to return
e*^*' et'eeew ek***? -seni^^^^MPw *n»se ^jFnjpse^^e* jeF^^e* ***n* a# a» *ee^pe» ^^p^we>e^p,e*>jr e*^w #•• *»,aiw^V'^»-e^wp ^ee>^ee
victory in Europe* In a July 194$ report on action* talma
ai^* -BmBBSs|p^Fa» ^> aawsw jap assy <e»'S*%* e>^B, <eVa^:^ne**'*e)aw ^ew^^p^SF^s wp-ev w^f-4b* s t^a»swaaa» ^a*^a ewss"<*-iw^S'^*
ew^sw w"senn^e^^spaw siieips* a»^^jfc^^^w^w^a ^p at aaa^sBen^*jw*^ VP e>*^ws* *n^s*es TidFe-a swh*is* flHasHMvilHHMvt
ilidi and iara»^A an<j the exhibition in ?-©* Angelas of tha
hospital ship ffftmftt and destroyer jS&llnxJU both of which
ware heavily damaged by tha eneay. Sa noted that tha two
ships &*#* crowds estimated at 250* 000* 13*
Earlier* wide publicity was given to the OS* J&aaar
lia upon its return to Sew York. The carrier had sustained
critical damage* yet survived* Admiral Killer told Captain
Lao that the v**^*\Lt* story *haa proven to be one Of tha
nest beneficial that tha 8avy has ever had* Tha eaphasls









ataunchness of our shipbuilding construction. In the
letter ha stated. "The reaetiona of the public to the
release of such stories has baao splendid, for exa»$>le,
MM
tha ^nr *»*'* ^atory/ resulted in wide~apread novo stories to
the offset that tha Aaerieaa public were fighting aai ovar
this attack on a hospital Ohio**
Millar at this tiaa waa working on a formula whereby
IS oar cant of each type of ship could he nana* whoa tha
ships returned to service after undergoing repair. This
waa a significant aodification of tha long-atandlog "Last
Bate Rule," in which tha isaaa of a ahip could not ha
released in connection with operations suoeeo.ueftt to tha
loot data tha ahip had been officially identified in a nowa
announce*at. 133 Millar eaphaaised to Captain Lee "that
tha tiae has coma for tha Jape to know how strong we are
and that acre and saora ahipa are returning to do battle."
In lina with thia policy, tha Cl»CP*c Public
Information Office ralaaaad aore than 200 atoriea in June
and early July describing ahip and air unit action against
tha Japanese homeland* To garner even aore aawa of this
type. Admiral Iliadtat tent a tsessege (*l*ac 64) dlr&cting
^^<a> a* •* Jfc^"r^w i*' ,w^pw^w^wa,aa*w^^^a as a*aa a-eas^eaeaea^^^s*^** aa^r jss^™^^^^^ ^roaaaHaaa osas^»ws*e* isae^a <s^a*
Jurisdiction "whose asoompliahiaanta ere conaidarad news-
worthy* " On July 25, ha requested ooassanding officers to
furniah Mat regular intervals • . * tha unclassified war





citiaa and states after which the ships vera nsned*
Thla Dracrtioe wee lat&r extended to include official* of
any eeaasenity or ration which had a special intereat in a
particaiar ship* auoh aa the fcirth^lace of a man tor whom
acasages to aa official they will often find their way into
local newepapers* radio stations and ether a»eia, • ships*
public information officers wara told*
Predictably* the relaxation of censorship rales had
a palatable offact on fcavy public and press relatione*
Miliar elatedly told L*e on June IS that there waa a *wide~
epread foaling aatoag the press that the iiavy i* now telling
ita full story* (see note 132). A month later* in corapli-
anting the CJttCPAC public relations officer on a
^pm^vna^eeseewv^Kai^^p ^wenwi^eno ano^^e >«^^ap^^^^^(B %Ma' eswnwwei^ ^ip* Sp w ^^pjfc ^a^h# <%a«a> ^pse^eajp^^ ^^ewp
wall aa their coeraanrting officers* he said, **he entire
atory wee wall played and the preea ia delighted to see
thia continuing trend of liheralnese and free thinking."
He added that he had received no static from his superiors
on the story* but rather that it had been "received with
wholehearted approval bach here* * In a June 15 letter to
Oeanander Murray ward* U&m* chief press censor for CZBCJMC*
Miller had atressed that ha had not experienced the
"slightest difficulty ia clearing material with COMXKCIf**
Significantly* he added* ** have found very few of the
taboos to be nore then personal thinking* h certain fear
.
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complex entered thtk situation in which no one would 90 to
bat."
On June 2&# Mmiral Miliar was able to writ®
Captain x«e# **9 have juet succeeded in breasting the night~
fiuhter notarial, we ara bow working on a break for radajtr."
On July 14. he inferred Bear Adairal Arthur w. Radlorg.
rcawBarter of Carrier Division Six, that radar would *©©*»>
out from under the lid* on August IS. "all the way
around, * ha told Admiral Radford* *we have bean able to
liberalise releases, censorship, etc. « and I believe another
few aonfchs will find practically no tabooa remaining. * And
aesln be roroudlv asosreaaed the oolnioo. ^Jteara the ssreee
point of view, tba navy baa) never enjoyed aucb a hiob jsaajb
of good will. *xn
In line witb Secretary #Orrestal»a daaira for
greater coverage of tba Navy in tba Pacific, be wanted to
have newspaper and me$a*ine publishers visit the Pacific
Theater, larliar re^uaats for aucb visita bad hmmn turned
down by President ftoosevelt, partially because tba
fraaidaat felt that aoet publishers—as Republicana—slight
be hostile toward tba administration. On January 2* 1945,
Forrest»1 sent Roosevelt a a*norandn» listing iteaa **Z




When Arthur Salsherger returned fross the Pacific he
expreaeed the view very *troi*gly that the intereet of
tfco public in the Pacific war would too greatly enhanced
by permitting publiehere to mefc* the saws trip he did—
he cone heck greatly impressed with the scale and 00090
of our operations* X wonder if you would ho willing to
review your original deoieion* I do not heliove that
a*^wo ^w^irSs^^e wwrw ^woo ^w » ™ a»™*w**Wff wf < ^^MRarasno^w^wsoai^^ww
• oo^e e^wi^^o^iews ™e^^™"^ 3P os^^^^w^o^w> p www s-^wp^ aiwiem^^^wie^^^B^e^WP ^wo^we^^^s^f ^^*jp^w^w^(^Bwwr
•»a>*#*w e woapv *•» ejase^i^^e^ej w^s* ^tw* * swaa^p *eje> **~ *sisis senses* <ntwp*^e™e www#fwwe)WH)ii
for the project, He discussed the laaue with Admiral King*
and 00 January 20, 1945, King wrote to Admiral Histlta
asking whether or not the viaite fey publiehera »ight cause
any inconvenience. The latter stressed Forrestal's
roaoona for allowing publishers to vieit the Pacific* "The
Secretary feola that it would ho beneficial to give the
publisher* the opportunity to observe for theaselvsa the
treaendous problems involved in the Pacific war since they*
rather than the correspondents, establish the policies
which govern the editorials and handling of atorioa
137
ooooerning the Pacific affairs* M
Respite forreatal's anxioueaeea to have publishera
viait the war zone, it was not until after Roosevelt's
death that the project actually got underway* In a May
1945 letter to Captain x#e» Admire! Miller pointed out that
the aeerotary was sole to convince President Truman mora
easily than aooaevelt "that all publiehera wore not anti-
administration. * However , each viait had to he approved hy
the White House, and the decision was wade to send the
nobliahere eat ia teene, pairing a "»onxay« with an
•<VMV «l» wr^^ww **
. WfH
. v. a :j. .: *f £*ff*J
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TBlepfeaat."
At thia tiao, puelieb&ra Hoy aowarcl and Banry Loco
were already in the *acifie # and ooepite s-HUar's intima-
tion in hia letter that men auch aa Luce and Howard would
tea *&ifficult to control* * the vialta proved to he highly
beneficial to tha Hairy*a public relation* program*
Millar wrote toe again in June 194S to iraaaauva him
that tha time end effort helim spent on thaoa iaiportaot
gneeta wa* paying off. 'Again, X aay that la amito of tha
tremondoun nuiennoe theae jpaopla ore* tha oat iraaolta are
nothing ehort of magnificent In tha good will feeing created
far tha navy**
fart of tha goodwill mloht hava etemmed from the
treatment thaoa puhliahcra received, in hia January 1945
lattar to Slmita, admiral King eugoeeted that oomaideration
ha 9Ivan to tha appoints**nt of on offloor to not no *hont*
to thaoa vary important gueeta. Ha oboarvaO that General
Blaeahower hod a former hotel memneer noting in thlo
capacity in Europe. And Millar promioed loo oooo aoajppy
Commander" to act aa "erector * for tha punliahere if ha
fait it would help. In tha eummer of ISMS* Commander
Robert *. wood* public rolotiono offloor for tha nureau of
waval fforconnel* woo aoolfood to tha CI*CS>AC atoff to act
in thia capacity*
But it war more than goodwill being created*




result of Uiee*s visit * collet** issue of jJLX^ft. would bo
devoted to the Pacific war* Ms told loo that "the Secre-
tary is esweediiKjly xeen that we give the widest possible
cooperation lit order to make « eucoess of this special
issue* which, we trust* will asks tha Motion cognisant of
your war," Part of the "cooperation* " *s it turned oat*
included asking I*e to allow 3*uos*s photographers to aaa




With tht Army. , Ansy Air Kama
Sflti,! Jiy iife i jui
As soon aa •aoretary Forrestal persuaded President
Trunan to si low publishers to journay to the Pacific, aa
Army public re 1stions officer phoned Admiral Millar*a
office "to ask if we minded if these people want on to
tea
witness Army activities. * The Savy offarad as objection*
and a procedure was worked oat whereby joint iavitatioaa
would he issued, However* oa August %$ 194S* Millar wrote
to Lieutenant Commander J. Fsul ScHeeta* 0SI», Captain
£*e*s esacwtive officer* that "th«i Army triad to pull a
faat one on us in the caaes of Patterson, O'Doanl. and
Jackson. • 8s eaplelned* "After our agreement to provide
3oint invitations to the publishers, they invited these
people separately, and we had to follow along. They have
ISO
agreed not to do this again.






of 1945 which served to point up the spirited competition
among the servioe* for .public recognition «® the war drew
to a close. Xt went beyond a gas* of professional jealousy
—the merger issue was foremost in the minds of all the
military leaders* and the service which attracted the nest
attention stood the best chance of getting money and sup~
port in the postwar years*
chiefly, the Hevy was conc*arne4 over two issues*
It was afraid that General aacArthur would get the *lion's
share* of credit for winning the Pacific wary and it was
apprehensive that naval aviation would fee aneorhed into
General "H*p" Arnold's JKrwy air Fores* after the war* These
fears were reflected in internal correspondence within the
Havy in the fwssr of 1#4S ana led to almost frantic
suggestions on the part of soma naval leasers to mount a
last-sainute public relations offensive*
On June 21, vice Admiral F* J* Hornet the vice
chief of naval operations* wrote to Admiral Kings *I have
learned from a variety of sources that there is apparently
a very definite whiaperiof campaign going on in Washington
and in the ^aoific" to the effect that naval aviation is
doing a "poor job** and furthermore is sustaining unneoee~
eerily heavy losses* *** Admiral Home cautioned that
"unless the public ie qtomn specific information as to what
navel Aviation has done and will continue to do in the






results. Urn au^gesteo that *«svery tpwgh mods toy anyone
connected with that Navy should hereafter incises soma
mention of »ftval M»i*tion and its in^rtanc* to the Pacific
war.*
A month later. Admiral £d«vdt forwarded north's
memorandum to Admiral Mlmita along with concrete proposals
142
to combat "this whispering campaign* **^* as iroflioawsndad
^p^^p^^^p Sb^a^p^^m^p^^ '^^s^^p^p^* ^^ae w^^aamwAwo^iwaf m>^wM^^m^^we*™*mmsp^p aw^ssfr'^vs^aw o o e
ths strategical sod tactical importance of naval Aviation.
"
Be also urged the prompt release, *ny names,* of the
^sssma^r™ ^m^m'^a'^w^t vn^ cj*aw ^pa^as^^wpepew es e> asss^etajrepw *99w9t ar aw^^^a* ^Baa^p^BBSisw ^paiHsaat i^^^pnsp
^•^w ^p^^^^m^BP^^pspsaae>aW'' ^^ *m ^pe<* sip^p^p *m^p i^f ap^f ^wsimpawaT™i'^^p^m*m ^^a SF^mai^e^w^p9 smp^p ^^^^w^^^^»^^» s
"Further improvement of transmission faoilltias for news
material may to* required for this* teat it io a requisite
aw^a* jpaj"*1 awa ssjp^^^ma*Tff mseiss> *oiemu mpmaws '•sp^aaame^^wwaFwe SHwaropsa"*a»tw m^^F^mspp^s%w tbp^s^w^m
,
Admiral towards* remark about transmission feeil-
itiss 9*9 especially pertinent at this time. Only two days
toe fore his memorandum to Kimits, t&lm C. Wilson, represent-
ing the United *ress in Washington * hittarly eotaplalne3 to
Admiral Millar that prist madia material was being anaecea-
sarily delayed in ths Pacific* "The navy's insistence
/aic7 en barring nswsosoar espy turn ths instantaneous
faoilitiss of ths voicecast." aaid Wilson, *ia in direct
143
contrast to oox experience with ths Army . . . **





with Captain f*ft. m Sla© aeoreesed the »2»
aviati^ eontroveiray in an Augoet 2 letter to
the captain (see mrt« 141) •
aP>a* %efflWP W-*a»^TH^FeV^*e^iW|#w ef*^*s^»* *^p ^fre^^weW
ia to try to gat all your
pound the word "»avy." In
reo« Wa note that 829 oaoy ia
Blag to talk about sir floats so noil as air tools
forces. It would not he wall to let the public feeoooe
confused on this oatter, because should they do so, the
first thing wo fcnow they will consider that *»•• sre
doing the splendid iob currently being done by K*lsey.
In other words, basically, it is sound to use the wor<i
>* before reference to aircraft* took forces, etc.
public •» understanding of the
Seopite his parochial concern, Miller had high
for the public relations activities of the Ara^f Air
m wrote to o friend oo August 4, *S attend*
Air fOroee Boy tflnnsw in Washington the other night,
is no oooot as to the invasiveness of their (
pai$n, u144 Earlier, he discussed with Captain loo the Amy
Air force's plan to establish o group of
the Air force only* The
thio group— **which would eat* sloop end
travel only with the Air fOroo*~~wos that a ganaraX writer
would be unable to understood the complexities of sir
Air Force soJeed Miller
solely to the »29s. The admiral t*
hot granted thaw normal accreditation with the









that existed* he aodadt "Obviously, there is no way we am
Josh HcCein # * outfit 9© up and sock the bell out of
,<>»« *ASS
Admiral McCain's carrier strike force end other
carrier task groups did conduct saturation raids on the
w^s'^i :^w^^s semens*eeiepwee^ss** erS^^e*«iB»emw*«s»sisan eita^em- esws^^asiee-efcmw emw esweMnvee^esee^^** ^ese
order to expedite coverage of one of these navy basiling
attacks* a plan was formulated whereby lieutenant Qesssaader
George McGhee* who subsequently became Assistant Secretary
of State # "flying on a e**2t weather mission over Tokyo,
o* ^^^^m^^HB^^mvn sv^^^ee,^m ^w ^If^hwis ^^e*^^i en e^mi^ssMOjn*^* sseeve^tS w*"S^me s»^*we»» sa ssO'eme iw ee ^fw^ 9
planes were over To*yo.
"
This raaesacje enabled public
relations personnel at aaa» to release advance press copy
on the raid by Kavy carrier aircraft.
The natter of accreditation for war correspondents*
which plagued both the Amy and Kavy at Okinawa* was
satisfactorily settled in July 1945 following a series of
nestings between Admiral Miller and Major general Alexander
0. Sarlee* Amy chief of public relations* along with
representativea from the Army Air Force* A system was set
up whereby correspondents in the Pacific would be Jointly
accredited to both the Army and the navy. The agreement
was so worded that the navy would retain control of the
local situation at Pearl Harbor and Guam*




Savy rataisa4 wer praaa activities in tba Pacific vas
an tfea joinfc-cojamano' natur* of Pacific
that tharn was a "oalinit© tram* in the
tha East to call for a singls aoBasaaiar for tha
attack on Japan, Should thia occ**r, aaa^stionsoly all
ftfelie Information aotivitias will stem tram tliat
tfeoaver ha isay ha.*147
Obviously* it woald bs ©aaaral Mae-Arthur.
was vary little the Havy could So to offast tha
hi9hly successful p«3sUc raiatlons eaapalsja aarriao* on In
not juat a figpaant of the Savy* a ioMaginaticau On July 30,
194$, Alexander ft, tCasay> Jonas, managing editor of tha
ffeshin&toa flatt* cont&laine<5 to tBanaral Surlaet
*
*a &*&**• • • * that from this point on ovary-
thing ihmt transpires in the Pacific, fro* tha ta*y
staraSneint. la seiner to he nublleisedl aa tha aaoloaiva
axploit of General fteaglas MaaArthur* • • • fhia aitair*
tion liaa beam true all through the South Pacific
ad one alwaye has to aaarch to fine" that
an? ether Individual eemeetee* with the
• * *
fliers" never appear*! in tha public print to ay
kaoMla&ga* Bvery leaser oot fall oce&lt* Atiel
recently AOairal Hisdta not only announce*' tha
also ail of tha Aeairais. ¥oa Washington fost yiaJbde
to no one in admiration of the i&llitary genius of
policy of his public ralations officara in saaking it
their job to publicise no ona exocpt the Ceaaaanaer in





On Au$uet 4* whea th* ••••ait on the aspanasn hone
lalanoa waa still toeing planned* Adairai Millar e»5pressed
to a friend his intention to 90 to tan Faeiflo to take
oeraonal charoe of SJavv tmlflto relations there (ana note
144)* also, to natter acoonaodet* war oorreapoadenta
daring the invnaioa of Japan, the ttavy in the nuwaar of
1$45 waa halloing three *pmae ahips," whose aala pttrpees
woold he to provide transportation and oaaiaanicatioiia for
I in
aadin representativee covering the ana service
•
Van ships vara to ba patterned aftar thn amy's
JbiMSiML* a aaanMinioationa vessel eaed at flfcixiiswii to tranaait
press and radio copy* and n later Amy "press ship deluna,
taa ajsifffiiM s»yt- fha lattar waa a victory ship taken ever
ay thn Army aarly in 1045 ami reaodelad to m&xv9 en General
JtecArthur'a "praaa flagship* auring the final assault on
a large auditorium cooplet* with 115 typewriterc at
pxttmm desks.
$w© 5,000 Watt tranaaiittara and several other trans-
aittara.
ai^^w^* awe ^y ^0
-Sk na'a^fw^aass m^wirw#ep#^wa' a '^wer^ne jb^^i^Sp n^^waaai^w wai^^p
recordera
»
n aoond notion picture etadio*
Two radio broadcasting studios.
Adainiatratlve offices.
Uving aeooaaodationa far a large ran&er of the
press* 150
Tha vary also had probleaa in taa Pacific in regard
to accreditation of correepondenta to the Britieh. and
eventually formal arrangeennts were nana to atation British








stated that* *M1 facilities for the dispatch and tranemia*
•ion of press material of all descriptions, . . . which era
available to U.». ^rreapondenta will to* equally available
to all British correspondents. * iSi Tha agreement was that
British correspondents would toe allowed on tomxicem ships
and installations, and American correspondent* oa British
ships* It was mads clear, however, that "the number of
British and American War Correspondent* will be proportional
to the forces of sash nation which ara operating in the
Pacific Ocean Areas*
*
the reasons behind this stataiMat appear in a Jans
1945 letter from Adniral Millar to Captain Las. He said
that he "foraaaw ttoe possibility that when V-E Pay case
alon*i we would find a sudden influx of British into the
IS2
Pacific. "*9* This was more than a natter of logistical
concern. Millar admitted, 'frankly, I have no desire to
have the British correspondents convey to the world proas
the thought that they have won the Pacific war.
Admiral Miller also was afraid that the British
would try to ansa* antra correspondenta into the Pacific
under the yuiae of being something they wore not* *¥w*
will find,* he wrote. *a distinct tendency for them to
claim that ths Australians, although British, are not
English. * Us suggested to Captain Urn that ha stand firm,
and that all "Colonials * rentals under the Britiah quota.
Zf not. ha said, there would soon be a surplus of British

3X3
correspondents and V«r at BOQ5 you sight as veil fly a
British Standard. *
flank speed la to* summer of 1»4S toward ita deal
"deetinstions * of increasing public awareness of tha Bavy*e
role in tha Pacific war and gaining public support for a
strong postwar navy.
In tha Unitec States* the Office of Public Informa-
tion waa involved in a continuous stress* of activitias. Xa
June, it arranged for an "air armada of naval plana a** to
tour smaller communitise in tha Cast and Midwest In support
of tha Seventh Wax Loan Srive. Xt aant tha chaplain of tha
US» »*-§»* i in. on a apeeial apeakiag tour mud provided a
aeries of epeafesra for the "Fighting xjnly" model on display
in Rockefeller Canter in Sew York* The captured Oerman
submarine, the u-505* waa exhibited in porta along the
Eastern Seaboard* and cooperation waa extended to sataftflay
av^niny gctatfr gor a story in ita august issue on tha carrier
ftft*A i1Tfyijr*- which waa predicted to he "the beat story *•
naval Aviation ever carried in a nxagasine of that type."
On July 10, the *i*avy Hour.* a new radio program
produced by 091 waa aired for tha first time on mc» Plana
also ware made to produce a separate radio enow on naval
aviation and to salute the 32nd Anniversary of naval




... .:. i • ••
aviation on August 10* Ala© in July* axtonaive publicity
was fivan to the Fifth Aaniv#raary of the navy'* ahip~
building program. In lata July, another e«a£»*«a«e of
naval district, float. timU ana air training
public information officers vaa hald* this titaa in
153
In the Pacific. Admixal fclimit* on June 3 issued a
directive designed to "strsagrthen tte Public Eolations
organisation in the Pacific Fleet. *154 Xta ataXn
vara tha attaofcmaiit of fuii~*tisaa public relations officers
to tha *Uvmt*m ataffa ana coefsands* of tto® float and a
requirement for ooamamUnf officers of ail float units to
assign collateral duty public relations offioora. Con-
current with the lattar was a req-Jtoat to OFI for ninety
additional public relation* officers for fall-tiao duty in
tha Pacific, It also was announce that 'periodic
hulletine" containing guidanoa in information mattara for
w.iss^w^^^y jbr^pjf es^#xasavs «&, ^ff^?^a«emw #r^P a> iwa* •w*fl>^r»w<*** > "w ^v^p *aiaw ^WwW# %H*e^p
firat edition of too semi-monthly &mm^W? P**n*to* ^gpffl"**
t&on Bui Win vaa publish^ on July 1* Later in the
pared ami aant out to all ENCaj and a "Ship'* Editorial
papers adaptable to both mimeograph and offast








The all-out emphasis on gaining publicity in the
Individual public information officers. For instance* the
FXO for Commander Service Fore*. U,S. Pacific Floats sent
an open letter "To war Co-respondents who want H»£Ag: a In
it ha advertised
t
you want to know »*»»nr«r «rft #iflrff feature stories?
• . * Public Relations of the* Pacific FXeet Service
has tha answer to that $64 question.
• • « Service Force is ;Jearpaefced with stories • • »
news feat ares • « * megesine pieces • • « radio copy
• . * everything from adventure yarns to logistics and
• • • And so this bulletin has bean prepared to pet
you on the trail of this story Oold Mine (and wa swan
SollLJUttlJ)* 1**
To the invitation* this huckstering FX© attached a list of
forty story ideas ranging from "The Filling Station Goes to
See 1* to The Grocery Store Oats Xta Feet Wet."
To facilitate transmission of news copy* a multi-
plex radio teletype system had heen set up at CX*CF#C
public relatione office on Guam, providing four direct
teletype channels to San Francisco. The system began
operating in March 1945, and fey the end of June, a,3$0,7*9
words of pt»— copy had been transmitted to the mainland.
Broadcasts also ware originated free 0ue» through the radio
station of the public relations office, "mm. " Xt warn
^^^m eepp^vw^w a»ae'^^'W> ^"" ^^w^^sef
^^TjP^* ^^ •a- ^m^mmmameirw e^m^ wem^m ^*s» wf^^^^w/f'^^ ^^^^^^e me*m™>
week were aired from this station during the summer of 194S








program*. Tim tminert of CBS paid special tribute to the
broadcasting facilities in the Pacific*
Today listeners in the United States oaa hear direct
broadcasts from practically any island we haw taken
and from ships of ths fleet* ... no matter where they
are. In the last year facilitiea Have expanded so that
we can now give . •
-•.,•» eyewitness picture of the news
as it is happening. 157
The broadcasts from ships at aea ware especially
impreesive to the media and the listeners bach noma.
admiral Millar wrote to Captain t*e on July 12, "Your
recant broadcaat from the Jsat* during the strike waa a
snook-out and all press people back here are talking about
it in 9lowing terms* * In another letter to Lee on
august 13, he exclaimed, "Seen morning at eight, I listen
to the broadcaat from the third fleet and it comas in like
tarn
a power houaai" On July 17, 1945* na milestone in war-
reporting waa p9mm»^ • • • , when radio commentators broad-
cast s naval bombardment of Kamaishi while it waa actually
ism
in progress**
The Navy's combat photographers received plaudits
in the summer of 1945, too* Speaking of their work in the
production of the motion picture, "The Float That Cams to
Stay, * the Hew York Zi$ftA "Overseas weekly** saidi
• • • the Savy has come through with one of the most
spectacular films of the Pacific war* This is a blow-
by-blow account of the savage attacks mads by the
Japanese Xamikaaa • • • fliers against the fleet units
that backed up the army-Marine assault /on Okinawa/*
The 103 cameramen who photographed the action during
the three-month campaign displayed cool courage and
resourcefulness under fire* This is only a twenty-




Oil 2d, Mmlfl mUm salute Captain u« on
of lii» information c*trsoro*#lt
r«g« yo«r boy* taw* boon providing in
, still sad notion pictures is simply
this
is «Soin^«
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When Secretary forreatal is raslly interested in a
course of action, he doeen't sleep and he doesn't lot
%^ e>S^wc ** ^s ay slaiS'^Pee'e} * swama^ ^«J *^ ^fcrW^er %^e» (S**^*j^* a^i^me^a* ^e^e^^esps^s*s^e^mwa ^w^ejej
Zt wee Secretary Forrestal suggesting that the surrender
ceremonies take ^lace on board the battleship tfaMUttCA*
X was sufficiently awafce to recognise what tha Army
would call a *aavy trie*. * 8*6 he said simply *a
battleship. * it would Have remained a &»&atafol«
j*ueetion, but when ha mentioned the H&sSwllirl - I teas*
the oaaa was closed. Tha President* upon receiving the
euo^eeticn* of oourem thought it an ejtcelJmmt idea,i$2
er m^a» ^a^w^^ e#^w«a» veeh'^v^F ^^^^aps ^wamsiam apmm ms^mie m*ame*^m
^^Jf **a^w^ms ^pwa^^e^o
Sacratary of fitate. that Admiral eimita should participate
in tha surrender ceremony, since tha Mavy had played such a
prominent role in winning tha Pacific war* tha arrangement
was made to have General MacArthur sign for the victorious
Allies ea a whole* while Vinits signed the surrender docu-
ment for tha United States.
To provide coverage of the surrender ceremony* tha
attack transport ffrSMtmnlir *•* aaaignod emcluaivaly for
public information purposes and accompanied tha f*tiFm{fW*
into Tokyo day. More than 300 war correspondents ware
a\^Aa\y¥#<'l| ^ n 4f ^%en U4 fiendM-iv £ ^ 4.«^ 1 >dP * w**w^^^^e *w^w^e aet Ww^w aTsjSSSsessSMMSBenask sa a^^^^ ,a» m^m
Admiral Miller wrote to captain Leo on September ll*
"The tfavy really swept the front pa$ae with photos* proas
* as
etoriae. etc. * of tha oaramomlma aboard tha Missouri. «*w^
sffsP wr e*'^^^m»^^PTmwp ^ww> ^^^^ms& a* aajmss&SiiFai^ni <»amaw^w^'waie ac^^im ae^a^f^es *» js*w ima**>m ^ *^mie>'^<»ee m^^r
the spotlight on Tokyo Bay.
I i
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Killer Wit-Pacific. S#t alao. fflBBJiCT BbUkUb* »©. 2*
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rACfU.t;i feuUfrUfi, aw. S* Bapteaber 1, 1945,
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i58fctra.. *&&*• Harold B* Mill**, URW, to Cap*.
Fitshush !*» uStt. 00R (03919) of uuiy 12. 11*45. and <*»
(Serial S698700R) of August 13. 1945. Millar Fila—Pacific.
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*Ad»inistratlve Kistorias, CUCFAC and CIHCSO*.
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l
*°Na%r York XlaBA "Overseas Meekly. " July 29. 1943.
quoted in Bacyia.**f» anii^i.*.. Be. S. Septexfcer 1. 1945.
p. 7.
mi,tr.» ftAdsu Harold B» Stiller. USH. to Capt.
fltaaooh I*e. UBSS, August 23. 1945 (Serial B79S20Q&)
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Miller File-Pacific.
*w Jaots F. Byrnes, quoted in Albion and Conaery.
ForrBfltBl . 130.
^Administrative Histories* CIBCFAC and CXmw&.
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settled /at * hastily called conFrance/. *s«e*tHiny
called ayeleas fission . . . has just reamed the Kavy
below the belt. . • • There'll be press conferences by
the admirals to place this thing in its proper
perspective* meantime let's don't let tills incident
throw us* Don't . • 1st us lose the public relations
war after all our mcntha and years of work. "i
This imaginary scene free) ffiftft't fllt,,»» 1ny *%» W**n*
was not so farfetched* when the atomic bombs were dropped
on Japan* one could alaost sense a kind of disappointment
among the Navy's public information leasers that their
"great" story had moms to an end. Admiral Miller conveyed
this feeling alaost as succinctly as author William
Brinkley when he wrote a Pacific fleet information officer
in October 1945 1 "The folding up of the «?aps suddenly
raised cain with all of our plans. . * • It is pretty tough
going with the ... cessation of headlines • • # . *
earlier, he had written to Captain Lees
Mow, with the fleet activities ceasing, we arc hard put
... to do much about the press. We are going to town
on "Stow-it-can-fes-told-stories* as well as demobilisa-
tion plans and conversion to peacetime activities* for
the most part, these are not particularly exciting ami
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Til* rssh of "now it en be told* episodes* made
poeaifele by an almoet total lifting of the security lid at
wax* a end* vara an attempt to capital!** on residual public
interest in individual war exploit*. However, Millar wa*
concerned that such public attention would soon wane* Ha
urged Captain £*e to expedite the tailing of theae deede*
cautioning t "ttnleaa we get the Kavy*a atory oat at once, it
will be a dead duck* *4
ihmt, a , Aftajnttarn
Thus* there waa a conscious a ffart in 0*1 and the
Pacific Float in the fall of 1945 to enhance public recog-
nition of the sea service* a role in the conflict. Writers
were asaigned to parens heretofore highly classified battle
reporta 'to extract the significant talea that abound,*
according to Admiral Miliar* Collateral-duty public infer -
nation officera and EMCa were encouraged to dig out
"individual stories which give a true picture of the
important part the Mavy haa played in winning the war. *
Special thanes were to be stressed—such as the destruction
of the Japanese iSavy, blockading* seisura of stopping-atone
bases, maintaining supply lines and the baadiardment of the
enemy's homeland by carrier-baaed aircraft*
The individual aoeoaplishment stories* of course,
were targeted for hometown distribution* Shortly after
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of newspapers and raui© stations to determine whether or
not such material was still desired* The results were
7
overwhelmingly in favor of continuing the program.
Emphasis also was placed on publicizing the Navy's
part in the occupation of Japan and aapanesf»~held territory
and the return of Havy personnel to civilian life, wavy
Demobilization Pictorial Project Teams* consisting of one
ESC and one photographer, were assigned to separation
centers to cover discharges; and a special office was set
up st Pearl Harbor to produce *c^iicfci«" stories on service-
man being brought back to the States in the 316-ship
B
"Magic Carpet" fleet* The latter proved to he an ingenious
system for gaining mention of Havy ships in material shout
personnel from all the armed forces of obvious and immediate
interest to the public.
In October 1945 » huge welcome-home ceremonies warm
staged for Admirals Himits and Balsey* and forty-eight
Pacific Fleet ships visited East Coast ports during the
"biggest ever" wavy Day celebration. Prom a press relations
standpoint* however* the transit of the ships through the
Panama Canal was marred when seventy correspondents* sent
down to cruise north with the fleet* "apparently « • .
Ifound a very cold reception down there in the District*
*
According to Admiral Miller* the poor treatment of the
madia representatives was a throwback to the "fear complex
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and during the early part of the war. Ha attributed
ita reawafcenino to the pHHM cancellation of censorship
regylation», which returned too responsibility for security
to the local coaaaaders.
At war»s end. Congress renewed ita debate on a
unified dmf&iime department, and tha top military loaders of
both the Army and Havy took turns at testifying, to help
prepare the navy's case. Secretary tforrestel resurrected
tha *ad hoe" committee he had created in the spring of
1944* naming Vice Admiral Arthur Radford as its new bead* 10
Inevitably, ©PX also became involved* and in Steceseber 1943
HiHer wrote to Captain Lao "that everything is being
dropped to take care of the merger angle. *11 fcespite
ail-out effort, the. savy's information chief was pessimistic
over the sea service's chances of winning the reorganisation
battle. His lack of confidence stemmed from his belief
"that we were about two years to© late, to say nothing of
old tradition of silent service.*12
Miller also was frustrated over the rapid loss ©f
information personnel through deasoiligation*
the war ended* there were soma 750 officer specialists
alone serving full-time in this field throughout the
13
navy.* Most of them were naval reservists who
to resume their civilian pursuits.
estimated that 50 pes cent of these personnel would he lost






In an attaint to entice sosae of the reservists to
in the wavy in a public information capacity. Killer
to the Secretary of the Mavy and the Chief of
naval *ersenna1 that a special designator be established
for officers aarving in this duty, ao thay would not bww
to compete for proaotioa with contemporaries Who had »uch
taore aaa and operational experience, forrestal immediately
approval the propose I, and it wee favorably considered by a
special board headed by Hear Admiral Oeorae C. Dyer in late
1945. However, with the aeroer issue freesine practically
all military legislation in Congre a«# action on the ««*asura
was not taken until 1947. By that tisse, th® majority of
the information^experienced reserve officers ht^i long since
As partial compensation for the loss of the
reservists, Admiral Killer was sola to procure about fifty
Regular navy officers to help maintain as much as poaaiole
of tha public relations structure built up during the war
in the naval districts* the floats and in
have proven our value too coa®lately to let it slip by us
now. ha professed*
Secretary Forrestal eupported Miller's contention
by writing to the Chief of Haval l^rsonnel in March 1946*
"It is considered essential that the service of Mavy public
information continue to function in m*&® »a in— *X
"<tW • ' i*r «?c4. *,*«»5.q tic*
j
.
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Bo ordered the establishment of information billets In "all
staffs* ashora and afloat, and in those other ilaval activ-
ities which sjpeciai circumstances may render necessary
• • . to aaeure adequate public relations coveragv.* Ha
also directed that tha Enlisted naval Correspondent ba
included in tha permanent rating system of tha Havy and
that tha Pleat Hometown Haws Cantor ha retained as a dis-
tribution point for etories about individual Havymen* 8a
further stated that ha wanted provisions made for tha
training of personnel assigned to public information
17duties.
forrestal's continued emphasis of public relations
was instrumental in leaping Office of Public Information
personnal strength at a level only slightly lower than its
wartiB* average. A 1946 table Of organisation for ©tX
listed billets for sixty-six officers and twenty-two
enlisted men* By April 1947* tha agency—known once again
as the Offices of Public suciations-Mhad actually expanded to
include allowances for eighty-four officers* forty*five
enlisted men and seventy-two civilians. At that time* it
waa headed by a vice admiral with two rear admiral* in
eha£9a of separata public information and civil relatione
divisions. ia





clows ly to its i©iv : sanding *xl*srrt service tradition in
its dealings with the press and the public* With a few
notable exceptions « such as the extensive publicity given
to the sailing of the Great Unite Fleet ia 1908* public
relations in the sea service was handled on an informal*
sporadic and often reactionary basis* A &avy sews Bureau
waa set up in world war X to assist the news toedla* but
austere economic conditions and public apathy toward the
military in the two decades which followed relegated this
formal organisation to a caretaker status buried in the
Office of maval Intelligence (OtU)
.
Early is 1939* however* as war clouds gathered in
Europe* otfl was compelled to enlarge its meager four-person
public relations branch and to establish subsidiary field
offices to meet heightened public and press interest in
naval affairs* In July 1940* Frank Knox* publisher of the
Chicago nalty mey and newly appointed Secretary of the
navy* directed a mobilisation of the sea service *s informs-*
tion function to a wartime footing* SSaval reservists from
the ranks of the mass media and related professions were
brought on active duty; and separate sections were added to
the public relations branch to service the specialised needs
of the various media* coordinate field activities and
monitor trends in news reporting and public opinion*
In May 1941* Knox transferred the function from




• a • £
33«
Relation* (0P») directly under hi* control and naming Rear
Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn *s it« head* A abort time later*
the Chief of naval Operations mm6& public relatione a
function of command* Personnel in the Washington office
increased from thirteen in the summer of 1940 to over
ninety on the eve of Pearl Harbor* The naval district
public relations offices also were augmented, including
personnel to man branches in various metropolitan centers
throughout the nation* In the fall of 1941, when full-time
information officers ware assigned to the Atlantic and
Pacific fleets* the Kavy's wartime public relations struc-
ture was virtually complete*
Soon* however* the age-old nemesis to full disclo-
sure in wartime—the necessity for military secrecy-
reappeared* As far back aa 193a, the Kavy already had
instigated a aeriea of security measures designed to mini-
mime publicity on new ship construction and fleet maneuvers*
In early 1941* Secretary Knox himaelf instituted a system
of "voluntary censorship* * in which the news media warm
asked to refrain from mentioning certain naval subjects
unless previously released by appropriate authority*
Upon America's entry into Woe Id war XX, formal
censorship was imposed on many faceta of war information.
President Roosevelt outlined the rulas* stressing that
nothing should be revealed which would give "aid and
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interpretation of What data would fall in this category in
the handa of the military.
The firat year of hostilities was primarily a naval
war* and Admiral Ernest J. King* the navy's top military
commander* exercised his censorship powers to the utmost.
Only sparse details were released about the damage at Pearl
Harbor; news of ship sinkings in the Atlantic "by German
submarines was closely guarded; and announcements of our
ship losses in the pacific wore delayed up to 100 days*
These actions aroused suspicion by the press and public
that the government was deliberately "sugar-coating" war
information* since the Navy seemed to be stifling h^H news
while promptly issuing the food. Elmer Davis* chief of the
new Office of H*x Information (ONI) * personally took the
Navy to task over its news policies and* with an assist
from the President* was abl^ to obtain timelier and more
complete disclosures by the fall of 1942.
The war took a new direction in November of that
year when Allied forces invaded Sorth Africa. With the
news spotlight somewhat diverted from sea engagements*
Captain Leiand P. Lovette* who succeeded Admiral Hepburn 9m
director of Public Ae1stions (PFR) in August 1942* was free
to concentrate on improving Navy releasing procedures.
Secretary Knox also urged Admiral King to relax certain of
his security restrictions* particularly with regard to




military handling of war news continued throughout noat of
1*43, and in September of that year, freeident ftoosevelt
fait it neeeeeary to direct the Army and tiavy to cooperate
fflor*: closely with owl.
A turning point in tfavy reporting occurred two
months later whan a "play-by-play* account of the landing
on Tarawa waa relayed through the eophiaticated coasotunica-
tiona facilities of a new asaphibiotss comoano ship. Thia
practice waa not to become standard for many months, hear-
ever* aince the commander of the Pacific iaXand-hopping
campaign. Admiral Raymond A. £pruance« frequently refuaed
to break radio ailence for public relatione purposes.
Also, ati'ict accurity waa maintained on the new techniques
and equipment uaed in amphibious warfare.
While controversy aurrounded the flow of SUnry newa
from the battle sones during the early and middle stages of
the conflict, QFR and the field offices at home were busily
engaged in a myriad of activities designed to enhance the
so a service's over-ail public relations. Combat photography
and combat art programs, begun during the stabilisation
perion prior to the war* were fully operational in the
fleets by early 1942* In Washington, a "beat system* was
s*>t up whereby press officers from ©PR. culled news items
from the various savy department agencies* and a 24-hour
watch »nd extensive photographic library were maintained to













conducted to provide background information that could not
be divulged in the regular press conference* held by the
Secretary of the navy.
Early in 1942* branch offices were established ia
Hew York to service radio networks and asagasinc- and book
publishers- An assistant director of public relations for
the West Coast was aaaaed in September 1943 to coordinate
efforts there, especially those connected with the jaotion
picture industry.
In the fall of 1941. the Siavy had taken steps to
work closely with defense plants la promoting morale mom
war workers. Secretary Knox created a special industrial
incentive division in his office In July 1§42 which enlisted
the aid of naval district: public relations officers in
presenting the famed Army-»avy *R" awards and other produc-
tion citations. Radio networks and local stations also
were called upon to assist in industrial morale and played
a prominent role as well in support of Mavy recruiting
publicity, war bond promotions* &«d Cross blood drives* and
such uni«fue ventures ss the solicitation of civilian
binoculars for use in the fleets.
Savy public relations personnel throughout the war
maintained cloae liaison with mi and other government
information agencies and with their counterparts In the
Amy. Marine Corps and Coast Ouard. Public relations
efforts of the latter two services cane under the <j«aeral
sag te&v ?»
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jurisdiction of QP& and the naval district office*, the
Wavy also was involved on a continuing basis in sotting op
displays and exhibits of wax materials* arranging inter-
views for returning combat veterans* projects on behalf of
the Savy Relief Society* tfavy Day celebrations and the
preparation of war posters*
In the aid-war years* 09R began to adopt a sore
creative approach fcy actively seeking msdia coverago of and
public interest in specific naval activities such as the
launching of the new I*UE*J1B&&&« the transit through mid-
America of the submarine £&£&• the uss ft] itiiMi firing
trials and the first anniversary of the WAVES. In addition.
it sought to educate Havy information personnel through
annual public relations officer conferences* a monthly
Public ftalitioni jjyUnfrifl and the issuance of a detailed
Sablia Me lotion* flaaiimi in 1943* OPR reached a personnel
strength of 140 shortly after the war began; and there were
274 public relations officers in field cosmsands by the end
of 1942* including *flight " information specialists
attached to new air training units formed in the susener of
that year.
Beginning in 1943* the improvement in the war's
outlook tended to neutralise security precautions and
resulted in a gradual but steady increase in the dissemina-
tion of Savy information. Despite the more liberal policy*
r ...
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however, public relatione in the eea service waa concisered
to be in a state of doldrums in the spring of 1944 whan
Secretary of the Wavy. Particularly in tha Pacific, where
there was a shortega of public relatione pereoansl and wax
correspondents encountered unacceptable delays la tha
censorship and delivery of their material, were short**
craftings noted.
forrestal*s immediate concern, however, was with *n
Army plan then before Congress to r&erge the nation's axtaed
forces after the war. rearing that tha *avy would be
"submerged" rather than surged in any such schema, the new
secretary ordered a revltalisaticn of its entire public
relatione program for an all-out effort in tha final steams
of tha conflict. The focus of tha campaign was to be in
the Pacific, aince tha Navy's role in the Atlantic and
European theaters was by that time one primarily of support.
In the Pacific, however, tha saa service faced stiff public
relatione competition from the Army and Army Air force.
following an inspection trip to that theater in tha
summer of 1944 by Rear Admiral A. Stanton Merrill, who had
relieved Captain ^ovette as DPR three monthe earlier,
numeroua innovative measures ware taken—not only to speed
tha flow of press copy and film from tha combat areas but
also to convince «avy commanders of the importansa of public
relatione to the war effort. Information "annexes" ware
•ft KOttM jClHItft &4Sft#Mfc ttltf &0O£
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included in future* operational plana; float censors
accompanied correspondents wherever they went for on-the-
spot screening of press material? and scores of full~tia*»
public relations officers vara dispatched to the Pacific*
their number totaling more than 400 by war's end. A for-
ward base was set up on sua© to handle the increasing
nuaber of reporters who flocked to the fecifie following
V-E Day* Modern transmission outlets were installed there
and at Hawaii to beaa radio and press copy* including
photographs* back to the States* Broadcasts also were
originated frost ships at sea*
The turnabout in the navy's "press sense * received
high praise frost the news stadia, with special accolades
handed out for the arranges*nts at 2wo Jicaa and Okinawa*
The public relations conscious FOrreatal wss not finished,
however* In consonance with Captain Harold B. (Min)
Miller, the new public relations officer for the Pacific
consaander, he mtvm4 to 'personalise * the navy's war role by
assigning a cadre of 100 Enlisted Savy Correspondents and
hundreds of collateral-duty information officers to write
stories on individual Kavyaen* to distribute these
articles to hometown newspapers, he established the fleet
Mesastown Sews Center in Chicago in March 1945.
The secretary took ateps, too, to improve the
central supervision of the navy's information program* In
the fail of 1944, Of* was completely revasysd, with *ore
--.-•.•










given to the planning audi ©valuation phases of the
public relations process. Monthly statements of specific
objectives were begun in January 1945* and •feedback**
reports on aotlona taken to achieve thorn were required frota
all navy public raiatioaa offices. In May 1945* Forrestsi
transferred Captain Millar from the Pacific to head OPft,
promoting him to raar admiral* Miller in June change** the
me^^sw^m*- ^^ 4. m*>es^e AiiAavv ^^<w^^ee m^# y*a'ao"* ^^es^saw^^es^m^F'^aa^e* ^^e*eeiw s^^m^F^s^eJ^w^^se^e
in removing virtually the laet traces of security restric-
tiona preventing a free flow of news*
Bagaeaki, the Havy was about to launch three "preee ships*
to be used exclusively tor public relations coverage of its
part in the invasion of Japan* Instead, it had to settle
for a "bright spotlight of publicity** surrounding the
surrender ceremony aboard the battleship uimffMfr i in Tokyo
Bay.
An NffpTTstaaJL
Frank Knox set the machinery in motion far a full
chronicling of the Havy* a world War XX story. Bowevsr, mm
we have seen* stringent security meaeuree and a lack of
understanding and appreciation for public relations by many
naval officers seriously handicapped its telling* particu-
larly in the early and middle atagee of the conflict.
In retrospect* with the Pacific fleet severely
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potentially disastrous submarine campilgn in the Atlantic*
it is most difficult to dispute the sagacity of Admiral
Xing'* tou$h security stance early in the war* neverthe-
less # it was inevitable in our democratic society that such
rigid censorship would soon run at cross purposes with the
public's appetite for news* which had been aided and
abetted for years by a highly competitive free press
insistent on full and speedy disclosure* The problem was
compounded in World war n by the massive personal involve-
want of the American people in the prosecution of the war
•ad the recent advances in communications technology that
served to make it the moat widely reported conflict is
history up to that time.
It is doubtful whether the degree of necessity for
military secrecy in wartime ever will be satisfactorily
resolved for either its proponents or opponents* In ail
probability* the issue will hinge in future wars—as it has
is the past—on the special set of circumstances operative
in each case* Secretary Knox pinpointed the dilemma when
he said in 1941 that security versus publicity is "not s
conflict between right and wrong but between two rights—
the right of the public to know all about its ssvy * .
.
sad the right of the ttavy to preserve national safety hf
not revealing anything of value to a potential enemy* * X
For the most pmst, the public and press conceded


















War IX. Y«t# it must be concluded that at the vary outsat
of hostilities the m9t service instituted an unnecessarily
restrictive aat of censorship rules* Furthermore* it
failed to educate the public ami pgeae properly aa to the
raaaoaa fox these rules and did not sake eufficient provi-
aion for their periodical review and liberalisation—
daapita tha steady improvement in the tactical situation*
The public information portion of tha official wartime
hietory of tha Pacific Pleat eeaaiina contained the admis-
sion that "after an initial vital need tor security* tha
20
bralces were not taken off fast enough." And Elmer Pavie*
in hie postwar report to tha President, "observed • « *
that naval officers* in deciding on what information would
give aid and comfort to tha enemy* * leaned over backward*
si
in interpreting the phrase in tha interests of security* "
This attitude* of course* had its genesis in the
longtime tradition of reticence on the part of naval
officers mud tha related "security syndrom** evolving f*om
the isolationist environment of naval operations—both of
Which ware personified in Admiral King* With this policy
emanating from tha vary top* it ia not surprising that a
certain "fear complex" over tha release of information
developed in Savy commandera* censors and even public rela*
tions officers* In the case of tha latter* tha decision by
the sea service before the war began to include the respon-







q i-iav * fins taoatiao »
itMOS ICft vsJCi-*
348
"split personality 4 ' in its public relations officers Which
Inhibit*** their natural inclination to fight for a more
liberal approach* ftl are inclined to be *Mo* men,"* said
a speaker at one of the navy's public relations officer
conferences* *• . • while . . we ought to realise that we
are the 'Yes* man. *21
A significant factor in perpetuating the Navy's
wartime intransigence in security matters was the apparent
justification of secrecy in the light of certain opera-
tional events. Wot instance* the strict silence maintained
on the breaking of the Japanese naval code early in the war
led to the ambush of Admiral Yamamote over the Solomon
Islands in April 1943 through the deciphering of an enemy
23
message. And Admiral King remained convinced as late as
May 1944 that his withholding of the fact that two addi-
tional American cruisers were sunk in the Battle of Save
island in the summer of X942 saved the aay for our embattled
Marine forces on Guadalcanal, lie claimed in his first
report on the war. "The Japanese did not take advantage of
this opportunity to engage in a fleet battle with the
balance of power on their side* probably because they did
not know—and we did not let them knew—how severe our
24losses were,*
A begrudging acceptance of and in some cases whole**
hearted support for stringent security measures by the news




policies, also contributed to the 8iavy*s reluctance to
abandon its strict stance on operational a#cracy. A patri-
©tic fervor permeated the entire nation* consider ably
diluting the hue and cry raised by a vocal minority for a
freer clow of war news. Ray 0aaiell of the Mew tork XJJMUI
Loncon Bureau typified this undercurrent of patriotism when
he exclauUoed in 1^43 » "There isn't any story in the world
that is 9006 enough to justify risking the life of a single
m
American soldier, * and Dale Minor wrote 101*9 after the
war that *thf prma* snore or less voluntarily constricted
its own role, ana abetted fey the military, which gave the®
not only uniforms but officers* ranks and prerogatives to
90 with them, reporters went to war store as civilian
adjuncts to the Fublie Information Office than as repre-
sentstives of the public's right to know."
*jmm a*™* J; * e»aa mp*p'e'*^p*^'^ee-»*ssim'W» *e<e»i»aa lessee* im* «*» <evaawie^SB w a< ^s^*a»aWHr«s*
ship and OKI* die attempt to balance the need for secrecy
against the morale benefits to be derived from releasing
certain information* even though classifies. As early as
Labor Day* 1$43# Secretary Knox decided to widely publicise
the launching of new ships—data of obvious value to the
enemy--in order to boost the incentive of shipyard worker®.
In October 1944* the vice chief of naval operations* Vice
Admiral a. 8* Edwards, elaborated on this policy 1
It is of great importance to us to publicise the





doe* keep up . . . morale; and X am always wall aware
that news masps tha public in a mood to bask the war
effort in general and to appr^eiat* What the **avy is
doing. Mow we have to balance that against how much
benefit wa mr« ^oiny to giv* tha enemy. 27
Of course* as wa have seen* tha wraps wars removed
from practically all classified subjects toward tha ana of
tha war, whan victory waa no loader in doubt. It is
debatable* however* whether thia would hava bean dome if
tha tactical situation had suddenly reversed itself. £lmer
Davie claimed, "The attitude of the services might haws
baan very different /later in the was/ in the case* say* of
a crest naval Oleaster* especially if it had occurred in
• . . a night battle* or an air-sea battle at long range *-~
whan it was doubtful if tha enemy knew the extant of his
2ft
success. • . •"
Such speculation raises the question of whether the
Kavy* even with the spur of the merger threat and the
prodding of Secretary forreatal* would have been able to
pursue as enlightened a public relatione course as it did
in the final stages of the war if operational secrecy had
still been aa vital a determinant in the release of infor-
mation* The weight of evidence from thia etudy would seem
to indicate that it could not have* Therefore* it can be
concluded that security considerations were the major force
in shaping Wavy public relations policies throughout the
entire war.
Aside from the m^ for secrecy* the vary nature of
•Y\, j, 5 .1 :, , : . • ^ - - - - "--• ''
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in itself played * prominent role in
delaying news of naval battles. Especially early in the
war, the H»vy waa often unfairly criticised fior short"
in its releaning policies that were due in no small
thia point in a postwar editorial! % • • the
of naval warfare in the facifie made it
extresaly difficult to jt«%e losses. Thia waa particularly
w*a* saws # eft Sjussa* Sfr<s»et saw* JfciiSj, ^asssHr ,aiww-aa fwuwiea^ a&wf* s*'^»^ms»^eA,
it clouded the war picture—so far as the
concerned—for virtually the duration of the war.**1
^w ea^eas^maa1 e*ee^a j|^^^^e>^^w^^ww>^we*ss' wa ^w^p Ps^saaevsaes^ns^F ^^^waa ^SJ^aaa^wap^*ei*jr a1
the eea service developed a sophisticate and at tiajaa
highly effective public relatione progress during the war*
In thia regard, the hypothesis stated in the introductory
chapter that its efforts were primarily responsive rather
creative until circumstances dictated a m>m enli^ht-
stance toward the 4»M of the eoafiiet waa not
lately borne out by the evidence. It la true that
*sell the aavy* ware ruled out in the prewar
JT " ^ •*" ******** **W» ^».^w^w^^*WWIRWmil *m '^MVN*W* ^F*f *Ms^ «l»^^W«A* w*» US' Own*1** W*^
the public waa stressed aa the $avy*s aaln public relations
aission after hostilities began, However, the
behalf of recruiting and industrial sssjftge>« the
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other sea service information activities during th* early
and Riddle stages of the war definitely fell within the
sj^sen^kemi %# 4> m»asj^s*sm* mtIav»w a>ffni *• *W' ^* eiM*e.«e»*^p%m fls*
a
* wfw *w*» Ik wt«m^m-ei* ^n^a*^|iw^
methods became nor* overt and e«paaaiva in the last part of
the conflict under the dynamic leadership of Janes
fOrrestal and in the face of the salification menace does
not detract from the creative nature of the earlier effort a.
•till* it was not until the final phase of the war
--when the Navy entered the public relations arena in full
force and in direct competition with the other services
—
that its program produced the kind of results it desired.
The previously cited accolades from and increased coverage
in the media, the wide public and press appreciation of the
highly innovative hometown news programs, and the internal
reports of accomplishments and other in-bouse correspondence
all attest to the considerable degree of success attained
by its information efforts in the last year of the war.
Although Secretary fOrrestal and Admiral Miller
both were pessimistic at times that their intensified cam-
paign to get the Navy's story across to the American people
was "to© little and too late,** it is the author *a opinion
that the ultimate disposition of the unification plan—in
which the Department of the Havy retained not only its
separate identity but also its Marine and aviation arms-
can be attributed at least partially to the aura of good
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public mind Mcaus© this wess exploited fcy effective public
relations. The message of the navy's rolo in winning the
Pacific war was communicated "loud awl clear. w In addition*
the extensive honetown publicity given to individual coebat
achievements greatly enhanced the traditional isuftfa of the
Of courao, tha return of massive numbers of Sfavyiaen to
civilian Ufa at war's end contributed a great daal to thia
favorable climate*
Two objectivee of the soa service's long-range
public relations plana in 1945 wara not achieved, h* at
tha and of World war X, both tha Amy and savy wara
unsuccessful in their attempts to forestall postwar dis-
armament* and tha «avy failed to gain public support for
compulsory military training, a program it strongly
fostered.
Mow close did tha navy's wartime public relations
approach the Cutlip and Canter definition of tha function?
There was awch evidence that by war's and the sea service
was well-equipped and motivated to undertake "the planned
effort to Influence public opinion through socially accept-
able performance based on two-way ccesmtnicatlon, * The four
basic steps for an effective public relationa process
—
research-listening* plannlog-decision making, communication
ma^ evaluation—had been established.
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»m early ae the fall of 1940 when an analysis section was
sat tip in 0M2*s public relations branch to provide a daily
a a j^ **. ^MJb* Mfc dff ^atftl* ^^^a s^^cx^l a as *tii^^>jii ^^a» S^a^ saShs^ ica ^ :'t ^a. sa^l^a. v* aft ata^a*
aa ^a%^^w ap sfc %# ^» M^^^^^ ^*^B>a^sapaa a*> •jsjr'^asa^^ wmhnmpmw ^s^f fla^ww ^n j^ ^st^w ^^^^^^»^> ^s ^m^^h
public relatione officera. breads in newe reporting and
public opinion aefeas<fuently were aonitored throughout the
war by 0#R in coordination vita the Army and dfl.
Planning alao waa atreaaatf in tna mobilisation
staoe of bavy public ralationa* but this phase of tna
procaaa received far lass eaphasie than it should have in
oociaion-aakifi9 during tna aarly at*} jaiddie yaara of tna
war cue to a lack of tia» and paraonnal and tha rapidly
changing events, in Becesber 1$43* following a tour of tna
Baropaan theater by Sacratary Knox* datail©a plans for
canaorsnip and public ralationa handling of tna atorstsndy
invasion ware ten&uiatad it^ tha ttavy in conjunction with
tha anay and tha aritieh, Also at this tin**, tha first
long-range plana for tha postwar period began to taka shape
in om. Whan £erreetai reorganised tiavy public relations
in tha fall of 1944* primary importance was attashad to
planning with tha ieeuance of monthly policy stata*aanta
containing spacific objectives and programs*
Tha third step* communication, was probably tha
aavy'a "long-suit" in tha public ralationa process, from
tha vary beginning* aided by the eagerness of tha Media to
report tha war and cooperate in tha war effort* Q»u and tha




«slv !ws .riO %***!
atiMMB
355
aamnuntotion--tho preee, radio, magaalnsa and books, still
and notion pictures, newsreels, advertising, and art and
posters--in publicising &avy activities. Furthermore,
except for the criticism leveled at its early nans raiaasa
policies anu handling of war correapondente, tha saa
service enjoyed mostly favorable madia relatione* a report
to tha secretary of the Savy in the fail of 1944 clai&adi
ffa can, aa a result of the, ejeselleat relations
fostered by this office /&9%/, eatress the Havy's view
via civilian outlet whenever necessary* Ms have
obtained millions of dollars worth of free advertising
via radio and press and pictures which could not have
been obtained otherwise* • . . This "good will" has
bean secured in a large part aa a result of direct and
personal contact end. by fair and impartial treatment of
all media. . . .*®
Finally, the fourth phase—evaluation--*waa included
in the public relations structure when an evaluation branch
was established as part of OPft*s reooastitution in the fall
of 1944* Detailed Monthly reports of actions taken in
support of objectives were provided by all public reletions
offices In the field and nwarlssd for Secretary Horrestal
by Admirals Merrill and Miller, Additionally, om
furnished questions on subjects of concern to the Havy for
public opinion polls by George Oaliup and the national
Opinion Sasearch Center and conducted ita own content
analyses and other surveys of newspaper coverage*
The extent of the influence of the "uniformed
civilians" employed in the savy* a program during the war ia






its information offices en the premiss thst public
relations "required * certain sort of snpertise ti»t
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officers of the it##uiar Havy were unli&aly to possess. * *
The atudy ha* ihwn that reserve public relations officers
in OffU the naval districts, tloots and other coomanda
helped to pave the way for good media relations ami
provided much of tho impetus and ideaa for an effective
program. Moreover* tno Enlisted Kaval Correspondents and
collateral duty public information officers in too facific,
the majority of whom ware- naval reservists* tiara the vary
backbone of tno hometown nans system. Vat* it is striking
that throughout ths war tha positions of diraotor and
assistant director in Q&& wars filled by angular Kavy
offloors. Apparently, tho rasarvist experts war© relegated
to functional and advisory rolas and played a relatively
insignificant part in deoision~mefcing« James Stahlman,
publishar of ths Kashvillo hftjuanx, hintad at this possibil-
ity in an editorial prepared for his newspaper in January
194St *Hy old friend foul Smith has gone back in tho Urn^y.
I hops tho top-aide is smart enough to give hie leeway to
handle Kavy news from the faoiflc as it should be
The civilians at the top, however, the two war tine
Secretaries of the Kavy, exerelssd great influence on the
thrust of the navy* a information efforts—as wo have seen










* shining exaaple s£ ft basic truism for any effective
public relations policy--thos* at the highest level of jnaa~
ageswmt oust want it and support it. or it cannot succeed*
Frank Knox wanted it as much as rerrestel* but* as
has been tgtntioned* the Xattar enjoyed certain advantages
in his pursuit of the goal that Knox did not have* First
©i ail* forreetal was not as hung up ©» ths horns of tha
security dilesnta as his predecessor. He believed that
publicising events which had already occurred would not
adversely affect the »mv^ 9m future operational Moreover*
if it had bean accessary* fOrrestal was store willing and
able to successfully challenge Admiral King on seenri
matters. Of course* as we have seen* Kind's tough security
stance ha& Imnn considerably softened in the spring of 1944
by the nation's favorable strategic position. As a rasait*
a direct confrontation between the admiral and secretary on
censorship policies was averted*
Secondly, the mm&&m ejs&rgonea of the unification
issue shortly after Starrestal hocsna secretary gave him a
powerful lave* for galvanising the Havy'a military leader-
ship into action on the public relations ma& political
fronts. He was helpod in this regard by the wartiae rise
to positions of authority of naval aviators* who did not
share the public relations inhibitions of their surface and
•abnarine counterparts. Also* due to tha ailing health in







Secretary of the «avy during ftaox*s tenure- Forrestal
wfei able to assume* firm control arwS leadership of all
aspects of naval affairs* aecauee of this, be o,aicXiy
earned the respect and confidence of naval officera to a
much higher degree than that experienced by Knox*
even with thea* assets, however* fbrrestal pro&afely
would not have boon able to affect tha turnabout in navy
public relatione in the final atagea of tha war if it had
not bean for hia pergonal direction of the program and his
^kmm %»^a> £aanv ^e? css^^mr^et^s^ps* SjiS^ ^w aaama-a^aiam tiapV itL^w-m9fm ajps^^e^asno«>*»• aaaw^jjamejKa»~^^ ™*•
tudee in the eea aervica toward the function*
How much were theee attitudes truly changed? What
ware the forces behind their change? And how permanent we»
the change? Tha lent two questions are predicated on the
assumption that these wee indeed <cja* hind of Chftttgs «< a
oonaequenoe of the wartime experience* the bulk of evidence
in thia atudy eupporta thia supposition.
The very dynamice of fiorld War IZ forced tha Havy
to consider the public relatione issplicatione of this
unique conflict concurrently with ita operational aspects
from the very beginning* At first . as had been the Kavy'e
practice in the past, there warn a noticeable tendency
the military leadership in the sea aervica to leave the
me>^^eiiwm d»^eeeiie ^f s» mu# s a>arfm> «es^m a* ^^nse *i>a^ • a* was/S^^r *^e^^e*ae wsesTwtf aswrnaa wticj*^m^w w^^s*em
civilians, despite tha directive by the Chief of Ifaval








owever, the early deatands by the proas ana public Dor
faster and oore costplete ajp^^fff* m»we# the admonlah-
stents from Secretary Knox, €M2 and later the President
hlaisolft and the vital necessity for recruiting* industrial
^eoses wVMwS ss^SjJyjn#*iyOj •» Sj^es. *»isW' IflMim ateVtwa SjPpjf •fcr**a£^w*is Wssts^pat*- A.^»^^W^w*'^»
to view public relations in s different light frost tim fall
of 1942 on* Thie begrudging obligation in itself served as
the initial catalyst for attitudinal change*
But, "evolution within tan tfavy is necessarily
deliberate,* as was pointed out by a postwar study of »avy
public relations. *Xn building a snip* for instance, too
is st stafce to articulate it hurriedly. So there is
^^^^&^£^KFWF av ewev^s i^^^i^s*^^^ wfcso^poe^p es^S"^^ ^w*^eie*s*^aeaw w* ^^^i^a^^Bp 4*^0 ^b^^w aensee^ssp> ap^ wc-'^eawwiosssTBf wPmspaw
• • • *^ e^asespes^fc^epev <B* eBawe>s# aw «%^^»s,sa# Va jaFSheiiFawrS* • *ssas)ss's ess* ws*e* wssawws^s
years of the war, the sas service's enthusiasm for public
relations was restrained, to say the least—particularly
asong the operators st sas, who only occasionally wars
"bothered* by an information offleer or war correspondent.
And when these operators wars reluctantly involved in
public relations, their natural reaction often was one of
loathing toward anything not directly connected with the
fighting effort. Willis* Brinkley humorously portrayed















I've got a plan cooked up. Itext island we invade X'n
going to pat all the correspondents on one ship and all
those ?ublic lieletions legions over there on another*
than I'm going to issue secret orders to the eicipper
that will ateer the two ship© into Tokyo Bay* Where the
Jape will capture the* both a*4 he oblige* to take care
of all the correspond©nt« and ffuhlic delations oddballe
and freaks for the rent of the war. It* 11 drive the
Jape nuts, free oar hands to fight the wax and get the
^•^•m m*rer^*ea») ^*e jp^m^w«ei ^m^Mn? *a>*m^w*» w
The merger conflict in 1944 * however. sfforced a
"Missouri man's kind of proof** of the neenasity far the
function. Vincent ttavie observed.
The attitude of the officer corps of the Regular
8avy towards puhlic relations • • • bagan to change
perceptibly in the spring of 1944* The reasons for the
change* • • * ware the dawning awareness of the
political battle hetween the navy and the other
services on the reorganisation issue and the emergence
of the Havv's new secretary* Janes forrestal, as its
fighting political leader.3*
from thie point on to the ^u& of the war. aa the
Sfc4fl*wsss^e>'*w *ve^*w(*s ee^s»^e^s^e*sewefjs ^n^^yme s> s^np*ai^s WwV w^p <*»^*» seas 4mmf *%js ^m %es»? Tnss»wmsi*4si"»w
attitudinai change among the admirals toward the viability
of information activities* With the emeeptlon of Admiral
gpruance and a lew others* these »evy leadera were eager to
jump on the puhlic relations bandwagon in search of ways to
salvage the sea service's strength and separate identity in
the postwar period. Furthermore, as a direct result of the
new "reepectability" and sense of urgency attached to the
function hy the top leadership, there was a shift of opinion
all the way down the line* Also* hy this time* many Regular
navy officers had performed puhlic relations duties or
experienced interfaces with the press as briefing officers*
•.-;".'
. • v i
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censors or roommates Of correspondents. Such familiarity
with the function tended to at leaet dilute their estrange-
ment fron it. The booet to morale provided by the Hometown
news program in 1945 further served to solidify attitudinal
changes toward public relations at all levels in the navy*
Just bow "•olid" wars these change e. however?
Admiral Millar wrote to Captain Fitshusfh Imo in October
1945* "We are having tremendous numbers of requests to fill
vacancies* all of which is a healthy sign indeed, and I
hope and am sure that the fleet at last has cone to realise
that the Public Information Officer can he of use to
Id
tfeeau* Despite this note of optimism* however* there was
a predictable letdown in enthusiasm for public relations in
the navy whan the uniformed civilians began returning none)
tanities lor dramatic coverage in the hometown and national
media diminished* Whet's sore* the letdown occurred in the
face of the "heating up* of the unification controversy in
the fall of 1945.
Ray Coll, Jr.* writing In the Honolulu JstKaXlAftsx*
alerted the Savy to this situation and cautioned against
its
Curing the course of the wsr the navy grudgingly
relasjsd fro* its long-held antipathy to publicity ami
correspondents for the aost part were cordially
xmeml^fm^ and given valuable material and facts* Mi
elaborate public relations • • • service waa established
•xA the service became humanised sa well as glamorised
in the public press*
1 '•. M* i
It !• hoped that this pleasant relationship between
the H«vy and the press will not fee pemitted to die,
itiTjcliiM tn fTjawj ,,h,awfc..^i*tQ^ thii irl , .lutftsi ahftUU
It is this correspondent ' s . • • opinion that the
navy is 90103 to need a good press* in the month*, yes,
in the years to eose.**7
of the actions already described to preclude a re^ressioa
to its prewar negativiso toward public relations* It
created a apecialiaed corps of public Information officers
and maintained the coapleaent and functional objectives of
the Office of rublic Information at near wartime levels*
efcifc *1» v^RsVs^nVvs %lw m JWW » lllnW«UwH oOwv^FVP es^Kao^ii'WJt wMt W»asW S'IR'iPmM^^^"*'
Mevy Correspondent rating* and instituted a training
psograai for both information officers and enlisted
journalists* In the iamadiate postwar years* whan the
sorter issue was still on the "burner, * it even convened
special conferences on public relations tor the hensfit of
commanding officers from fleet and shore units* it also
continued the annual wartime costings of information
officers and made the public relations anaemes permanent
appendages to operation plana and orders*
All of these actions were the direct consequence of
the navy's world war XI experience with public relations*
Further evidence of the impaet of the war on the function
in the sea service is contained in a Secesfeer IMS &*&*.
oval .taatitutft.ftrftt^fyitca, article. The author* Lieutenant





years certain b^lyi-nincs hsv© Immiii Mil • • * toward
continuing a strong «»6 w*ll--balanend naval public col*
tioas policy.*** Bo cites the following indicators?
(a) a Navy public relations structure does exist in tao
Sw'Vm'w ^w»4j(* vOO ww www* w"SSr w»W 10*00 wOOwjw OIpwjf w'm^^S' ipw'OTB^^^^ wW^^^^w^^W^p
afloat ana ashore?
(b) offloor and enlisted personnel assigned to public
relations doty novo familiarised themselves with
primary elements of constont Kavy policy t
(c) too press sod other elements . • . have become
sccustensd to obtainiaa their information fromW>WJ^« M^P^pWMMirW WW ^FMf W^WWMWWWPS WwaW-wt** PWwW/^MW*W^<Hi^WW^WWWtW^WW> W**' WJiWIK
official savy sources • . • rather than frost
w*w* wt-WP'wwawVw' •m^ti^'Vaww w»>*^sm w™ #sSw*'*"wfc S»™ar S
(d) the Hovy occupies a unique pl*e* in the public mind
and consciousness* and there&re can more assily
maintain this position?
(o) many naval personnel havo contributed to national
publications and Have taken part in program*
reaching too public, thereby gaining favorable
attention for tao *avy among millions of citismns.
These positivo conditions did exist at tao oad of
tao war. nevertheless* tao *tfrlfr.»r¥fe of many senior naval
offloors toward the function regrettably relapsed to the
prewar state of disinterest* ignorance and oven antagonism.
Captain Arthur ft. Ashton* one of the original specially-
designated Wavy information officers* rsmlaiaeod la 1M?
about the difficulties encountered by this group in the
immediate postwar years
t
These pioneer PIQa wore not always regarded m bona
fide stsff officers sad in some instances they had
neither direct access to the "old man* nor a seat in the
staff meetings. Too frequently they received tao role
of a fire department official and were called to the
scene of a public affairs problem only after it was oat
of control.
There was a general inclination to refuse media
requests for information about the- Havy if even the
slightest unfavorable publicity might result* "no
ecammnt* was the formula ia some public affairs plans

for coping with the ex-ises that attracted the pr*e»«
The Havy Public Information Manual lacked authority,
and ponaand diractivea concerning PSOb often praecribed
sere doo'ts than doe for the conduct of their duties.
*
9
Vincent Bavls, in an analysis of the «pa and downs
in Vavy public relations eince World Har XX, iiat* many
example* of definite intareat and attention being paid to
the function* However, he etili oooeludea«
isotwithstanding theae avideneaa of ma increased
belief by the naval officera in the political i«por~
tanoa of a continuous and active public relatione
campaign on the liavy'a behalf, other evidence aureate
that this belief never became permanently strong nor
widespread within the officer corps* The intentional
seeking of publicity remained odious to many, and
probably moat, sea service officers* The old convic-
tion persisted that the navy's record and Ita
continuing importance to the nation would *speex fox
itself* •
. • * This attitude was the sans as it had been tradi-
tionally throughoot most of the navy* a history t selling
the navy's case to the public should not be necessary
and, in any case, it was uncomfortably political in
nature, not in accordance with the dignity of the pro*
fession* The inhibitions weirs overcome only when the
officers were so fearful for the continued existence of
the navy that this anxiety transcended the ssbeultural
restrictions* *&
The last sentence in Davis - observation would scesn
w-Sjf ei^ewoea*e*'e^r^ey «»asenvw anse^a* en^Se *#r*e»v wa»js^fc4sa^e*(jj, <&«• A*waar^g^»L %-*j^^s^cnat%a J^^ae# s> iSiii » *i»e»^ww
t ions on the part of the admirals and others in the navy
daring the latter stages of World War XX was more of en
accommodation with the dynamics of war, particularly the
merger threat, than a true "change of heart*
The author, after eight continuous yeara of
personal experience as a naval public affaire officer on






Certainly, for florae twenty years after the war. the
impaaeioned plea of Jams Forrestal to the new ensigns at
the naval Academy 4a June X$4S to "consider yourself a
purveyor of information about the »svy" was not heeded to
any significant $m*$*mm* However, it muet be stated in
closing that the present civilian and military heads of the
ssvy have instituted in the last several years an increas-
ingly enlightened public relations program that is rapidly
making inroads into the last vestiges of the silent service
tradition* It is the author's opinion that the tierId
war XX experience. Which served to institutionalise the
function i» the navy for the first tin** in its history* set
the stage for the present day climate. Although the spot-
light on Tokyo Bay has been dimmed In the intervening years,
the blackout at tearl Harbor definitely has been
** *s>«eV^snw^e*#e^n*iS'^s>mjs.s)
One to the wide scope of this thesis and consequent
peripheral treatment of many facets of Ssvy public relations
in world War XX, a number of subjects relevant to the
history of mass 7ommnTi Ications were only touched upon*
Several of these are deserving of and present interesting
opportunities for more detailed and critical investigation*
for instance, the entire area of Kavy media rela-
tione ia, in the author's opinion, fertile ground for





with th» still flodglino radio and Motion picture indus-
tries* including the newsrecl oompaniee* especially fells
into this category* But the extent of its utilization of
and liaison with the print media* and its cooperation with
commercial advertisers—a topic not dealt with at all in
the thesis—also are of special interest and importance*
In the case of the print media, a separate study on
press coverage of the navy's wartime activities would have
value not only in detailing the scops and direction of
wartime reporting but also in ©assuring the effectiveness
of the sea service's information program and* conversely*
the limitations imposed by its censorship policies* In
this regard* the views and experiences of war correspondents
assigned primarily to the Mavy would he quite illuminating
if recorded en masse. Rear Admiral Harold ©. (Kin) Millar
has maintained close liaison with many of these oorre-
apondants through an informal organisation Known as
"Upchucfeers, Unlimited. *
Referring to security restrictions on the flow of
World war tt information* ftschariah Chafes* «3r». wrote in
1947 « "X hope that a scholarly account will eventually be
given of the practical operation of military censorship
41during this war . . . . " To the best of the author's
knowledge* such a study has not been completed* Lamar
Mackay discusses military release of information policies














Offlea of War information in World War II." and the Umvf't
role in censorship has been covered in considerable detail
in this thesis. lewv«ri thin vital aspect of the ana
flpWjfcTFeVww aw or**e» %AaW j^lpWeAeWpv aV ,|iPu M#« ia ewapSvipa* Jf ^Va <ai># eowenstw
eVsswan» ap^pSyi an ewSeanAeew ^ep^een-wejii ^nwn™^Bey %*ea^js.owe#en^pTe'ne»
The navy's efforts, both overt and covert, to
cultivate favorable public. press and congressional opinion
for ita views on the Armed forces aaroar issue daring and
aftar World war XX provide a particularly faacinating araa
of atudy for future public relations resaerchere. the)
subject haa received only superficial treatsmnt im this
thesis, primarily aa the catalyst for the wsvy's public
relations ranaisaanca in tha final stagas of tna war* Zt
is dealt with in grantor depth in Vincant Davis* *&&.
ftda&ritli tohfay «m*s fsatwiu; Aw funfit Inl^y, .ftatf. t)MS. U«i»
liarau- iftfc»-.lt,aft. However, waay spaclfic details of this
interesting lobbying csapnlyn still remain to be unoovaroi
and published, A certain atoount of natarial on tna topic
is contained in sonsa IS? and 153 of tna Fhilibart
Collection and in the Jtorrestal Vapors deposited Ui tna
national Archives.
Inextricably tied in with tna pernor^related
endeavors* of course, is the strcnc influence of James
torrent*! on aavy public ralationa* Although his role in
this regard during; World War 11 is woven throughout
Chapter Five of tna thesis. his information activities on





behalf of the Kavy after tha war and during hi* tenure ae
the nation's firat Secretary of Sefeaso ara worthwhile
topics for further study* Vincent Davis, in the above
mentioned books, goes into sons detail aboat f©rrestal*s
great interest in and personal direction of public relations
While Secretary of the navy* but does not cover his period
as head of the defense Departsrent* Also. Bavis* treatment
of the subject is intertwined with many other facets of the
secretary's leadership. As has boon stated, fferrastal**
detailed attention to public relations was unique for a
s^^BrWp^e»^w www if ^s^a* ^^ae^ai a^^^ow ^p vmsjsvs a* ^wa^^w ei^j^ev ^weis^r S'^^v^mbs* ^e^ a* ^si **^^™^s^^e»
governmental agency. It is tha author's belief that his
career would be a iieat suitable and valuable aubjoct for a
oosttlntelv Indaoandant studv.
Other pertinent topics for further investigation
"^^B ^w w*a^^w ew^ww^p ws ^P^eaoies^ewe* er 1^^^^^ ep^a^^sj* ^mbjpssof ^saiaaw aPTSWeejs^^we' ^wa* %* o^fc'a^Mjea^^^^^^w
during the wax. its internal relatione activitiaa^^incltidino
the development of am ummp* «&£ other eowMiand information
publications* tha publicity on behalf of naval recruiting,
"»w" i^ea^^^e^w^w ^a^ i^a^^^.«s> ^eiiw»paa ™ ^jf ee ok sp^^^o sees' *ae# se^e^ ^p*oa ^ss^w ipp^^» sif^^^W1, ,^f <^^^^^e ™ ?w>*^e^w^sp a
and tha naval district and other field cosaninri public rela-
tions ofiicea~~«speciaxiy that of the Pacific float in the
last year of tha war*
Tha establiabBamt of tha fleet aoaotewn Stows Center




subject* deserving of special attention* Historica of the
IWTWC and the current Wavy eniiate& Journalist specialty. *
continuation of the EMC system he$i»n in world War II* have
never been written. *?et# both ere integral parts of ths
ssa service's public affairs program today*
The jftavy'e attests to publicise the activities of
oe oioo i^WpWOw se^^^opiwipw^-Ofc as *aitSflWno»rOOi8ii!Sn 't^^ee^o soo>^s''^essaflewi^sa '^•f o*ee^^ i^eM^*e^>a» ^piek «?**
of Blac* EWC* and pablie solotions offieors toward the end
of the oar* mentioned only briefly in the thesis* is
definitely worthy of additional coverage—especially in
*s»ee^£e*w \A» #* wOTt^s -enhs^WPA MM oo^Sy^ Vpe^joPen'^POSoV^W nass We>*M#e> *• wjf *>^»» .Jk^Wte-wnv^pSeW <e*^n
the military*
Finally* the World War IX public relations programs
of the Ms Marine Corps and U*S. Coast award* and the
estso 11 atonent after ths war and suaoaCjUent operations of
the wavy Office of legislative Affairs* are special topics
that shfrttl^ he considered for separate atody* sober
t
Lindsay in This* WliuT* Mis fives an overview of the Marino
ssoibat correspondent and other phases of Corps information
efforts during the war* hot his coverage is within the
context of the entire history of Marine Corps public rela-
tions and does not 90 into sufficient detail* fho author
ia not aware of any history of Coast auard public relations
ever having boon written* Yet* this service vmm quit*
active mod successful in this field during World War 11*
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contained in personal lil* of aAd». Harold a. Millar,
USM (Rat*), entitled *Capt. Xae * Pacific." Hereafter
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ballota amm mailed oat, and in the firat nook wore than
3,000 nera returned. Soma 3,190 newspaper* indicated they
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Public Relations to ulti^le addreaseee April 9, 1947, both
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Office of War Information in tfOrld war XX* * unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966* p. 416.
Hereafter cited as Maekay, *d*X»"
3
*Lt* Cadr. Stoyvesant &. Wright, US*»* "The sews-
reels, rt remarks made before a conference of naval district
public relatione officers in Washington, &«£•« «?uly 28*31,
1941, recorded in mineographed minutes of conference*
p. 122* Philibert Collection* Box 15$*
23U.8. Bevy Department. Office of the Chief of
Baval Operations* flaW r^«M, ttma/iriMp- OfKMrnMKI
5530. SA of June 1967, p. 19.
*4Adm. Ernest J. J*ing. USB, quoted in «H*t of the
Darkness** Xiaxi, May 1, 1944* p. 61.
**»ay Daniell, quoted in Lt. Cadr. u Hone Walter,
9IBI, "Public Relatione in War and Peace." ti- ft- Mmrsi
Imrtt-iif.t pgofifiadiB8»> o9tisao (1943).
26Dale Minor* **» in^^^ia* nag (jfe* york* 1970) ,
7VAdm. ft, &. Bdvards* OSB, remarks node to the
press* October 6* 1944. A mimeographed copy is contained
in Philibert Collection* Box 157.
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**Wia* "Stftyo**," 22S, quoted In Mekty. "OWI,*
4X6*
*
"statistics of Victory*'* an editorial in the Mew
*or« m**^ wtaw^ Deceofcer 10, 1545. A reprint is
contained in Philibert Collection, Box 157
«
setterandum in undated, its subject is a review of the Unvy
MSnagenwnt Engineers* survey of OPSU which strongly sug-
gests that it was written in the fail of 1944.
31Davla* Sg&ax* 2*7.
32jams &• Stahlsean, *Pr©e» the Shoulder, " an
editorial in the Masbville (Tenn.) ojinrrif» - January 30,
IMS, A reprint is contained in personal file of BAdw*
Harold S. Miller, mm (fcet.). entitled Public delations
Policies ami Directives**
33
Cwflr. James C. fihaw, IBM, ana eapt. John s.
shiproan* mm C&*t.)« The,
.
.Casm . to;jaffay. .Public xm
U.S. savy Dapartsaant, Office of Information, Washington*
D.C.. 1952, p. 41*
3SDsvia# Xaftfey* 268*
3
*L*r., Mte. Harold B. Miller, UBS, to Capt,
Pitshugh lee, OSS, O0* (Serial 90ei400R) • October 9, IMS.
Miller File—Pacific.
Stay Coll, Jr., Honolulu so^ff^^r- Qtaoted in
PUCn^rr aal latin » Mo. $. Bovesfeer 1943. p. 3. «fhe exact
date of Mr, Coil's article is not given, but it is identi-
fied as a "recent story.*
^Lt. William H. long, BS8R. -Public Eolations and
the Peacetime Mavy, w 11,1, teval instUuts tmamfi^taqMM
7itl470 (1943).
39Capt. Arthur a. Ashton, usa, navy's Senior PAD
Bsviews susy Years. w 'Hfiir'Mflr (August 1967), 11*
i0
fcavis. JLofcte* 279-283, fJh<M fn- The analysis of
Bevy public relations after World war XX is contained in
pp. 27 2-201. Phil a. Goulding, former Assistant Socretary
of Defense tor Public Affairs, hacks up Davis* contention
that the attitude of naval officers toward public relations
,
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was still comparatively negative aa lata aa the 1960s, Xn
his book, Confirm or Bany (»aw xorte, 1»?0) . Ooulding
atatest "It it was a Savy problem. • • . wa wars laas con-
fideat of being read into the picture that rapidly. . . •
tha ifavy waa not always overly anxioua to share its private
bad news avaa with tha Secretary of Defease* . • • Xt is
eiiaply a little withdrawn fron the rest of tha world and
even a little peculiar* * (p. 141).
41Seahariah Chafee* Or*,
(Chicago* 1947) , Vol. 1, p. 457*
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A WOTE Off SOURCE*
A aajor portion of the primary source dcctraents
cited in f!*e thesis wore found in the HoIon* f»hiiifcort col-
lection of materials pertaining to Mavy public relations
bofore , during nod oftor world war XX* ifit* on eye toward
its historical potential. Hiss Philibert carefully eotqpilod
this data through alnoot thirty years of continuous sorvioo
as a »avy civilian information assistant, beginning with
ths Wavy Sows Bureau in World war X and ending in 194? when
she moved with Jasses Forrestal to the Defense ©epsrtment.
The Philibert Collection was of isssinss value to
the author because it included in a single source much of
the inftMfwst Ion needed tea detail the develooMint of Raw
public relations policies, procedures and organisation.
Its contents represent a true cross-section of navy activ-
ities in ths information field, encompassing Materials of
considerable variety and scope. Many of the documents
contained in the collection—such as the OPR and Pacific
fleet public relations bulletins, minutes of the annual
information officer conferences, and personnel directories
and telephone lists—were not found elsewhere.
Officially titled "Historical Records of the Msvy
Office of Information. 1919*1951, the collection consists
379
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of six boxes numbered 153-158 in Job Order Gi~A~2740„
Xtem 10, «t the Weanington national Records Center,
Suitland, tea. The contents are not indexed in any meaning-
ful manner and are arranged only in a loose chronological
order, with the early Materials in Box 153 and the post**
World War XX data in aox 158. Access to the collection
must be obtained through the Operational Archives Branch,
ifaval History Division, Office of the Chief of naval Opera-
tions, located at the Kavy Yard in Washington, &.c,
Xn addition to the Philib*rt papers, many other
administrative files and materials sept by the Navy Office
of Public lie let ions during World War XX »xm on deposit at
the Suit land records center • These include library refer-
ence material; ftsvy department and CXSCPAC communiques and
news releases; speeches and press conferences by frank Knox
•ad James fbrrestel; data on censorship, films, radio
m*a>^^ye ewwsem a *#mi^iflBW^mn* j^s^Wif e«-'miw» sb- ^SBeme^^r ^meflww ^weBMW ^#wiwe • ee vsmp%rWi^emvFaveH^*eP M fp^ies* wpjb*
books of Kavy Pay activities* general correspondence of a
classified and unclassified natural preas clippings con-
cerning the Bevy's part in the wart source material lor the
naval administrative histories i and naval district public
relations activities. Job Order information and access to
these records also can be obtained through the Operational
Archives araneh*
Classified files of the offices of the Secretary of
the navy and Chief of Naval Operations from 1939 through
$mO fttooo** immoA*** acacia*** .%&} *• ,ui »**x
""JflftlllfMI X*W 4;
ButJU
. *. . »
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1946, catalogued under the general subjects of public
relation* and public information, mt* located at the Opera-
tional Archive* Branch itself* Unclassified files of these
two offices under frhnaie headinos are deposited st the
National Archives, War Records Rranch, 3»aval Records
Section. Also at tim Archives are unclaasified general
files of the Office of Public Relations (E*~117, Record
Group SO) and the restricted set of personal papers collected
by Jsmes fbrrestal*
The lOrrestal Facers were extremely beneficial in
helping to set the tons and spirit of the secretary's great
influence on navy public relations in the final stage of the
war. the portion of the collection relating to public
relations consists of only four bones* but contains personal
manoranda and other documents not available elsewhere*
Permission to peruse the Forrestal Papers must be granted
by the Secretary of the Savy* and they can be examined only
under close monitorinf and supervision* the point of
contact is Mra* Mildred C* Barueh, Chief of the Records and
Reference Unit of the Office of the Secretary of the Kavy.
Room 4D706 in the Pentagon.
Supplementing the Forrental Papers as the focal
point of information for the laet year of the war was the
personal Interview with Rear Admiral Harold a* (Jftin) Killer*
USH (Retired), and hie two personal files— "Public Relations
4Q0 1
,", "if.;,.
: & ' <..
Ik. (0 «fcA *** .»fXO«*««
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lettera front Admiral Milter to Captain &s* and others,
contained in the latter fil<*« were especially valuable all a
sources of specific details on the accelerated public rela-
tions campaign in the Pacific. Admiral Killer retired froat
sessww sw ^mw Jj asss s^ss^mssiweei^^^se j» *^«s^f ^sssma s^^e?,e#^^ssesp •paa»v ^(p*ssah s^ *> ^» ww sw^p^w
Relations for Pan American World Airways. Be resigned fro*
that position in the lata 1960s and is presently serving as
Vice President for Public Relatione at aofatra College,
Bes$>steed, ST. Y-
The interviews cited in the footnotea are listed in
the Bibliography, along with descriptive information on the
interviewees* ?he author gained further background data
through personal and telephonic conversations with the
following individuals! Mr* Daniel £. Kimball, who served
in the reference and research section of ©PR fro* May 1943
to the end of the war? Mrs. Harry fu Thurber, widow of Vice
Admiral Thurber, US8 (Retired), who headed the Public
Relations Branch in the Office of Maval Intelligence from
July 1940 to May 1941* Vies Admiral If. a. (Slixa) fieecher,
Jr., USH (Retired), Who served in various capacities in
092's public relations branch and in OPR from 1942-194$;
Sad Cossvander Merle Macbain, one of the first specially*
designated tfavy public Information officers in the postwar
period.
At the Library of Congress, the author screened the








Sact ion. Being a }©urnaliat who relied siore on tte»ory
rather than the written record* Knox* a collection la
limited to elevan small boxes containing miscellaneous cor-
respondence* speeches and newspaper clippinga. However* it
did torn up severs! interesting letters to friends and
colleagues which provided additional insight into his
public relations-oriented philosophy.
Also screened wars the personal paper* of Frank E«
Mason* the special assistant for public relatione to
Secretary £nox, which are located In the Mass Coos*unications
History Csnter of the Wisconsin Historical Society in
Madison* Tills collection revealed little of value to the
thesis other than the transcripts of several Knox press
conferences*
Public information sections of the unpublished war**
tine narrative histories of Jfavy conmsnds , contained in the
Havy Library in Washington aa a series entitled "United
Statea Saval Administration in World War XI, * furnished
svany details on the operations of the naval district* fleet
end other field public relations offices* A partial susntr*
script on the history of the navy's Office of Public
Relations was prepared In the last year of the war by
George Marvin, a civilian specialist in 0*R. However, an
intensive search of Wavy and other goveranent records and
numerous inquiries by the author to persons associated with
OF* and the Office of Naval History during and after the
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war have railad to uncover any part of this manuscript.
The unpublished Master » a thesis by F. Donald
Scovel, "Helm*s A D&et History of tha Development of the
Public Affairs function is th* United States »evy,
1361-1941" (University of Wisconsin, 1943) • traces tha
evolution of aavy public rslations frost its ambryonic
beginnings in colonial times to th* period immediately pre-
coding World war II* Zt includes pertinent background for
this study and provided specific data that serveo as a
natural lead-in to the start of the world War II Kavy
public relations story* i.e., the establishment of the
Office of Public Halations in May 1941.
Tha doctoral dissertation by Lamar S. Meckay,
"Domestic Operations of tha Office of War Information in
World War II* (university of Wisconsin* 196s) * covers in
considerable detail the coordination of military interaction
activities with those of OWI* Of particular value to this
thesis was Msckay's treatment of the difficulties cmi
Director Elmer Davis had with the Bevy over releasing
policies early in the war* A related FtuD« dissertation*
•the Overseas Branch of the Office of war Information* " by
Robert l* Bishop (University of Wisconsin* 1966)* deals
with American propaganda efforts overseas during the mar
and the coordination of these efforts between the 0WI maA












Berry, Robert W*, aAdm., U$W (Ret.). Telephone Interview.
March 17, 1970. Admiral Berry served mi pros*
officer in the Public Relations Branch of the
Office of Hav&X Intelligence free April 1940 to May
1941 ana held various positions ia the navy's
Office of Public Relations throughout World War XX,
Eller, 1* Jft*i KAdau* US* (Ret.)* Personal Interview*
washington, B.C., April 10* 196$. Admiral tiler
was a postwar director of Mavy Public Information
ana director of naval History when this interview
was conducted.
foxrestal, James v. Personal Papers* national Archives,
Washington, B.C. Access to this restricted set of
papers can be obtained only by permission of the
Secretary of the navy (see *A Mote on Sources,*
p. 375)
•
Knox, Prank* Personal Papers. Manuscript lection* Library
of Congress, Washington, B.C.
Macfcay, Lamar Seal, "Domestic Operations of the Office of
war Information in World War IX." unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, university of Wisconsin, l96e*
Marts, T. X. Personal Interview. Washington, fi.C*,
April le, 19#8* Miss Marts was a civilian informa-
tion assistant in the ttavy Office of Public
Relations during world War XX and served as
administrative and information aide to the Director
of Waval History at the time of this interview.
She retired from government service in January
lift*
Miller, Harold B., RAcm. , USK (Bet*). Personal Interview.
ai»w "fork, ». IT., June 18* 1963. Admiral Miller was
public relations officer for Commander in Chief,
U.S. Pacific fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, from
October 1944 to March 1945 and served *m Mavy
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Killer* Harold B.* RAd*., mn (feat.), Fereonal fiiea
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and "Cap*. L&e & Faeifie" (eee "A Bote on Source a*
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p. 375)
Fhilihert* Helena* Telephone Interview. June 13* 1963.
Miea Fhilibert served aa a civilian information
aaaiatant for tha Wavy free World War I until 1*47*
Bay* Harold Brad lay. capt. # U8JSR (Sat.), Fereonal Inter-
view. Weahington* !>»£*• anna 13* 196a. Captain
Say wee a eeeurity review officer in tha Wavy
Office of Public Relatione during World War XI.
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in tha United Btatee Wavy* l£el~mi. * Unpublianed
itaatar'a th©aia* Waiveraity of Wieconein* 1968.
Shaw. Gilbert* Lt* Cadr.* U8GG. Fereonal Interview.
Xadianapeiia* Xnd.. March 14* 1972. Coaasander Shaw
wae an tniiatod Kaval Correspondent beginning in
1946 and currently ia attaehad to tha division of
Fufclio Information* tleadquartera* U.S. Coaat Guard*
•Kith. Jay B.# Capt.* USHR. Faraonal Interview.
Indianapolis* Xnd.* May 10, 1870. Captain Bwith
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